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Despite its economic origins, the Eurozone crisis triggered an equally significant constitutional 
moment as Eurozone members and European institutions abandoned existing channels of 
intergovernmental cooperation and Community decision-making, in favour of informal ad-hoc 
means of coordination between them. The turn to executivism and informality challenged Europe’s 
constitutional settlement, forcing European legal scholarship to investigate the broader 
constitutional significance of the Eurozone crisis. Operating within this moment of reflection, the 
aim of this thesis is to investigate the constitutional implications of the Eurozone crisis and to assess 
the wider constitutional significance of this moment.  
The ways through which response measures have been decided and overseen by national and 
supranational courts is studied through the case of Cyprus. More specifically, the thesis observes 
how coordination between European institutions and Eurozone members intensified during the 
crisis, leading to the development of existing bodies of the European Union. The Eurogroup’s 
involvement in devising and implementing a bail-in resolution for the Cypriot financial crisis is 
studied more closely. After determining the constitutional implications of institutional development, 
the thesis continues to consider how national and supranational courts responded to claims brought 
before them by Cypriot depositors affected by the bail-in.  
Drawing on critical literature conceptualising the political economy of constitutionalism beyond 
the state, the thesis positions institutional development within the ongoing relationship between 
neoliberalism and European constitutional law. One of the central elements of neoliberal political 
economic thought, as identified by the thesis, is the separation and insulation of economic decision-
making from political interference – what I term as a scrutiny lacuna. By tracing the separation and 
insulation of economic decision-making in the gradual development of European constitutionalism, I 
consider the constitutional implications of institutional development and assess the exercise of 
judicial oversight during the crisis. Through the scope of a political economy of constitutionalism, I 
argue that during the crisis we can observe the creation and constitutionalisation of a scrutiny 
lacuna, thus resolving any conflict between opposing constitutional objectives operating within 
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Constitutional moments often arise during crises. The Eurozone crisis is no exception. 
Throughout its long history, the term ‘crisis’ denotes a moment of judgment and a definitive 
moment between stark alternatives.1 In Hippocratic medicine, where we trace its initial use, crisis 
denotes the moment where the patient would either live or die and this binary between two stark 
alternatives continues throughout the use of the term. It is in the exercise of judgment, the choice 
between alternatives that crises often pose constitutional moments; that is, moments in the history 
or development of a constitutional arrangement that come to define it. Despite its economic origins, 
the Eurozone crisis is one of those moments as it juxtaposed the need for implementing a set of 
economic measures against constitutional restrictions on possible courses of action. This tension 
manifests, more vividly, in how crisis response measures were decided as Eurozone members and 
European institutions abandoned existing channels of intergovernmental cooperation and 
Community decision-making in favour of informal ad-hoc means of coordination between them. The 
turn to executivism and informality challenged Europe’s constitutional settlement, forcing European 
legal scholarship to investigate the broader constitutional significance of the Eurozone crisis. 
Operating within this moment of reflection, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the constitutional 
implications of the Eurozone crisis and to assess the wider constitutional significance of this 
moment.  
The constitutional implications of the Eurozone crisis have been discussed with reference to 
many different aspects of European constitutionalism. However, this thesis takes a closer look at the 
ways through which response measures have been decided and considers the shift of institutional 
practices towards informal coordination between EU institutions, financial institutions, technocratic 
bodies of the EU and national governments. More specifically, the thesis observes how the 
Eurogroup develops as a central institution in the process of economic decision-making during the 
crisis. Despite its informal status as a forum for ministers of finance whose currency is the Euro to 
discuss matters concerning their common currency, the Eurogroup acted as the space within which 
national governments entered into negotiations with EU institutions, international financial creditors 
and other Eurozone members for the provision of financial assistance. Its statements expressed a 
common position between all actors, foreshadowing the direction and form of crisis response 
 
1 Reinhart Koselleck traces the historical use of ‘crisis’ from its genesis in Hippocratic medicine and ancient Greek politics 
through to its modern resurgence and contemporary use. See: Reinhart Koselleck, "Some Questions Concerning the 
Conceptual History of ‘Crisis’" in The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts, trans. Todd Samuel 
Presner (CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 236-247, 237; See also Reinhart Koselleck, "Crisis”, Journal of the History of 
Ideas 67, no. 2 (2006), 357-400, 358. 
 13 
measures. As the Eurogroup’s involvement in economic decision-making during the crisis increased 
and its statements outlined important policy measures, its role was disproportionate to its informal 
status. Institutional development, specifically that of the Eurogroup, gives rise to a number of 
constitutional questions, including the ability of the Eurogroup to reach legally binding decisions on 
crisis response measures; the division of competences between the EU and its Member States; and 
the exercise of ultra vires review by national and supranational courts. Therefore, the thesis is 
concerned with the ways through which crisis response measures have been decided. It considers 
the channels of decision-making employed during the crisis, investigates the development of the 
Eurogroup and accounts for judicial responses to institutional development. The constitutional 
implications arising from the Eurozone crisis are located in the joint impact of institutional 
development and judicial responses to novel channels of decision-making on Europe’s constitutional 
settlement. To achieve this, the thesis considers in depth an under-examined example of 
institutional development, that of the Eurogroup, and analyses the Eurogroup’s role in the process 
of devising crisis-response measures in the context of the Cypriot financial crisis.  
In order to examine the constitutional implications and wider significance of the Eurozone crisis, 
the thesis positions institutional development within the broader relationship between 
neoliberalism and constitutional law in the European Union. One of the main theoretical challenges 
for constitutional theory presented by the Eurozone crisis is how to conceptualise the development 
of institutional power. As the disparity between formal constitutional provisions and the exercise of 
power increases, institutional development does not only challenge the way we understand specific 
aspects of Europe’s constitution but also European constitutional settlement as a whole. Drawing on 
critical literature conceptualising the political economy of constitutionalism beyond the state, the 
thesis seeks to explain institutional development through the ongoing relationship between 
neoliberalism and constitutional law as well as highlighting the development of this relationship 
through the Eurozone crisis. 
1. The Eurozone crisis and its constitutional significance: The constitutional 
implications of institutional development 
In this section of the chapter, I consider the constitutional significance of the Eurozone crisis as 
addressed by major discussions in the field of European constitutional law and locate two major 
questions in existing literature. First, questions of constitutionality focusing on the compatibility of 
crisis response measures with existing constitutional provisions. Second, a broader constitutional 
question concerned with the effect of the Eurozone crisis on Europe’s constitution as a whole. After 
navigating through existing discussions, the section sets the focus of the thesis, indicating that what I 
 14 
am most concerned with is not the content of crisis response measures but the way they were 
decided. Hence, the section ends with an overview of existing discussions on institutional 
development and constitutional implications thereof.  
1.1. The Eurozone crisis as a constitutional moment 
The Eurozone crisis is an economic and financial phenomenon originating in the global financial 
crisis in 2008 and affected several countries sharing Europe’s common currency. A number of 
Eurozone members were affected more than others with Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and later 
Cyprus being most affected by the economic downturn. Although each state faced country-specific 
difficulties, two main factors are believed to have contributed to the economic crisis. Firstly, 
mounting public debt and the inability of governments to repay or finance existing loans and other 
economic obligations caused a deterioration in public finances.2 Secondly, banking institutions in a 
number of these countries faced collapse due to over-indebtedness.3 National governments found 
themselves in a position where they had to finance these institutions (via a bail out) in order to avoid 
the collapse of their banking system, with the effect of over-burdening public finances. The severity 
and nature of the crisis was such that it created the possibility of a sovereign default in some 
members. Given the unprecedented degree of integration, consequent of the European Monetary 
Union with the Euro as its common currency, a sovereign default in several Eurozone members put 
the viability of the whole monetary union at stake.4  
During the economic turmoil, those countries with financial or other difficulties implemented a 
series of crisis-response measures in order to improve economic conditions in their economies but 
also safeguard the viability of the common currency by avoiding sovereign default in a Eurozone 
member. In broad strokes, as a more detailed discussion follows in Chapter 3 of the thesis, crisis 
response measures addressed two main aspects of the crisis; the budgetary discipline of Eurozone 
members and the recapitalisation or restructuring of their banking sectors. To tackle sovereign debt 
issues, a number of financial institutions were created for the purposes of providing financial 
 
2 Indicatively, the percentage of debt to GDP in 2010 was at very high levels in a number of Eurozone members, including 
Greece (129% of GDP), Italy (131%), Ireland (104%). Source: Calculated from OECD, Economic Outlook (various issues), as 
cited in: Philip Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer, "Can the Euro Survive After the European Crisis?" in The Euro Crisis, eds. Philip 
Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 1-34, 6. 
3 Yiannis Kitromilides, "The Irish Tragedy”, in The Euro Crisis, eds. Philip Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 159-194; Alexander Michaelides, "Cyprus: From Boom to Bail-in”, Economic Policy 29, no. 80 (2014), 
639-689. 
4 Indicatively, in 2009 the Eurozone area experienced negative growth ranging from -5.4% to -2.1% for all four quarters of 
that year while 2012 and the first two quarters of 2013 were also characterized by negative growth. Source: Eurostat and 
www.tradingeconomics.com  
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assistance to Eurozone members.5 Budgetary discipline was addressed through the introduction of a 
new framework for fiscal surveillance by EU institutions while a series of austerity measures in a 
wide array of policy areas (including labour, health, education, pensions and welfare policy more 
generally) were implemented in those Eurozone members in receipt of financial assistance from 
European institutions through loan conditionality.6  
Much has been said about the constitutionality of these measures and whether they are in line 
with existing constitutional provisions in either the European Union Member States. An important 
strand of constitutional discussion concerns the implications of the Eurozone crisis on the Maastricht 
principles of the European economic constitution and economic governance more generally.7 The 
creation of financial institutions by Eurozone members and European institutions, such as the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), capable of providing loan facilities are said to challenge 
several constitutional provisions.8 As Chapter 3 of the thesis indicates in due course, the ESM’s 
creation challenged the division of competences between the EU and its Member States as well as 
Article 125 TFEU that prohibits a bail-out of Eurozone members by the EU or any other Eurozone 
member.9 Moreover, practices of the European Central Bank are said to exceed the Bank’s 
competence by engaging in economic policy and direct monetary funding contrary to Article 123 
TFEU.10 In addition, the introduction of a new fiscal coordination framework in combination with 
austerity measures in those countries in receipt of financial assistance challenge the fiscal 
 
5 The European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) were created at 
first instance before a more permanent mechanism, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was established. 
Furthermore, a series of six Regulations and Directives, the so-called ‘six-pack’ was introduced pursuant to Articles 121, 
126 and 136 TFEU, while an additional two Regulations, also known as the ‘two-pack’, further strengthened the EU’s 
budgetary surveillance. These Regulations and Directives are outlined in Chapter 3 of the thesis.  
6 Fritz W. Scharpf, "Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Pre-Emption of Democracy”, Zeitschrift Für Staats-Und 
Europawissenschaften (ZSE)/Journal for Comparative Government and European Policy (2011), 163-198. 
7 Christian Joerges, "Europe's Economic Constitution in Crisis and the Emergence of a New Constitutional Constellation”, 
(2012). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2179595; Paul Craig, "Economic Governance and the Euro 
Crisis: Constitutional Architecture and Constitutional Implications”, in The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary 
Constraints, eds. Maurice Adams, Federico Fabbrini and Pierre Larouche, 2014), 19-40; Kaarlo Tuori and Klaus Tuori, The 
Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Fabian Amtenbrink, "The 
Metamorphosis of European Economic and Monetary Union”, in The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law, eds. 
Anthony Arnull and Damian Chalmers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 719-756; Fabian Amtenbrink, "New 
Economic Governance in the European Union: Another Constitutional Battleground?" in Varieties of European Economic 
Law and Regulation. Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation, eds. K. Purnhagen and P. Rott, Vol. 3 (Cham: 
Springer, 2014), 207-234. 
8 Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756 
9 Tuori and Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis, 120-136. This issue is also discussed mostly with reference 
to the case of Pringle. See: Stanislas Adam and Francisco Javier Parras Mena, "The European Stability Mechanism through 
the Legal Meanderings of the Union's Constitutionalism: Comment on Pringle”, European Law Review 38, no. 6 (2013), 848-
865; Paul Craig, "Pringle: Legal Reasoning, Text, Purpose and Teleology”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law 20, no. 1 (2013), 3-11; Juliane Kokott, "Perspectives on the Role of the Advocate Generak in the Eurozone Rescue 
Decision: Advocate General Kokott on Pringle v Ireland (Seech to Judicial Press Conference of Karlsruhe, March 6, 2013)" 
Michigan Journal of International Law, March 6, 2013, 2013); Bruno de Witte and Thomas Beukers, "The Court of Justice 
Approves the Creation of the European Stability Mechanism Outside the EU Legal Order: Pringle”, Common Market Law 
Review 50, no. 3 (2013), 805-848. 
10 Tuori and Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis, 162-168. 
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independence of nation states.11 Another important constitutional parameter in relation to crisis 
response measures is the continuing erosion of fundamental or social rights as constitutionally 
enshrined social objectives and values, such as equality and citizen welfare, are continuously 
challenged.12  
Faced with a series of constitutional implications, constitutional scholarship recognised the 
broader significance of the crisis, as existing understandings of Europe’s constitution were put into 
question. Indicatively, Kaarlo and Klaus Tuori argue that the multi-layered effects of the Eurozone 
crisis in areas such as the EMU, social rights and democracy, comprise a wider mutation of the 
European constitution.13 Christian Joerges identifies the “transformation of Europe’s constitutional 
constellation”,14 while Paul Craig, Federico Fabbrini, Mark Dawson and Floris de Witte, amongst 
others, also identify a deep transformation in Europe’s overall constitutional architecture.15 As the 
crisis indicated a broader mutation of European constitutionalism, another line of inquiry attempts 
to identify the current condition of Europe’s constitution. Indicatively, European constitutionalism 
was described as executive federalism;16 a New Sovereignty with Largely Unfettered Power of Rule;17 
as executive managerialism;18 as an expertocracy19 or as authoritarian liberalism.20  
The constitutional importance of the Eurozone crisis cannot be questioned. As indicated above, 
the issues arising from the implementation of crisis response measures are not limited to the rather 
narrow question of constitutionality – that is whether specific measures go against a constitutional 
provision (such as Article 125 TFEU), arrangement (such as the division of competences outlined in 
 
11 Amtenbrink, The Metamorphosis of European Economic and Monetary Union, 719-756; Amtenbrink, New Economic 
Governance in the European Union: Another Constitutional Battleground? 207-234; Craig, Economic Governance and the 
Euro Crisis: Constitutional Architecture and Constitutional Implications, 19-40. 
12 Tuori and Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis. 
13 Ibid. See also, Kaarlo Tuori, "The Eurozone Crisis as a Constitutional Crisis”, in Polity and Crisis: Reflections on the 
European Odyssey, eds. Massimo Fichera, Sakari Hänninen and Kaarlo TuoriRoutledge, 2016), 3-40. 
14 Christian Joerges, "Europe's Economic Constitution in Crisis and the Emergence of a New Constitutional Constellation”, 
German Law Journal 15, no. 5 (2014), 985-1027. 
15 Craig, Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitutional Architecture and Constitutional Implications, 19-40; 
Federico Fabbrini, "States’ Equality v States’ Power: The Euro-Crisis, Inter-State Relations and the Paradox of Domination”, 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 17, no. 01 (2015), 3-35; Mark Dawson and Floris Witte, "Constitutional 
Balance in the EU After the Euro-Crisis”, The Modern Law Review 76, no. 5 (2013), 817-844. See also: Edoardo Chiti and 
Pedro Gustavo Teixeira, "The Constitutional Implications of the European Responses to the Financial and Public Debt 
Crisis”, Common Market Law Review 50, no. 3 (2013), 683-708; Giuseppe Martinico, "EU Crisis and Constitutional 
Mutations: A Review Article”, Revista De Estudios Políticos (Nueva Época), no. 165 (2014), 247-280; Nicole Scicluna, 
"Politicization without Democratization: How the Eurozone Crisis is Transforming EU Law and Politics”, International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 12, no. 3 (2014), 545-571. 
16 Jürgen Habermas, "The Crisis of the European Union in the Light of a Constitutionalization of International Law”, 
European Journal of International Law 23, no. 2 (2012), 335-348. 
17 Damian Chalmers, "European Restatements of Sovereignty”, LSE Legal Studies Working Paper, no. 10/2013 (2013). 
18 Christian Joerges and Maria Weimer, "A Crisis of Executive Managerialism in the EU: No Alternative?" Maastricht Faculty 
of Law Working Paper, no. 2012-7 (2012). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2190362. 
19 Fritz W. Scharpf, Political Legitimacy in a Non-Optimal Currency AreaMax-Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, 
[2013]). 
20 Michael A. Wilkinson, "The Specter of Authoritarian Liberalism: Reflections on the Constitutional Crisis of the European 
Union”, German Law Journal 14 (2013), 527-558. 
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Article 5(1) TEU) or principle (such as democracy as outlined in Article 2 TEU). Instead, the crisis 
poses a deeper, fundamental or foundational question. Whether described as an existential crisis,21 
an identity crisis22 a challenge to the fundamental principles of EU law23 or a mutation of the whole 
constitutional architecture,24 the common thread behind legal commentary is that the Eurozone 
crisis poses a serious challenge to existing constitutional provisions and, by extension, the way we 
understand European constitutionalism. Operating within this moment of reflection, the aim of this 
thesis is to investigate the constitutional implications of the Eurozone crisis and assess the wider 
constitutional significance of this moment. 
1.2. The constitutional implication of institutional development  
As indicated above, a number of discussions speaking to the content of crisis response measures 
have received considerable attention in academic literature and highlighted the constitutional 
implications of the Eurozone crisis against several aspects of European constitutionalism, including 
the European Monetary Union; social and fundamental rights; fiscal coordination and fiscal 
independence of Member States; Europe’s institutional architecture; the division of competences 
between the EU and Member States; and foundational constitutional principles. However, 
examining the rather broad spectrum of constitutional questions arising from the content of crisis 
response measures is not the task of this thesis.25 Instead, the thesis takes a closer look at another 
less well-explored parameter in the constitutional assessment of crisis response measures: the way 
they were decided. 26 Instead of asking how the content of crisis response measures may, or may 
not, be unconstitutional, the thesis considers whether institutional practices and formations 
developed in order to promote, construct and implement crisis response measures pose a challenge 
to Europe’s constitution. Therefore, several of the constitutional implications outlined above are 
considered but not with reference to the content of response measures. Constitutional implications, 
such as the EU’s institutional structure, the expansion of competences, fiscal independence of 
Member States, and the exercise of judicial review are considered with reference to the ways 
 
21 Agustín José Menéndez, "The Existential Crisis of the European Union”, German Law Journal 14, no. 5 (2013), 453-526. 
22 Amtenbrink, New Economic Governance in the European Union: Another Constitutional Battleground? 207-234, 207. 
23 Matthias Ruffert, "The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law”, Common Market Law Review 48, no. 6 (2011), 
1777-1805. 
24 Tuori and Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis. 
25 For a review of this area of law see: Martinico, EU Crisis and Constitutional Mutations: A Review Article, 247-280 
26 Carola Glinski and Christian Joerges, eds, The European Crisis and the Transformation of Transnational Governance: 
Authoritarian Managerialism Versus Democratic Governance (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014); Bruno De Witte, "Euro Crisis 
Responses and the EU Legal Order: Increased Institutional Variation Or Constitutional Mutation?" 11, no. 3 (2015), 434-
457; Uwe Puetter, The European Council and the Council: New Intergovernmentalism and Institutional Change (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014); Christopher J. Bickerton, Dermot Hodson and Uwe Puetter, "The New 
Intergovernmentalism and the Study of European Integration”, in The New Intergovernmentalism: States and 
Supranational Actors in the Post-Maastricht Era, eds. Christopher J. Bickerton, Dermot Hodson and Uwe Puetter (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 1-50; Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union in the Light of a Constitutionalization of 
International Law, 335-348; Dawson and Witte, Constitutional Balance in the EU After the Euro-Crisis, 817-844. 
 18 
through which the measures were decided. Drawing on the constitutional implications of decision-
making practices, broader questions concerning Europe’s constitutional identity are also examined.  
One of the main observations of constitutional scholars, concerning the ways in which crisis 
response measures were decided, relates to the development of existing EU institutions, the 
creation of new institutions or the configuration of new institutional formations – a phenomenon 
broadly termed as institutional development.27 As Chapter 3 of the thesis indicates, institutional 
development is linked to the promotion of a specific response to the economic challenges presented 
by the crisis. Dominant framings of the economic conditions leading to the crisis influenced, to an 
important degree, the position of European institutions and Eurozone members on what needed to 
be done. Moreover, as the viability of the whole monetary union was at stake, Eurozone members 
not in financial difficulties also engaged actively with discussions on crisis-response measures; an 
observation discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. This was partly due to the common interest 
shared between all members of the monetary union and, perhaps most importantly, due to the fact 
that other Eurozone members financed loan facilities provided to countries in distress. Therefore, 
under the urgency and severity of a continuing economic downturn that threatened the viability of 
Europe’s common currency, European institutions and Eurozone members stressed the need for a 
coordinated response; a response that would not only take into account the specific needs of one 
economy but one that would have as its overarching purpose the viability of the Euro and the 
continuing ability of creditor members to service the loan provided by debtor countries. However, in 
order to form and give effect to a ‘coordinated’ response, European institutions and members of the 
Eurozone resorted to measures and methods of decision-making outside the existing constitutional 
framework, leading to institutional development. 
 In order to give effect to what were considered appropriate crisis response measures, European 
institutions adopted a series of coordination practices that often overcame constitutional limitations 
on possible courses of action. Institutional development aimed and achieved intensified 
coordination between European institutions and Eurozone members in order to promote those 
measures deemed appropriate by dominant framings of the crisis irrespective of any constitutional 
limitations. For example, the ESM was created and capitalised by Eurozone members as an 
international organisation as constitutional limitations explicitly prohibited the bail-out of a 
Eurozone member by any European institution or Eurozone member.28 Despite the fact that 
 
27 Ibid; Chiti and Teixeira, The Constitutional Implications of the European Responses to the Financial and Public Debt Crisis, 
683-708; Tuori and Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis; De Witte, Euro Crisis Responses and the EU Legal 
Order: Increased Institutional Variation Or Constitutional Mutation? 434-457. 
28 Jonathan Tomkin, "Contradiction, Circumvention and Conceptual Gymnastics: The Impact of the Adoption of the ESM 
Treaty on the State of European Democracy”, German Law Journal 14, no. 1 (2013), 169-189. 
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European institutions, including the European Commission and European Central Bank (ECB), played 
an active role in the ESM’s operation, its positioning outside the EU legal order meant that 
coordination between institutions and Eurozone members could be conducted without the 
limitations posed by EU law.29 Debt conditionality attached to ESM loans ensured the continuing 
operation of a policy agenda set and agreed by Eurozone members and European institutions alike 
without any limitation or effective judicial review at the European level. It is during this time that 
austerity, as Chapter 3 will indicate, was promoted as a one-size-fits-all policy approach and applied 
indiscriminately through debt conditionality. Another example of intensified coordination is the 
enhanced fiscal coordination framework, as achieved by new legislative provisions, whereby the 
Commission and European Council pre-approve national budgets so as to ensure compliance with 
fiscal targets set by the European.  
At the same time, changes can be observed at the institutional level of the European Union 
where methods of coordination, deliberation and decision-making escape the constitutionally 
established channels of intergovernmental cooperation and Community decision-making. As Chiti 
and Teixeira put it, despite the long tradition of the Union’s Community and intergovernmental 
methods, “EU responses to the crisis have been worked out mainly through mechanisms minimizing 
the role and function of the Community channels and based on a specific form of coordination of 
national governments”.30 As the thesis will indicate in Chapter 3, several observations provide 
substance for this argument. For example, Dawson and de Wite indicate how the “European Council 
has increasingly assumed the role of legislative initiator, both establishing detailed proposals, and 
securing and monitoring their implementation”.31 In a similar tone, Tuori and Tuori indicate the 
European Council “with its President and the Euro Summit, both epitomizing executive, 
intergovernmental federalism par excellence, clearly took the lead in determining the measures to 
be taken to overcome the crisis”.32 Similar observations can be located beyond legal literature, with 
the work of Uwe Puetter, Christopher Bickerton and Dermot Hodson being one of the most notable 
examples. These scholars observe the continuing shift towards intergovernmentalism, with the 
Eurozone crisis being the latest example of a longer process in the dismantling of Community 
 
29 As Chapter 3 of the thesis indicates, the CJEU ruled that even when acting as agents of the ESM pursuant to the relevant 
Treaty, the Commission and ECB continue to be bound by EU Treaties. The implications of this ruling are discussed in the 
relevant chapter. See: Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P Ledra Advertising and Others v. Commission and ECB, 
EU:C:2016:701 
30 Chiti and Teixeira, The Constitutional Implications of the European Responses to the Financial and Public Debt Crisis, 683-
708, 686.  
31 Dawson and Witte, Constitutional Balance in the EU After the Euro-Crisis, 817-844, 830. 
32 Tuori and Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis, 7. 
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channels.33 Uwe Puetter’s in-depth study reveals how policy coordination between Heads of State 
(European Council) and ministers of finance (ECOFIN) occurred during the Eurozone crisis, noting the 
development of informal methods within these institutions but, also, the development of their de-
facto competence to decide on economic policy, including fiscal policy.34 However, institutional 
development and accompanying executive informality is not limited to new ways of coordination 
within existing institutions but can also be identified in new institutional configurations or the 
increasing importance of technocratic bodies of the EU. As Tuori and Tuori indicate, “rescue 
measures and mechanisms, as well as tightening fiscal discipline, have been planned and negotiated 
not only within the institutions acknowledged by the Treaties but also in, for instance, a Working 
Group of the President of the Council [and] the Working Group of the Eurogroup”.35 Part of 
institutional development, therefore, is the continuous shifting of economic deliberation to informal 
bodies or novel institutional configurations. The ‘Troika’ (European Commission, European Central 
Bank and International Monetary Fund) is a primary example of an institutional configuration 
developed during the crisis and whose role was crucial in determining the conditions under which 
financial assistance to Eurozone members was provided.36 Another example is the Eurogroup, to 
which the discussion will return in due course.37  
Existing literature on institutional development highlights how the creation of channels of 
decision-making during the crisis gives rise to several constitutional implications. Economic 
deliberation and coordination during the crisis took place outside the scope of established methods 
of cooperation or decision-making, in a highly occluded setting through informal discussions, mainly 
between national and EU executives acting on advice by the EU’s technocratic bodies.38 The first 
constitutional implication identified by a shift towards new and informal methods of European 
coordination, concerns the institutional architecture of the EU.39 The second implication observed is 
closely linked to the effects of informal cooperation and decision-making. As Chapters 3, 4 and 5 
 
33 Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter, The New Intergovernmentalism and the Study of European Integration, 1-50; Christopher 
J. Bickerton, Dermot Hodson and Uwe Puetter, "The New Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the post-
Maastricht Era”, Journal of Common Market Studies 53, no. 4 (2015), 703-722. 
34 Puetter, The European Council and the Council: New Intergovernmentalism and Institutional Change; Uwe Puetter, 
"Europe's Deliberative Intergovernmentalism: The Role of the Council and European Council in EU Economic Governance”, 
Journal of European Public Policy 19, no. 2 (2012), 161-178. 
35 Tuori and Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis, 217.  
36 Kevin Featherstone, "External Conditionality and the Debt Crisis: The ‘Troika’and Public Administration Reform in 
Greece”, Journal of European Public Policy 22, no. 3 (2015), 295-314. 
37 Paul Craig, "The Eurogroup, Power and Accountability”, European Law Journal 23, no. 3-4 (2017), 234-249. 
38 Deirdre Curtin, "Challenging Executive Dominance in European Democracy”, The Modern Law Review 77, no. 1 (2014), 1-
32; Michelle Everson, "A Technocratic Tyranny of Certainty: A Preliminary Sketch”, in Self-Constitution of European Society, 
ed. Jiří Přibáň (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 228-246. 
39 Craig, Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitutional Architecture and Constitutional Implications, 19-40; Chiti 
and Teixeira, The Constitutional Implications of the European Responses to the Financial and Public Debt Crisis, 683-708; 
Menéndez, The Existential Crisis of the European Union, 453-526. 
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indicate in more detail, instead of employing Community instruments for the legal implementation 
of decisions reached by institutions and members of the Union, political and economic power is 
employed to ensure the transposition of supranational decisions to national measures. In this 
exchange, national parliaments and governments are faced with the stark alternative of national 
bankruptcy or accepting the loan and conditions set by European creditors. National parliaments are 
requested to give legal effect to measures deliberated and concluded at the supranational level 
without any scope for manoeuvre or adjustment. The sight of emergency parliamentary proceedings 
to approve or disapprove a set of measures handed down by European institutions was anything but 
uncommon during the Eurozone crisis.40 The degree of intervention and interference with policy 
decisions in sensitive areas of national significance, from social to fiscal policy, constitutes a de-facto 
increase in the competences of the Union and an equal diminution in the fiscal sovereignty of 
Member States in receipt of financial assistance. Consequently, a third constitutional implication 
arises and concerns the disturbance of Europe’s fragile democratic settlement.41  
Any assessment of how crisis response measures challenge, alter or overcome existing 
constitutional provisions and, more importantly, broader understandings of Europe’s constitution, 
rely on an understanding of European constitutionalism prior to the crisis. Similarly, institutional 
development is discussed in the content of existing debates or understandings of Europe’s 
constitution. For example, crisis response measures are considered in the context of Europe’s 
economic constitution42 and the development of new financial institutions is considered in the 
context of the European Monetary Union’s institutional structure.43 Moreover, the involvement of 
European institutions in economic decision-making is considered in the context of existing 
understandings of Europe’s institutional formation,44 against the formal constitutional relationship 
between the EU and Member States,45 or against understandings of intergovernmental relations.46 
The wider impact of crisis response measures is often considered in relation to constitutional 
 
40 Costas Douzinas, Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis: Greece and the Future of Europe. Polity, (2013). 
41 Tuori and Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis,207-209. 
42 Joerges, Europe's Economic Constitution in Crisis and the Emergence of a New Constitutional Constellation, 985-1027; 
Christian Joerges, "Constitutionalism and the Law of European Economy”, in Beyond the Crisis: The Governance of Europe's 
Economic, Political, and Legal Transformation, eds. Mark Dawson, Henrik Enderlein and Christian Joerges (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 217-232. 
43 Craig, Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitutional Architecture and Constitutional Implications, 19-40; 
Amtenbrink, The Metamorphosis of European Economic and Monetary Union, 719-756 
44 Chiti and Teixeira, The Constitutional Implications of the European Responses to the Financial and Public Debt Crisis, 683-
708; Mark Dawson, "Opening Pandora's Box: The Crisis and the EU Institutions”, in Beyond the Crisis: The Governance of 
Europe's Economic, Political and Legal Transformation, eds. Mark Dawson, Henrik Enderlein and Christian Joerges (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 87-93. 
45 Mark Dawson, "The Legal and Political Accountability Structure of ‘Post-Crisis’ EU Economic Governance”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies 53, no. 5 (2015), 976-993. 
46 Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter, The New Intergovernmentalism and the Study of European Integration, 1-50. 
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accounts that position political notions, such as democracy or accountability, at the centre of 
Europe’s constitutional identity.47  
1.3. Institutional development, the Eurogroup and judicial review: Identifying the blind spots of 
constitutional discussions 
While the discussions outlined above are not without their merit, they fail to account for a 
constitutional relationship that has shaped European constitutionalism: that between neoliberalism 
and constitutional law. As Michelle Everson indicated, despite the illegalities observed during the 
Eurozone crisis “the more potent threat to a European rule of law now resides in the mix of the 
totalising powers of governance and economic rationality”.48 Accounting for the ongoing 
relationship between European constitutionalism and neoliberal political economic thought would 
steer the direction of constitutional discussion beyond the mere recognition of a mismatch between 
formal constitutional provisions and institutional practices or the simple acknowledgment of the 
failure of European constitutionalism to stand up to the political values which it is supposed to 
protect. Moreover, recognising the relationship between Europe’s constitution and neoliberal 
political economic thought prior to the crisis allows us to position institutional development within 
ongoing processes aiming to insulate economic decision-making from political interference. A 
central objective and contribution of this thesis is to present institutional development as an 
extension and continuation of neoliberal political economic thought already operating within 
European constitutionalism. 
Despite exhaustive discussions of institutional development with regards to the European 
Council and Council configurations, another aspect of institutional development remains, to this day, 
highly occluded. The Eurogroup is recognised by the Treaties as an informal forum of discussion for 
those ministers whose currency is the Euro but has no formal decision-making powers.49 With the 
outbreak of the financial crisis the Eurogroup gained disproportionate, to its informal status, 
significance as it brought together key stakeholders, such as Ministers of Finance, the Commission, 
the ECB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). During its planned monthly meetings, but also 
in emergency meetings, the forum not only continued to act as a meeting-place for Eurozone 
ministers, but it also actively participated in the process of deliberation and negotiation of EFSM, 
ESFSF or ESM debt conditionality. Within the Eurogroup, issues such as the terms of Memorandums 
of Understandings, loan values and repayment periods, but also assessments of economic targets 
 
47 Tuori and Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis; Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis as a Constitutional Crisis, 3-40. 
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and objectives for debtor countries were discussed and decided. Despite the increasing importance 
of the Eurogroup, no extended study on the constitutional implications of its development has been 
conducted to date,50 sustaining a blind spot in the study of institutional development and the 
constitutional implications of the Eurozone crisis. One of the aims of this thesis, is to address this 
omission and contribute towards expanding the study institutional development during the crisis to 
include the Eurogroup.  
To an extent, it is within the nature of political institutions to develop their methods and find 
new ways to exercise their power, often in ways that expand their competences. In fact, political 
scientists coined the term “interstitial institutional change”51 to describe constitutional development 
occurring between formal constitutional amendments. The role of European Courts, as described in 
the Treaties, is to ensure “that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is 
observed”. 52 According to the Treaties, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ensures 
that each institution exercises its powers “with due regard for the powers of the other institutions”53 
and in accordance with the division of powers affected by the constitutional arrangement, 
developing into a constitutional court.54 As Chapter 5 of the thesis will indicate, constitutional 
guardianship in the EU is conducted at both European and national levels, often with competing 
claims as to which court has the final say.55 As the CJEU enjoys interpretive monopoly in matters of 
EU law, the Court is tasked with ensuring that any Union action can only occur within the bounds of 
those competences transferred by Member States and according to the principles of subsidiarity56 
and proportionality.57 While national constitutional courts continue to claim a jurisdictional 
authority to hear cases that may affect national sovereignty, the exercise of judicial review by the 
CJEU and national constitutional courts ensures the constitutional arrangement and identity of both 
the European Union and its Member States.58 As several examples can be found in the jurisprudence 
of both the CJEU and national courts where the limits or practices of institutions have been 
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challenged,59 it is no surprise, that a number of claims have arisen in national and supranational 
courts to challenge the constitutionality of response measures and the ways through which they 
were decided.60  
As Chapter 3 indicates, a number of cases appeared before national and supranational courts, 
each challenging different aspects of the crisis response measures. Two broad categories of cases 
can be identified in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union.61 First, cases 
challenging conditionality measures under adjustment programs on the basis of their compatibility 
with fundamental or social rights. Second, cases challenging the legality of crisis response measures 
against existing constitutional provisions and principles, including the division of competences and 
democratic settlement achieved between the EU and its Member States. One of the central 
questions arising from institutional development observed during the crisis is how constitutional 
courts, including the Court of Justice of the European Union and national constitutional courts, 
performed their function as guardians of the constitution. Despite the wide engagement of 
commentators with some of the issues arising in crisis case-law, including the possible violation of 
existing EMU provisions or existing social and fundamental rights, little attention has been given to 
the issue of institutional development, more generally, and the Eurogroup more specifically. As 
Christian Joerges pointed out, “it is simply amazing that it has become the rule among lawyers not to 
take these issues seriously”.62 This omission is particularly true for the Eurogroup as cases 
challenging the involvement of the forum the decision-making process followed during the crisis 
remain under-discussed. This blind spot has significant effects for the assessment of institutional 
development and the constitutional implications thereof. Moreover, as institutional development is 
the most “obvious anchor in the court’s case law” for considering broader issues of constitutional 
identity,63 examining judicial responses to the Eurogroup’s development deepens our understanding 
of the broader effects of the Eurozone crisis on Europe’s constitutional identity. Therefore, in order 
examine in length the Eurogroup’s development and its constitutional importance, the thesis will 
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consider how the CJEU and national constitutional courts responded to cases challenging the 
forum’s involvement in economic decision-making during the crisis.  
2. Research Agenda and Questions 
In the backdrop of the above discussion, the thesis asks:  
How has the Eurozone crisis impacted European constitutional law and what can be learned 
through the case of Cyprus?  
• How was the political economy of European constitutionalism prior to the Eurozone crisis 
influenced by neoliberalism?  
• How have crisis response measures impacted the political economy of European 
constitutionalism? 
• What was the role of the Eurogroup in deciding a bail-in resolution for the Cypriot financial 
crisis? 
• How have constitutional courts responded to the Eurogroup’s involvement in reaching a 
bail-in resolution for the Cypriot financial crisis? 
• How is judicial review of the Eurogroup’s involvement in deciding crisis response measures 
impacting the political economy of European constitutionalism? 
2.1. The case of Cyprus: Tracing the Eurogroup’s institutional development  
The case of Cyprus provides one of the few examples where the full extent of institutional 
development and its constitutional implications can be observed. As Chapter 4 of the thesis 
discusses, during the Cypriot financial and banking crisis a novel instrument, the bail-in, was used as 
a resolution mechanism for the recapitalisation of failing banks. As opposed to a bail-out, when the 
banking institutions are recapitalised through external funding, a bail-in uses the bank’s own 
resources to recapitalise the institution. What this means, effectively, is that the bank’s creditors 
contribute towards recapitalisation, including depositors. Cypriot depositors affected by the bail-in 
challenged this resolution mechanism before national and supranational as an act ultra vires of the 
European Union. In doing so, the influence of European institutions to devise and promote the bail-
in resolution was brought before the Courts. As a result, the case of Cyprus provides a first-class 
example of reviewing the Eurogroup’s development and considering how Courts respond to the 
tendency of Union institutions to expand their competences during the crisis. 
Despite the constitutional significance of the Cypriot case, legal commentary is limited in how 
this case is discussed. While significant contributions have been made to the literature by a number 
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of EU scholars, these remain limited to discussing the impact of crisis response measures on social 
and fundamental rights.64 The bibliographical shortcomings identified above apply equally in the 
case of Cyprus, as the Eurogroup’s role in deciding a bail-in resolution has not been adequately 
discussed by legal scholarship. This blind spot extends to the ways through which legal scholarship 
discusses the constitutional significance of cases challenging the Eurogroup’s role in deciding a bail-
in resolution. The cumulative effect of these two shortcomings is to undermine the constitutional 
significance of the case of Cyprus and institutional development more generally. By conducting an 
in-depth study of the Eurogroup’s role in deciding crisis response measures in the case of Cyprus, the 
thesis contributes to extending understandings of institutional development during the crisis and 
associated constitutional implications, including the EU’s institutional architecture; the increase of 
EU competences and equal diminution in the fiscal sovereignty of Member States in receipt of 
financial assistance; and the disturbance of Europe’s fragile democratic settlement.65 Furthermore, 
the case of Cyprus acts as a paradigm through which to consider the wider constitutional 
significance of the Eurozone crisis through the operation of constitutional review in instances of 
institutional development.  
2.2. A note on methods 
In order to investigate the Eurogroup’s institutional development through the case of Cyprus, 
Chapter 4 conducts an in-depth study of how a bail-in resolution was reached between the 
government of Cyprus, Eurozone members, European institutions and the IMF. This endeavour is 
faced with a methodological obstacle from the very outset, as meetings are conducted behind 
closed doors with no official minutes being released and no transparency as to what goes on within 
the forum. Despite the release of Eurogroup Statements at the end of each meeting, these 
documents contain no information concerning the process of deliberation. Usually, Eurogroup 
Statements outline policy decisions and, as Chapter 5 indicates, are phrased carefully so as to avoid 
the assumption of responsibility for any decision by the forum. Given the highly occluded setting of 
Eurogroup meetings, the thesis draws upon a range of sources in order to determine the 
Eurogroup’s role in economic decision-making during the crisis. These sources include existing 
economic and political analysis of the negotiation procedure, public statements from Eurogroup 
participants, a leaked ECB document, and Eurogroup Statements on Cyprus. I also conduct a textual 
analysis of two plenary sessions in the Cypriot House of Representatives in order to determine the 
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role of national bodies in reaching a bail-in resolution. By combining these sources, the thesis draws 
conclusions about the role of the Eurogroup in devising and promoting a bail-in resolution for the 
case of Cyprus and the forum’s broader role in economic decision-making during the crisis. Chapters 
5 and 6 continue with an in-depth study of judicial responses to cases brought before national and 
supranational courts by Cypriot depositors affected by crisis response measures. Through a close 
reading of the judgments delivered by the CJEU and Supreme Court of Cyprus, I consider the 
constitutional implications of judicial review.  
3. Positioning the thesis: Toward a political economy of constitutionalism 
In order to examine the constitutional implications and wider significance of the Eurozone crisis, 
the thesis positions institutional development within the broader relationship between 
neoliberalism and constitutional law in the European Union. In the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis 
significant attempts have been made to examine the relationship between economic measures 
adopted during the crisis and the economic rationality underlying them.66 While European 
constitutional lawyers may have disregarded to a significant extent the relationship between 
political economy and constitutionalism, notable efforts have been made recently to bridge this 
gap.67 By positioning the constitutional implications of crisis response measures within renewed 
discussions about the relationship between neoliberalism and European constitutional law, the 
thesis approaches the question of institutional development through the lens of the political 
economy of constitutionalism. Therefore, in this section of the chapter I aim to outline the central 
characteristic of a political economy of constitutionalism as an approach to the study of 
constitutional law.  
3.1 A political economy of constitutionalism: Origins and directions 
A political economy of constitutionalism is positioned within the broader tradition of critical 
theory. As Robert Cox notes, the distinctive characteristic of critical theory is its refusal to “take 
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institutions and social power relations for granted but call them into question”.68 Understood in this 
way, critical theory is an approach to how one analyses social power and structures. It stands in 
opposition to an approach that “takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power 
relationships and institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action”,69 
works within this given framework and finds solutions to particular problems in order to improve 
existing institutions. Hence the aim of critical theory is not to improve existing institutions and social 
relations but to consider the “conditions for their radical transformation”.70 As a critical endeavour, 
a study in the political economy of constitutionalism aims in revealing how a social order structured 
through constitutional law came about in order to radically change it.  
As a critical approach, the political economy of constitutionalism is influenced by the Marxist 
tradition. One of the main influences of Marxist thought on the political economy of 
constitutionalism is the positioning and study of constitutional law within a broader set of social and 
economic relations. Marxist thought has, more often than not, treated law as “an ideological 
buttress to material realities”.71 According to this view, law is nothing but the reflection of the 
capitalist mode of production. The operation of law, determined by the material conditions of 
production, is directed towards the sustenance and regulation of capitalist economic and social 
relations.72 The reductionist account of law is reflected in Marxist interactions with constitutional 
law and is exemplified in the work of Ferdinand Lassalle.73 As Christodoulidis and Goldoni explain, 
Lassalle identifies two types of constitutions: the formal and material.74 Firstly, the material 
constitution reflects the set of real relations among social forces and is conditioned by the material 
forces of production as these are found in the economy. It is, therefore, pre-legal and pre-political. 
Secondly, the formal constitution which is a mere reflection and codification of already existing 
relations of power – a juridification of relations among social forces. Although Lassalle does not 
reject the idea of the constitution as a higher law he rejects any political or juridical origins of the 
formal constitution.75 Accordingly, the formal constitution is “the fundamental law proclaimed in a 
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country which disciplines the organization of public rights in that nation”76 and also the site and 
articulation of underlying relations of power. Summarising Lassalle’s argument, Christodoulidis and 
Goldoni indicate that the “constitution of society is represented as independent from the formal 
constitutional order, and that the latter simply codifies ex-post an underlying relation of forces”.77 A 
further example of over-determinism can be located in Charles Beard’s ‘An Economic Interpretation 
of the Constitution of the United States’. Beard’s analysis of the American constitution focuses on 
the economic interests driving the constitutional settlement. However, in doing so, Beard analyses 
constitutional developments as the “direct reflection of already established economic relations”.78 
More recently, Tim Di Muzio’s essay ‘Toward a Genealogy of the New Constitutionalism’ reflects a 
similar tendency to read constitutional law as the direct reflection of economic relations and 
interests.79  
The limitations of a reductionist view of law are outlined by Christodoulidis and Goldoni. At first, 
the view of law as a “surface phenomenon reflecting, or at best sanctioning, the deeper dynamic of 
the capitalist organisation of production” undercuts “the mobilisation of law in the direction of a 
critique of capitalism”.80 In an attempt to retrieve from Marxism “a critical understanding of law”,81 
Christodoulidis and Goldoni draw on the writings of Engles and Althusser82 to point out that 
economic factors are not wholly determinant of social relations but operate alongside other forms, 
such as law, in a process of co-production or co-constitution. As a result, the legal form is believed to 
be relatively autonomous from social or economic conditions. Along the same line, O’Connell points 
out that “in this context law, state and rights are elements of the complex set of social relations 
which contribute to the reproduction of capitalism, and not just epiphenomenal reflections of the 
material base”.83 Contemporary Marxist understandings of law increasingly recognise the partial 
autonomy of law in such a way that law and social relations are understood to be in a relationship of 
mutual co-production.84 It is within these renewed attempts to retrieve a critical understanding of 
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law from Marxism that the political economy of constitutionalism, as an approach to the study of 
constitutional relations, emerges.  
By positioning constitutional law within capitalist social relations, the political economy of 
constitutionalism offers an insight into the intersection between two sets of relationships. On the 
one hand, constitutional law comprises the body of legal rules related to the structure, distribution 
and legitimate use of governmental power. The specific relationship studied by constitutional law, 
therefore, is that between law and polity. On the other hand, political economy captures the 
relationship between polity and economics and considers the role of politics in economic outcomes. 
The study of the political economy of constitutionalism operates at intersection between these two 
sets of relationships and is an “invitation to conceive the constitutional order as deeply intertwined 
with social production and reproduction”.85 A central proposition of this approach is that the market 
is not a natural phenomenon but rests on the material conditions created, in part, through law. 86 In 
other words, the framework within which the economy operates and the conditions under which 
producers and consumers may establish their relationships are partly constituted through law. This 
is true even for those types of markets that are considered to be free of state intervention. Even a 
free market requires a stable political environment to operate in and, most importantly, a state that 
establishes and guarantees the freedom of the market. Hence, state institutions, “both in their 
absence and in their presence”,87 operate to establish, maintain and regulate economic activity 
within a market. Accordingly, the question posed is “not whether but how law and politics shape 
market activities.”88 To say that constitutional law and political economy examine the intersection of 
constitutional law, politics and economic activity is to ask how constitutional law in its presence or 
absence determines the conditions within which economic activity takes place. Therefore, this 
approach focuses on how constitutional instruments create a framework for the economy to 
operate and how social, political or economic conditions influence the development or 
interpretation of those rules.  
As an approach to the study of constitutional law, the political economy of constitutionalism 
allows us to examine the constitutional order beyond its formal articulation (what appears on the 
surface) and as a body of rules underlined by a material constitution. 89 Without reverting to the 
deterministic position of earlier Marxist thought, as indicated above, the political economy of 
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constitutionalism acknowledges that constitutional law is intertwined with social, economic or 
political conditions and is, therefore, an expression of those conditions. As Owen Parker pointed out, 
the traditions of constructivist, critical and post-structuralist thought note how “a set of ideas - 
described variously as intersubjective understandings, historical structures or rationalities of 
government - may play a significant role in the manifestation of economic and political structural 
realities”.90 Cox expressed the same belief in simpler words by arguing that “theory is always for 
someone and for some purpose”;91 or, as pointed out by John Maynard Keynes, theories are not 
neutral:“[T]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when 
they are wrong are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little 
else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are 
usually slaves of some defunct economist.”92 All of the above quotes indicate a continuous 
conversation between political economic thought and constitutional law.  
Of particular interest to this thesis, is the way through which formal constitutional rules give 
expression to economic ideas or principles. How, in other words, the material aspect of a 
constitution is influenced by social, political or economic conditions and, more specifically, theories 
about how the state should be structured, how government should be conducted, how the market 
should or should not be regulated. The political economy of constitutionalism, as an approach to the 
study of constitutional law, allows us to examine how these theories are reflected and consolidated 
through constitutional law.93 Therefore, the intersection between political economy and 
constitutionalism studied by this thesis, is located at the exchange between political economic 
thought and constitutional law in both its formal and material level.  
At this point a new term enters in the discussion: neoliberalism. Neoliberalism escapes rigid 
definitions mostly due to the versatility of neoliberal practices. In general terms, though, 
neoliberalism is a set of economic beliefs concerning the conditions under which markets should 
operate, their relationship to the state and how governance should be exercised beyond the 
economy. It is for these reasons that the term is said to describe “the new political, economic, and 
social arrangements within society that emphasize market relations, re-tasking the role of the state, 
and individual responsibility. Most scholars tend to agree that neoliberalism is broadly defined as the 
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extension of competitive markets into all areas of life, including the economy, politics, and society”.94 
Therefore, neoliberalism is not only a set of political economic ideas but, also, a set of political 
economic practices that give effect to the neoliberal vision. As the term describes the new political, 
economic, and social arrangements within contemporary society, the thesis considers the 
intersection between neoliberalism, as the dominant political economic discourse of our times, and 
constitutional law.  
Therefore, the thesis adopts the political economy of constitutionalism as an approach to the 
study of constitutional law in order to consider the implications of the Eurozone crisis on Europe’s 
constitution. This approach positions the development of constitutional rules within capitalist social 
relations and considers how social, political or economic conditions influence the development or 
interpretation of those rules. This allows us to see beyond formal constitutional rules and recognise 
the material aspect of the constitution; specifically, the set of ideas that operate to give shape to 
economic and political structural realities through constitutional law. However, a political economy 
of constitutionalism as developed more recently, does not fall back on a deterministic understanding 
of constitutional law. Instead, it recognises that constitutional law may reflect and consolidate 
political economic thought, but it does “not necessarily do so”;95 there is space for constitutional law 
to express something other than neoliberal rationality.  
4. The creation and constitutionalisation of a scrutiny lacuna: Chapters overview 
Chapter 1 – The political economy of constitutionalism beyond the state: Tracing the relationship 
between neoliberalism and constitutional law. 
The aim of this chapter is to identify how neoliberalism takes effect through the operation of 
constitutional law. More specifically, the chapter is concerned with the creation and operation of 
economic institutions beyond the state, what constitutional scholarship identifies as 
constitutionalism beyond the state, and its relationship to neoliberal political economic thought. The 
main claim of this chapter is that constitutional law gives effect to the neoliberal political economic 
objective of separating and insulating economic decision-making from political interference; what I 
identify as the creation of a scrutiny lacuna. Three steps are taken to establish this claim. First, the 
chapter considers the intellectual history of neoliberalism in order to identify the main elements of 
neoliberal political economic thought. Second, the chapter examines how constitutional law beyond 
the state is employed as a medium through which neoliberal political economy takes effect. Third, 
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the role of judicial review is considered as a further parameter to the relationship between 
neoliberalism and constitutional law. Through these steps, the chapter identifies the main elements 
in the relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law.  
Chapter 2 – European constitutionalism as a space for constitutional conflict. 
This chapter sets out to consider the relationship between neoliberalism and European 
constitutionalism prior to the Eurozone crisis. More specifically, the chapter considers how central 
elements of neoliberal political economic thought, as identified in Chapter 1, find expression in 
European constitutional law. However, the chapter also identifies the operation of constitutional 
objectives that are in direct conflict with neoliberalism. What the chapter argues, therefore, is that 
prior to the Eurozone crisis, European constitutionalism was as a space for constitutional conflict 
between neoliberal and opposing ideas, objectives and practices. This conflict is traced through 
three different sites of analysis: theories of European constitutionalism; the institutional structure of 
the European Union; and the exercise of judicial review by the ECJ. In each of these sites of analysis, 
I identify how constitutional law reflects and consolidates neoliberal political economic thought 
while also acting as a vehicle for articulating other constitutional objectives that come into conflict 
with neoliberalism. It is for this reason that the chapter suggests an understanding of European 
constitutionalism prior to the Eurozone crisis as a space whereby multiple constitutional objectives 
operate and, by extension, come into conflict with each other.  
Chapter 3 – The constitutional implications of crisis response measures: The creation and 
constitutionalisation of a scrutiny lacuna  
In this chapter, I consider the constitutional implications of the Eurozone crisis and the broader 
significance of this moment for European constitutionalism. To achieve this, the chapter focuses on 
how crisis response measures have been decided. It starts by examining how dominant framings of 
the crisis influenced both the policy approach adopted by EU institutions and the ways through 
which measures were decided. It continues to consider the constitutional implications of developing 
new channels for decision-making and ends with an overview of how the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) dealt with the consequent constitutional implications identified in earlier in 
the chapter. I argue that the intensification of coordination between European institutions and 
Eurozone members leads to an intensification of insulation afforded to economic decision-making. 
As a result, the chapter identifies the creation of a scrutiny lacuna within European 
constitutionalism. Further, it is argued that judicial responses to the constitutional implications of 
intensified coordination operate to provide legal validation to the scrutiny lacuna, leading to its 
constitutionalisation. For these reasons, the chapter concludes that the Eurozone crisis presents a 
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clear neoliberal moment where the separation and insulation of economic decision-making takes 
precedence over all other constitutional objectives, dissolving in this way any constitutional conflict 
operating within European constitutionalism prior to the crisis.  
Chapter 4 – How the Eurogroup shaped crisis response measures in Cyprus: A case of institutional 
development 
In this chapter, I consider how the Eurogroup was transformed from an informal forum for 
discussion to a deliberation and decision-making body during the Eurozone crisis. Drawing on the 
example of Cyprus, the chapter examines the Eurogroup’s development and considers in detail its 
role in the process of devising crisis response measures. Moreover, the relationship between 
Eurogroup Statements outlining a bail-in resolution and national measures giving effect to the bail-
in, is considered through a close reading of two plenary sessions of the Cypriot house of 
Representatives. The chapter argues that the Eurogroup acts as a decision-making body by 
deliberating about, and deciding on, appropriate economic measures to be adopted by Eurozone 
members in need of financial assistance. The chapter also argues that the Cypriot House of 
Representatives was faced with a fait accompli and that its role was limited to translating the policy 
decisions contained in the Eurogroup statement to legal provisions at the national level. By 
acknowledging the role of the Eurogroup as a decision-making body, the chapter contributes 
towards a better understanding of the scrutiny lacuna and the ways through which economic 
decision-making is insulated from political interference, mainly from the national level. This 
contribution extends our understanding of the relationship between neoliberalism and European 
constitutionalism at the institutional level.  
Chapter 5 – Cypriot depositors before the European Court of Justice: Constitutionalising the 
scrutiny lacuna 
In this chapter I consider whether, and how, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
exercised judicial overview in response to the development of a scrutiny lacuna during. The 
questions I raise here rely heavily on observations and conclusions put forward in previous chapters, 
specifically Chapters 3 and 4. Together, those chapters highlight how increasing coordination 
between EU institutions and Eurozone members increases the degree of insulation afforded to 
economic decision-making at the supranational level to the degree that a scrutiny lacuna is created. 
Constitutionally, the creation of a scrutiny lacuna translates to an increase of EU competences, the 
alteration of both the EU and Member States’ constitutions and a shift in the democratic settlement 
between EU and Member States. Through a close reading of cases brought before the CJEU by 
Cypriot depositors, I consider the exercise of ultra vires review by the Court. The central claim of this 
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chapter is that by exercising a light touch of review, the CJEU refused to intervene in informal 
methods of coordination thus providing legal validity to constitutional changes effected by 
institutional development – what I term as the constitutionalisation of a scrutiny lacuna. Ultimately, 
I identify how the exercise of judicial review operates as yet another insulating instrument and argue 
that the ECJ limits the reach of its own jurisdiction in a way that severely undermines the exercise of 
ultra vires review in the European Union. 
Chapter 6 – Constitutionalising the scrutiny lacuna at the national level: The case of Christodoulou 
This chapter considers the extent to which the Supreme Court of Cyprus exercised ultra vires 
review in light of institutional development during the crisis and whether its approach further 
constitutionalises the scrutiny lacuna. By conducting a close reading of cases brought before the 
Supreme Court of Cyprus by depositors affected by the bail-in, the chapter indicates how the Court 
foreclosed the possibility of constitutional review at the national level by ruling the case of 
Christodoulou96 as inadmissible despite the considerable scope for constitutional review afforded to 
it. Drawing on the legal analysis conducted throughout the chapter, I argue that the Court’s 
approach is an act of self-limitation and provides further legal validity to the scrutiny lacuna. As a 
result, the scope and effectiveness of constitutional review both in Cyprus and in the EU is further 
reduced.  
Conclusions 
The contributions of this thesis can be broken down to four main arguments. First, the thesis 
contributes to the study of institutional development during the crisis. By tracing the intensification 
of coordination between European institutions and Eurozone members, the thesis identifies how 
institutional development leads to intensified insulation of economic decision-making and the 
creation of a scrutiny lacuna. Second, the thesis offers a further contribution to the study of 
institutional development by indicating how judicial responses to institutional development operate 
to provide legal validation to institutional practices adopted during the crisis, constitutionalising in 
this way a scrutiny lacuna. Third, the thesis develops theoretical considerations concerning the 
relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law, specifically, how judicial review can 
complement institutional practices that enhance the insulation of economic decision-making from 
political interference. Fourth, the thesis contributes to broader discussions on the constitutional 
 
96 Myrto Christodoulou v. Central Bank of Cyprus (and other consolidated cases), (2013), Case No. 551/2013, Supreme 
Court Judgment of 07/06/2013. 
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implications of the Eurozone crisis by arguing that European constitutionalism is no longer a space 
for constitutional conflict. 
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Chapter 1 – The Political Economy of Constitutionalism Beyond the 
State: Tracing the relationship between neoliberalism and 
constitutional law  
The aim of this chapter is to identify how neoliberalism takes effect through the operation of 
constitutional law. More specifically, the chapter is concerned with the creation and operation of 
economic institutions beyond the state, what constitutional scholarship identifies as 
constitutionalism beyond the state, and its relationship to neoliberal political economic thought. As 
indicated in the introduction of the thesis, the political economy of constitutionalism focuses on how 
constitutional instruments create a framework for the economy to operate and how social, political 
or economic conditions influence the development or interpretation of those rules. Critical literature 
indicates how neoliberalism, as a body of political economic thought, plays a “significant role in the 
manifestation of economic and political structural realities”.1 In other words, there is a strong 
connection between neoliberalism, as a discourse promulgating the “extension of competitive 
markets into all areas of life” and the “new political, economic, and social arrangements within 
society that emphasize market relations, re-tasking the role of the state, and individual 
responsibility”.2 The political economy of constitutionalism considers the role of constitutional law in 
giving effect to neoliberal discourse – how the new political, economic and social arrangements, 
influenced by neoliberalism, take effect through the operation of constitutional law. In order to 
identify this relationship, the chapter brings together four different strands of critical thought.  
First, the chapter draws on philosophical and historical examinations of neoliberalism to identify 
the central political economic objectives put forward by neoliberal thought. Second, drawing on 
sociological and historical accounts, I identify the relationship between neoliberalism and economic 
globalization in order to indicate the influences of neoliberal political economic thought on 
economic globalization. Third, the work of political economist Stephen Gill is considered in order to 
identify how constitutional instruments are employed by institutions beyond the state. Lastly, the 
chapter draws on the work of Wendy Brown in order to identify a further parameter to the 
relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law. Drawing on these, often unconnected, 
lines of critical inquiry the relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law is identified in 
three separate sites of analysis: the intellectual history of neoliberalism; the institutional structures 
 
1 Owen Parker, "Challenging ‘New Constitutionalism’ in the EU: French Resistance, ‘social Europe’ and ‘soft’ Governance”, 
New Political Economy 13, no. 4 (2008), 397-417, 397. 
2 Simon Springer, Kean Birch and Julie MacLeavy, "An Introduction to Neoliberalism”, in Handbook of Neoliberalism, eds. 
Simon Springer, Kean Birch and Julie MacLeavy (London: Routledge, 2016), 2. 
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established beyond the state and their practices; and, finally, the operation of judicial review. Based 
on these three different sites of analysis, the chapter proceeds in three steps.  
In the first section, I draw upon the intellectual heritage of neoliberalism to identify the main 
elements of neoliberal political economic thought. I indicate that as an individualistic philosophy, 
neoliberalism elevates the market to a central institution of social ordering. Contrary to early 
conceptualisations of neoliberal ideas about the state, I draw on recent developments to show that 
neoliberal political economy rests on the idea of sustaining a specific kind of state; one that creates 
and protects the conditions for the free operation of market forces. By considering this body of 
neoliberal thought, the section isolates the main aim of neoliberal political economy: to separate the 
market from politics so as to insulate economic decision-making from the influence of political, or 
other irrational, interference. Hence, this section argues that neoliberalism aims to create a scrutiny 
lacuna3 within which economic decision-making can enjoy a significant degree of insulation from 
political interference that could distort the market. The role of constitutional law is identified in the 
creation of an institutional framework that is capable of sustaining the separation and insulation of 
economic decision-making from political interference. Section two of the chapter considers in more 
detail the intersection between neoliberalism and constitutional law beyond the state. While the 
first section of this chapter considered this intersection in broader terms, the second section 
proceeds to consider how institutions developed beyond the state employ constitutional 
instruments to separate the economy from politics and insulate economic decision-making from 
irrational political interference. This section is based on two theoretical propositions put forward by 
critical theory concerning the operation of neoliberalism in global economic governance. Firstly, that 
neoliberal political economic thought is realised though the creation of global institutions and, 
secondly, that economic institutions beyond the state employ constitutional instruments to 
reproduce a neoliberal restructuring of states.4 The section points out that the challenge faced by 
critical constitutional thought is to recognise the role of constitutional law in constituting a global 
political economy where the reconfiguration of legal authority sectorally and functionally 
contributes towards the division between politics and the economy and insulates economic 
decision-making from irrational interference. It then continues to consider how critical political 
economists tackle the above question. Finally, section three of the chapter draws on the work of 
 
3 I first encountered the term ‘scrutiny lacuna’ during my stay at Erasmus School of Law as a Visiting Research Fellow. Due 
credit must be given to Alessandra Arcuri and Florin Coman Kund for using the term in their research agenda. The use of 
the term in this thesis, including its definition, theorisation and constitutional relevance in relation to the Eurozone crisis, 
remain my own.  
4 Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2018); Stephen Gill and A. Claire Cutler, New Constitutionalism and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014). 
 39 
Wendy Brown in order to highlight yet another parameter to the relationship between neoliberalism 
and constitutional law: that between judicial review and neoliberal political economic thought.  
The chapter argues that the relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law is guided 
by the political economic objective of separating and insulating economic decision-making from 
political interference; what I identify as the creation of a scrutiny lacuna. The role of constitutional 
law, or if you wish the point of intersection between neoliberalism and constitutional law, is 
identified along four observations. First, that the development of institutions beyond the state on a 
sectoral and functional basis is in itself a way of separating economic matters from political or 
democratic contestation and interference. Second, that constitutional law locks in neoliberal 
discourse as constitutions can be used to ensure certain economic conditions. Third, that 
constitutional law can insulate institutions from political interference, either through the division of 
power amongst state institutions or through affording institutions independence. Finally, the 
relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law as identified by the above observations is 
complemented by the operation of judicial.  
1. Neoliberal political economy and the insulation of economic decision-making from 
political interference 
Neoliberalism is a term that escapes rigid definitions mostly due to the versatility of neoliberal 
practices. In general terms, though, neoliberalism is a set of economic beliefs concerning the 
conditions under which markets should operate, their relationship to the state and how governance 
should be exercised in a number of sectors beyond the economy. It is for these reasons that the 
term is said to describe “the new political, economic, and social arrangements within society that 
emphasize market relations, re-tasking the role of the state, and individual responsibility. Most 
scholars tend to agree that neoliberalism is broadly defined as the extension of competitive markets 
into all areas of life, including the economy, politics, and society”.5 While broad definitions of 
neoliberalism successfully capture the wide application or effects of neoliberal thought and 
practices, it is necessary to consider how neoliberalism operates in specific areas of social life. For 
this reason, this section takes a closer look at neoliberal political economy – the relationship 
between market and state as this is put forward by neoliberal thinkers. In doing so, the section 
draws a link between individual freedom, as the main philosophical commitment of neoliberalism, 
market freedom, as the mechanism through which to achieve individual freedom, and the state.  
 
5 Springer, Birch and MacLeavy, An Introduction to Neoliberalism, 2. 
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This exercise aims to draw out the main elements of neoliberal political economy. It will be 
argued that neoliberal political economy is centred around the idea of a strong state constituting the 
market but, also, protecting the market from any irrational intervention. To achieve this, 
neoliberalism seeks to separate the market from politics in order to create a protective barrier 
between the free operation of market forces and what is perceived to be irrational political 
interference. Since neoliberals consider democratic decision-making to be one of the main forms of 
irrational intervention in the economy, the section indicates how neoliberal political economy sets 
out to insulate, as far as possible, the market from democratic intervention. 
1.1. Individual freedom and the free market: the neoliberal telos.  
While market freedom may appear as the central philosophical commitment of neoliberalism, 
individual freedom is in fact the ultimate telos of neoliberal thought. Milton Friedman, a leading 
figure in the development of neoliberal thought, makes this explicit by accepting that neoliberals 
take freedom of the individual “as our ultimate goal in judging social arrangements”.6 Market 
freedom is not a secondary commitment but rather the only means of achieving the ultimate virtue 
of individual freedom.7 As Friedman points out, the lineage of liberal thought focuses “on economic 
freedom as a means toward political freedom”,8 indicating in this way the centrality of market 
freedom in achieving individual freedom. 9  
The link between capitalism and individual freedom is established in two lines of argument.10 
Firstly, Friedman observes that individual freedom depends, to a degree, on political freedom. 
Through a historical analysis, Friedman draws a connection between the rise of capitalist 
institutions, including the free market, and political freedom. His argument is, briefly, that 
humankind has managed to overcome its typical state of tyranny, servitude and misery only when 
competitive capitalism, mercantilism and the free market gained dominance11. This leads Friedman 
to the conclusion that “history suggests only that capitalism is a necessary condition for political 
freedom”.12 Beyond historical indications, Friedman also attempts to establish a logical connection 
 
6 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 40th Anniversary Edition ed. (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 
2009), 11.  
7 Philip Mirowski, "Postface: Defining Neoliberalism”, in The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought 
Collective, with a New Preface, eds. Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2015), 417-455, 437. 
8 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 11. 
9 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 7. 
10 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 
11 Bob Jessop, "Capitalism and Democracy: The Best Possible Political Shell?" in Power and the State, ed. Gary Littlejohn 
(London: Croom Helm, 1978), 10-51. 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Bob_Jessop3/publication/312017345_Capitalism_and_Democracy_The_Best_Possi
ble_Political_Shell/links/5883a76a92851c21ff44aabb/Capitalism-and-Democracy-The-Best-Possible-Political-Shell.pdf. 
12 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 10. 
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between capitalism and individual freedom and insists on a clear demarcation between the political 
and economic spheres. Neoliberal theory argues that when this division exists “economic power can 
be used to prevent the abuse of political power; political power can be used to counteract market 
failures”.13 Within these conditions, competitive capitalism can “expand in a crisis-free manner 
through the smooth operation of market forces and, in addition, dispersed economic power will help 
to block the abuse of political power”.14 In a similar tone, Friedman establishes the link between 
economic and political freedom by arguing that: “the kind of economic organisation that provides 
economic freedom directly, namely, competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom 
because it separates economic power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset 
the other”.15 Consequently, individual freedom cannot be achieved without a free market. 16  
It is no surprise, therefore, that neoliberal thought could go as far as arguing that institutions 
such as the state or even society could or should be replaced by the market as “the primary 
mechanism for producing, promoting, and preserving social order”.17 This means that neoliberal 
thought “entails both positive assumptions (i.e. the market is more efficient than other institutions) 
and normative assumptions (i.e. the market should replace other institutions because it is both more 
efficient and liberating)”.18 In essence, neoliberals give primacy to the belief that “the social good 
will be maximized by maximizing the reach and frequency of market transactions”19 leading to the 
conclusion that the market and its rationality should be extended to cover a range of human 
activity.20 By appreciating the centrality of individual freedom as the key philosophical commitment 
of neoliberalism, we also begin to appreciate why neoliberal thought is focused on establishing a 
free market but also on disseminating market rationality across all areas of social life, including 
constitutional law.  
1.2. Restructuring the state in search for a scrutiny lacuna: The role of constitutional law  
Neoliberal thought elevates the market into a central institution in organising social life. Despite 
consensus as to the centrality of the market in achieving individual freedom, the various schools, 
operating under the broader umbrella of neoliberalism, do not reach a consensus as to what 
precisely the market is, or should be. However, Mirowski identifies Hayek’s position as the dominant 
 
13 Bob Jessop, "Finance-Dominated Accumulation and Post-Democratic Capitalism”, in Institutions and Economic 
Development After the Financial Crisis, eds. Sebastiano Fadda and Pasquale Tridico (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 83-105, 
84.  
14 Ibid, 84.  
15 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 9. 
16 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 7. 
17 Springer, Birch and MacLeavy, An Introduction to Neoliberalism, 3. 
18 Ibid, 3. 
19 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 3. 
20 Ibid, 3.  
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framing of the market.21 Hayek considers the market as “an information processor” analogous to the 
human brain but with far greater capabilities and capacities.22 As the optimal information processor, 
the market has the capacity to reach the best level of efficiency when left to operate according to its 
own forces. Consequently, neoliberal thought is committed towards sustaining the free operation of 
market forces. Contrary to common perception, though, neoliberalism does not entail a return of 
classical liberal economic thought, also known as lasseiz-faire economics.23 The starting point of 
neoliberalism is that the free market does not come about naturally but must be constructed. As 
Morowski points out, neoliberal thought seeks to activate both “political effort and organization” 
towards the direction of creating and sustaining a stable free market society.24 Consequently, 
Foucault noted, neoliberalism can be understood as a “call to vigilance, to activism, to perpetual 
interventions”25 – political, legal or social interventions – in order to create and guarantee the 
neoliberal vision of how a market, but also society more generally, should be structured. It is in the 
attempt to give the market a given structure that neoliberalism and constitutional law interact. 
However, before considering the intersection between neoliberal political economic thought and 
constitutional law, it is important to outline the main elements of neoliberal political economy.  
Neoliberal political economy – the relationship between state and market – is a consequence of 
the kind of market neoliberals wish to see. The first neoliberal mantra concerning the relationship 
between the state and the market is that of separation and non-intervention. This is based on two 
main arguments. The first is directly related to the perception of the market as the perfect 
information processor. According to Hayek’s position, originally expressed as a critique of 
socialism,26 each economic actor possesses relevant information that no central authority, whether 
the state or any other institution, may possess or process. Only the price system, Hayek continued, 
can be considered as a “feasible way in which the information possessed by each can be pooled and 
translated into an efficient schedule of economic outputs”.27 In addition to the inability of the state 
to second-guess market signals, the second justification for non-intervention is that state institutions 
are susceptible to other considerations leading to inefficient or crisis-causing decisions. As Streeck 
points out, neoliberal thought is “obsessed with the figure of the opportunistic or myopic, in any 
 
21 Mirowski, Postface: Defining Neoliberalism, 417-455, 434-35. 
22 Ibid, 435. 
23 Jedediah Purdy and David Singh Grewal, "Law and Neoliberalism”, Law & Contemporary Problems 77 (2014), 1-23, 1. 
24 Mirowski, Postface: Defining Neoliberalism, 417-455, 434. 
25 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1978-1979, trans. Graham Burchell 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 137. 
26 Richard A. Posner, "Hayek, the Law, and Cognition”, New York University Journal of Law & Liberty 1 (2005), 147-166, 147. 
See also, Friedrich A. Von Hayek, "Economics and Knowledge”, Economica 4, no. 13 (1937), 33-54. ; Friedrich August Hayek, 
"The use of Knowledge in Society”, The American Economic Review 35, no. 4 (1945), 519-530. 
27 Von Hayek, Economics and Knowledge, 33-54; Posner, Hayek, the Law, and Cognition, 147-166, 147; See also, Mirowski, 
Postface: Defining Neoliberalism, 417-455, 435. 
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event irresponsible, politician who caters to an economically uneducated electorate by fiddling with 
otherwise efficient markets and thereby preventing them from achieving equilibrium”.28 Similarly, 
Harvey points out that neoliberals will often argue that “powerful interest groups will inevitably 
distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit”.29 
Consequently, neoliberal theory advocates the “disembedding of the market from state and other 
forms of institutional regulation in the name of the free market”.30 Grewal and Purdy term this as a 
defensive use of power directed towards the preservation of existing market relations. 31  
While neoliberals fiercely argue for the separation of the market from political interference, they 
also recognise that a market is not a natural phenomenon but, instead, a construct. Iain Bruff 
indicates that neoliberal agenda “from the beginning has been less interested in giving free reign to 
markets than in engineering and managing the markets that it wishes to see”.32 As a construct, and 
not a natural state, the economy must be “organized by law and political institutions, and requires 
political intervention and orchestration”.33 Consequently, the neoliberal vision relies on state 
intervention – mainly through legal provisions in the form of constitutional instruments, policy or 
regulations – to create and sustain the right conditions for the market. Both the separation of 
politics (state) from the economy (market) and also market conditions are achieved through the 
construction of legal frameworks, including a constitutional framework.  
While the above position may seem paradoxical, recent advancements in the understanding of 
neoliberal political economy indicate that the co-existence of a neoliberal mantra of non-
intervention and an active state through which neoliberal policies are channelled, are an integral 
part of neoliberal economic political philosophy. In an attempt to better capture the relationship 
between market and state in neoliberalism, Grewal and Purdy argue that:  
“the opposition between ‘market’ and ‘state’ as conventionally posed is nonsensical. What the 
neoliberal position advances is not a claim of ‘market against state’ or even simply a push for 
‘more market, less state,’ but rather a call for a particular kind of state”.34  
 
28 Wolfgang Streeck, "The Crisis in Context: Democratic Capitalism and its Contradictions”, MPIfG Discussion Papers, no. 
11/15 (2011), 3. 
29 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 2. 
30 Ian Bruff, "Neoliberalism and Authoritarianism”, in Handbook of Neoliberalism, eds. Simon Springer, Kean Birch and Julie 
MacLeavy (New York and London: Routledge, 2016), 107-117, 109. 
31 Purdy and Grewal, Law and Neoliberalism, 1-23, 5. 
32 Bruff, Neoliberalism and Authoritarianism, 107-117, 107. Emphasis in original. 
33 Wendy Brown, Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2009), 41. 
34 Purdy and Grewal, Law and Neoliberalism, 1-23, 8. 
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Hayek, himself, provides adequate evidence for this conclusion. The “political institutions prevailing 
in the West”, Hayek argued, “produce a drift in [the direction of destroying the market]”.35 It is not 
socialism, or any other “deliberate attempts of the various kinds of collectivists to replace the 
market economy by a planned system” that threaten the market – it is the very institutional 
framework prevailing in the West during the post-war period. The inevitable destruction of the 
market can “be halted or prevented only by changing this institution”36 – the institution of the state. 
Consequently, Peck and Tickell indicate that “only rhetorically does neoliberalism mean ‘less state;’ 
in reality, it entails a thoroughgoing reorganisation of governmental systems and state-economy 
relations”.37 In a similar note, Bruff notes that neoliberalism should not be viewed as hostile to the 
state but to specific state practices.38 In other words, neoliberals do not target the state as such but 
institutional formations enabling state practices that go against the market. Hence, the first element 
of neoliberal political economic thought, as identified above, is that of separation of the economy 
from political interference in order to limit, as much as possible, irrational interventions in the 
economy by state institutions.  
The second element of neoliberal political economic thought identified is that of insulation. The 
political system capable of housing neoliberalism has no name and democracy is by no means a sine 
qua non of neoliberal political economy. On the contrary, democracy understood as “governance by 
majority rule is seen as a potential threat to individual rights and constitutional liberties”.39 
Considering the centrality of individual freedom in neoliberal thought and the purported inability of 
the state to ensure market efficiency – hence the perfect conditions for ensuring individual freedom 
– it is no surprise that democracy is the primary target of neoliberal restructuring. To put it in 
different words, in neoliberal political economy, the impact of popular democratic decision-making 
should be restricted. Hayek was explicit about this: “the root of all evil” he argued, “is the unlimited 
power of the legislature in modern democracies”.40 More recently, Slobodian also highlighted that 
neoliberal thought considers democracy as “a potential threat to the functioning of the market 
order. Therefore, safeguards against the disruptive capacity of democracy are necessary.”41 
Moroswick clarifies that while neoliberals endorse democracy, as an appropriate state framework, 
popular participation is kept “relatively impotent, so that citizen initiatives rarely change much of 
 
35 Friedrich August Hayek, "Economic Freedom and Representative Government”, Institute of Economic Affairs, no. Fourth 
Wincott Memorial Lecture, Occasional Papers no. 39 (1973), 9. 
36 Ibid, 9. For further commentary, see: Bruff, Neoliberalism and Authoritarianism, 107-117, 109. 
37 Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, "Conceptualizing Neoliberalism, Thinking Thatcherism”, in Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban 
Frontiers, eds. Helga Leitner, Jamie Peck and Eric Sheppard (New York: Guilford Press, 2007), 26-50, 33.  
38 Bruff, Neoliberalism and Authoritarianism, 107-117, 109. 
39 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 65. 
40 Hayek, Economic Freedom and Representative Government, 9. 
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anything (‘constrained’ democracy instead of the allegedly existing ‘unconstrained democracy’)”.42 
Given the hostility of neoliberalism to democratic decision-making, Bruff concludes that: 
“the conditions of neoliberal order are not realized through the unleashing of market forces 
alone, as per neoliberal rhetoric...instead, we should see the state as a permanent and necessary 
part of neoliberal ideology, institutional and practice. For it is state-directed coercion insulated 
from democratic pressures that is central to the creation and maintenance of a politico-economic 
order which actively defends itself against impulses towards greater equality and 
democratization”43.  
Therefore, the second element of neoliberal political economy identified is the insulation of a 
market from democratic interference. The idea of separation, identified above, is reframed into a 
direct and explicit aversion towards democratic decision-making in order to avoid irrational 
interference in the market. Insulation of economic decision-making is, therefore, a form of 
separation of politics from the economy focused on the restriction of institutions in decision-making, 
such as democratic or mass participation institutions, or the insulation of institutions, as for example 
central banks (explored later in this chapter), from interference and contestation. Both the 
separation of politics from the economy and insulation of economic decision-making from 
interference creates a ring fence around institutions and, most importantly, around neoliberal 
rationality. As a result, neoliberal political economic thought proposes the creation of an insulated 
space for institutions to operate – what I identify as a scrutiny lacuna.  
As the discussion above indicates, neoliberal political economy does not target the state, as a 
governmental entity, but certain state practices – mainly state intervention in economic matters. For 
this reason, the two main elements of neoliberal political economic thought identified to this point 
are the separation of politics from the economy and the insulation of economic decision-making 
from political interference, specifically from democratic bodies. Combined, these elements 
contribute to the creation of a scrutiny lacuna. Both of these elements are achieved through the 
reorganisation and restructuring of the state. Hence, one of the central issues addressed by 
neoliberal political economy is how the state can constitute the market but at the same time ensure 
non-interference. In ‘The Road to Serfdom’, Hayek indicates how this is possible. Given Hayek’s 
belief that state intervention creates a degree of uncertainty that is catastrophic for the individual, 
he argues that it is of outmost importance for the purposes of certainty and planning to be able to 
foresee the actions of a state. Towards this end, Hayek supports a system of government that is 
 
42 Mirowski, Postface: Defining Neoliberalism, 417-455, 436. 
43 Bruff, Neoliberalism and Authoritarianism, 107-117, 109-110. Emphasis in original.  
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structured around the rule of law. Indicatively, Hayek argues that a state should “in all its actions 
[be] bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with 
fair certainty how the authorities will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan 
one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge”.44 Drawing from the above extract found in 
one of Hayek’s central texts, a clear picture concerning the role of the state within neoliberal 
political economic thought can be extracted. In simple words, a state should operate to safeguard 
individual freedom – the ability to act without interference by the state in pursuit of private interest. 
It is in the creation of the above conditions that neoliberal political economic thought and 
constitutional law intersect 
In order to create the conditions under which an individual may pursue their private interests 
with certainty, security and predictability, the state must operate under the rule of law, where rule 
of law means the exercise of power through, and within, a generic system of rules that is predictable 
and prevents any irrational interference with market forces. Consequently, legal rules are, in effect, 
a positive “instrument of production, helping people to predict the behaviour of those with whom 
they must collaborate”.45 Examples of accepted state intervention include the establishment of 
conditions favourable to the market, such as the recognition of strong property rights or, as the 
chapter will indicate in due course, the establishment of independent central banks. Governmental 
practices, such as state intervention, that go against individual freedom must be curtailed while 
governmental practices that enhance individual freedom, such as the existence of a legal framework 
that protects private property, are considered necessary.  
Although no explicit mention is made of constitutional law as a means to achieving a neoliberal 
political economy, references to the role of law in ensuring the proper function of the state are 
indicative of its constitutive role. For example, Milton Friedman argued that government in a “free 
society”46 should:  
“maintain law and order, define property rights, serve as a means whereby we could modify 
property rights and other rules of the economic game, adjudicate disputes about the 
interpretation of the rules, enforce contracts, promote competition, provide a monetary frame-
work engaged in activities to counter technical monopolies and to overcome neighbourhood 
effects widely regarded as sufficiently important to justify government intervention”.47 
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Friedman’s remark is important as it outlines the kind of governmental activities that neoliberals 
consider acceptable and, more importantly, the central role of constitutional law in promoting and 
realising the relationship between state and market envisaged by neoliberals. By entrenching 
various aspects of the market, from property rights to competition and monetary objectives, 
through constitutional instruments, neoliberals actively seek to embed and protect economic 
principles into the fabric of a governmental structure; to constitutionalises, in other words, 
neoliberalism. As neoliberals seek to “redefine the shape and functions of the state”48 in such a way 
so as to support the kind of market they wish to see, constitutional law acts as a process through 
which the state is restructured according to the neoliberal vision.  
Drawing on the above discussion, the main elements of neoliberal political economy can be 
identified. The section outlined how the quest for individual freedom, as the main philosophical 
commitment of neoliberalism, elevates the market to a central social institution. Viewed as the 
optimal information processor and the only institution capable of promoting individual freedom, 
neoliberal political economic though argues that the market should be left to operate according to 
its own devices and forces. Given the centrality of the market, as a social institution, the section 
proceeded to identify the separation of politics from the economy and insulation of economic 
decision-making from irrational interference as two central elements in neoliberal political economic 
thought. Together these two elements of neoliberal political economic thought indicate that 
neoliberalism seeks to carve out an insulated space for economic decision-making, what the chapter 
identifies as a scrutiny lacuna. The intersection between neoliberalism and constitutional law is 
located in in the process of creating and sustaining the conditions for the separation of politics from 
the economy and insulation of economic decision-making from irrational interference. The 
remainder of this chapter continues to further consider the intersection between neoliberalism and 
constitutional law in constitutional formations beyond the state.  
2. Neoliberalism and the new constitutionalism: How constitutional law separates and 
insulates the economy from political interference. 
The aim of this section is to consider how the main elements of a neoliberal political economy – 
the separation of politics from the economy and the insulation of market forces from interference, 
including democratic decision-making – are achieved through constitutional law beyond the state. In 
other words, how constitutional law beyond the state is employed as a medium through which 
neoliberal political economy takes effect. To achieve this, the chapter turns its attention to the 
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parallel development of a global neoliberal political economy and international institutions beyond 
the state. Drawing on insights from critical literature, I identify the connection between neoliberal 
political economic thought and economic globalisation; more specifically, how institutions created 
beyond the state insulate economic decision-making from political interference. The section 
continues to consider the intersection between institutions beyond the state, constitutional law and 
the process of insulating economic decision-making from political interference through the work of 
Stephen Gill.  
2.1. Constitutionalism beyond the state and the separation of politics from the economy  
As critical political economists indicated, the development of economic globalisation in the 
aftermath of the cold war has a distinctly neoliberal flair. 49 While it is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to survey the rich body of work indicating the links between neoliberalism and global 
political economy, it is important to note how international, transnational or supranational 
institutions and agreements act as neoliberal “processes of economic integration beyond state 
borders” that forward a “worldwide market revolution” structured around neoliberal market 
principles.50 Examples include the European Economic Communities (EEC), predecessor of the 
European Union, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
World Bank (WB) or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). More recently, Quinn 
Slobodian shows how the development of the above institutions sits comfortably with the 
intellectual heritage and tradition of neoliberalism. Slobodian draws on two previously unconnected 
strands of scholarship – on one hand, the intellectual history of neoliberalism as developed by 
mainly by historians and, on the other, work conducted by social scientists. While the intellectual 
history of neoliberalism draws out its philosophical commitment to a structured market free of 
irrational interference, social scientists indicate how neoliberal practices operate to “insulate market 
actors from democratic pressures in a series of institutions from the IMF and the World Bank to port 
authorities and central banks worldwide”.51 Drawing on both strands of scholarship, Slobodian 
argues that “the neoliberal project focused on designing institutions – not to liberate markets but to 
encase them, to inoculate capitalism against the threat of democracy, to create a framework to 
contain often irrational human behaviour, and to reorder the world”.52 Slobodian’s work draws 
together the central elements of neoliberal political economic thought, as outlined above, and the 
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ways through which these ideas take material effect in the operation of institutions beyond the 
state. What we learn from existing literature in a variety of fields (including critical studies of 
economic globalisation, critical international political economy, political science, sociology and 
history) is that neoliberal theorisations of the state and market take effect in processes of economic 
globalisation, including the creation of economic or financial institutions, agreements, and political 
formations beyond the state. The creation of these institutions, therefore, contributes towards the 
separation of politics from the economy and insulates economic decision-making from political 
interference, including democratic interference.   
The creation and operation of institutions beyond the state gives rise to a new constitutional 
problématique. As Saskia Sassen observes, the development of such institutions signals the 
transferring of decision-making for specific sectors or functions of the economy, such as trade, 
outside the domain of nation-states.53 With the creation of institutions beyond the state, legal 
authority is transferred beyond the national sphere on a sectoral and functional basis. Sectoral, in 
this instance, refers to a particular sector of the economy – for example, monetary policy, 
agriculture, the environment or education.54 Functional claims to legal authority are not limited to 
one specific sector but in terms of “cross-sectoral policy objectives”.55 For constitutional scholarship, 
critical or otherwise, the challenge posed by the sectoral and functional reconfiguration of economic 
decision-making is to conceptualised constitutional concepts in the face of a paradigm shift pushing 
constitutionalism beyond the nation-state and towards a globalised and increasingly interconnected 
world.56  
Some attempts to conceptualise the sectoral and functional transferring of authority to 
international, transnational or supranational institutions are limited at describing a system of 
institutional checks and balances beyond the state that resembled those constitutional structures 
found within nation states.57 However, the challenges posed by constitutionalism beyond the state 
are increasingly recognised. Neil Walker, for example, points out how economic globalisation signals 
“the emergence of polities whose posited boundaries are not (or not merely) territorial, but also 
sectoral or functional. That is to say, claims to ultimate legal authority are no longer limited to (state) 
 
53 Saskia Sassen, A Sociology of Globalisation (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), 5. 
54 Bruno de Witte and Gráinne de Búrca, "The Delimitation of Powers between the EU and its Member States”, in 
Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union, eds. Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 201-222, 214. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Gavin W. Anderson, "Beyond ‘Constitutionalism Beyond the State’”, Journal of Law and Society 39, no. 3 (2012), 359-383. 
57 Anne Peters, "Global Constitutionalism”, in The Encyclopedia of Political Thought, ed. Michael T. GibbonsJohn Wiley & 
Sons, Ltd, 2015), 1484-1487; "Global Constitutionalism”, Max Plank Institute,, accessed 18 August, 2017, 
http://www.mpil.de/en/pub/research/areas/public-international-law/global-constitutionalism.cfm; Anne Peters, 
"Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures”, Leiden 
Journal of International Law 19, no. 3 (2006), 579-610. 
 50 
claims to comprehensive jurisdiction over a particular territory, but now also embrace sectorally and 
functionally limited claims, whether such claims are also territorially limited, as in the EU, or global, 
as in the WTO.”58 While Walker may recognise the sectoral and functional reconfiguration of legal 
authority, his work remains within the boundaries of liberal thought, much like the majority of 
constitutional theory beyond the state.59 As a result, the central propositions of liberal thought, 
including formal individual autonomy, abstract equality before the law, participation through 
representation and most importantly the division between politics and the economy, are 
reproduced through these discussions.60  
For critical scholarship, the challenge posed by constitutionalism beyond the state is not how to 
reconceptualise modern constitutional concepts in order to capture and describe a global 
constitutional order but to capture the intertwined relationship between constitutional law and 
aspects of a neoliberal political economic order. Part of this inquiry is to capture the role of 
constitutional law in the process of insulating economic decision-making from political interference 
through the creation of institutions beyond the state. Similar inquiries have been developed in 
international law. David Kennedy, amongst other international lawyers,61 indicate how today’s 
problems are best understood by “thinking of politics and economics as intertwined projects and 
close collaborators in the distribution of political authority and economic reward”.62 While Kennedy 
recognises the need to study the intersection between constitutional law and political economy, 
another strand of critical international law provides useful insights in the way that constitutionalism 
beyond the state and its relationship to neoliberalism can be understood. Third World Approaches 
to International Law (TWAIL) indicate how economic globalisation acted as a way of recolonization 
for those non-European states and peoples that gained independence after the second world war. 
As Chimni observed, international financial institutions or agreements undermine “the autonomy of 
third world States” as they are deprived of “the authority to undertake the task of redistribution of 
incomes and resources [due to the] relocation of sovereign economic powers in international trade 
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and financial institutions”.63 It is precisely this process of severing authority to decide on economic 
matters that constitutional scholarship seeks to theorise. The challenge, therefore, is to recognise 
the role of constitutional law in constituting a global political economy where the reconfiguration of 
legal authority sectorally and functionally contributes towards the division between politics and the 
economy and insulates economic decision-making from irrational interference.  
2.2. Constitutionalism beyond the state: locking-in neoliberalism and insulating economic decision-
making from political interference.  
As the link between neoliberalism and institutions beyond the state has been established above, 
the aim of this section of the chapter is to identify the role of constitutional law in the process of 
insulation of economic decision-making from political interference. The work of political economist 
Stephen Gill provides useful insights in outlining the points of intersection between neoliberalism, 
institutions beyond the state and constitutional law. As a critical political economist rooted in the 
Gramscian tradition, Gill traces changes in the discursive formation of global political economy and 
identifies how social relations are transformed in their structure and language so that they are 
“conditioned by the long-term commodity logic of capital”.64 Neoliberalism, for Gill, is both a 
concept of political economy and a set of social practices.65 As a concept, neoliberalism provides the 
“discourse of global governance”.66 As a set of social practices, neoliberalism is identified in “laws, 
rules, regulations, policies and institutions”67 that reflect neoliberal ideas such as “market efficiency, 
discipline and confidence, and policy credibility and consistency, viewed from the standpoint of both 
the ideology of sound money”68 are used in order to regulate economic and social relations. Gill 
identifies the manifestation of neoliberalism, as a concept, in social practices including legal 
instruments and continues to identify the effects of employing legally binding instruments as a 
means of creating and sustaining a neoliberal market.  
The intersection between neoliberalism, both as a concept and as a set of social practices, is 
termed by Gill as the new constitutionalism and it too is understood as a concept “as well as a mode 
of law and regulation”.69 As a concept, new constitutionalism “forms the political-juridical 
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counterpart”70 to neoliberal discourse. As a mode of law and regulation, new constitutionalism 
achieves the “reformulation and redefinition of the public sphere and rules for economic policy, 
according to orthodox market-monetarist postulates in macroeconomics (fiscal and monetary policy) 
and microeconomics (e.g. trade, labour market and industrial policy)”.71 In this regard, law performs 
a disciplining function; it ensures, in other words, the prevalence of neoliberal logic and continuing 
adherence of governments to this logic.72 However, new constitutionalism is not restricted to 
constitutional law. Instead it involves “many political-legal elements and regulatory mechanisms, 
encompassing hard and soft law that have developed unevenly across space and time.”73 Due to its 
rather broad scope new constitutionalism refers to a “combination of various sets of processes”74 
and employs a rather unitary understanding of law; there is no distinction between the many 
instruments considered by new constitutionalism. Moreover, Gill’s new constitutionalism is criticised 
as adopting a deterministic approach to law. As Parker notes, “governing technologies such as the 
law might contribute to the promotion or practical realisation of neoliberal rationalities, they will 
not necessarily do so”.75 Despite its shortcomings as a conceptual instrument, Gill’s work on new 
constitutionalism captures effectively the intersections between neoliberalism, institutions beyond 
the state and constitutional law.  
The first observation identified by Gill is that of separation and insulation of economic decision-
making from political interference at the national level. One of the examples used by Gill to establish 
this argument is the provision of financial assistance to nation-states by these institutions as it is 
accompanied by certain conditions, also termed as loan conditionality. Debt conditionality is 
precisely what the term suggests – the provision of debt subject to certain conditions. Introducing 
loan conditionality is a way of forcing through neoliberal reforms in many contested policy areas 
including labour law; property rights; competition law; capital mobility; foreign direct investment; 
tax reform; banking, financial or bankruptcy regulation; and the privatisation of national resources.76 
By withholding parts of the loan, the IMF and World Bank monitor the progress of debtor counties 
 
70 Ibid, 6. 
71 Stephen Gill, "New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy”, Global Change, Peace & Security 
10, no. 1 (1998), 23-38, 30. 
72 Gill and Cutler, New Constitutionalism and World Order, 315. 
73 Gill and Cutler, New Constitutionalism and World Order: General Introduction, 1-21, 6. 
74 Ibid, 7. 
75 Parker, Challenging ‘New Constitutionalism’ in the EU: French Resistance, ‘social Europe’ and ‘soft’ Governance, 397-417, 
401. Emphasis in original.  
76 Gill, New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy, 23-38, 26; Scott Greer, "Structural 
Adjustment Comes to Europe: Lessons for the Eurozone from the Conditionality Debates”, Global Social Policy 14, no. 1 
(2014), 51-71, 53; Sarah L. Babb and Bruce G. Carruthers, "Conditionality: Forms, Function, and History”, Annual Review of 
Law and Social Science 4 (2008), 13-29, 16; Devesh Kapur and Richard Webb, "Governance-Related Conditionalities of the 
International Financial Institutions”, G-24 Discussion Paper Series, no. 6 (2000). 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/pogdsmdpbg24d6.en.pdf. 
 53 
against the conditions set and release parts of the payment according to the successful introduction 
and enforcement of conditionality.77 Through legal instruments, such as conditionality, Gill identifies 
the locking in of neoliberal policies. One of the insights provided by new constitutionalism, 
therefore, is that the locking in of neoliberal policies consolidates the separation of politics from the 
economy and the insulation of economic decision-making from political interference. Neoliberal 
policies conceived and developed within international institutions are then applied by nation-states, 
often through a relationship of domination, with the effect of limiting the policy approaches 
available to these states. Hence, the severance of economic authority from the national sphere 
separates economic decision-making from political or democratic contestation. For the purposes of 
our discussion, new constitutionalism showcases how the development of institutions on a sectoral 
and functional basis is in itself is a way of separating economic matters from political or democratic 
contestation and interference and continues to exemplify the use of legal instruments in achieving 
this.  
The second observation is the ability of constitutional law to lock-in neoliberal discourse 
emphasising “market efficiency, discipline, and confidence; economic policy credibility and 
consistency; and limitations on democratic decision-making”.78 Mexico is a good example of how 
constitutional law can be used to lock-in neoliberalism as 30 amendments were made to Mexico’s 
revolutionary constitution of 1917 in order to be fully compatible with the NAFTA’s “requirements 
concerning free movement of goods and services, extended protections for private property and 
privatization of common lands.”79 The third observation put forward by Gill is the separation and 
insulation of economic decision-making from political interference; an observation that is closely 
linked to the ability of constitutional law to lock-in neoliberal discourse. Certainty, stability, 
protection of private property and a fettered government that cannot interfere with the market are 
elements of the neoliberal idea of the state, as outlined above, and these are the conditions that 
neoliberals seek to establish and preserve through constitutional law. 80  
The example used by Gill to show how constitutional law is employed to create those conditions 
considered necessary for a market to operate according to the neoliberal economic rationale is that 
of democratisation.81 Constitutional revision observed during the last decade of the twentieth 
century in the developing world was linked to the provision of financial assistance by international 
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institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF.82 This period saw the implementation of “a 
hierarchical system of representation in which the key economic and strategic areas of policy are 
separated from democratic participation and accountability.”83 Gill indicates how the division of 
powers between institutions, a cornerstone of modern liberal democracy, ensured and enforced by 
a strong judiciary, contributes towards sustaining a stable political environment for the market to 
develop. Democratisation for Gill is not strengthening the demos but an institutional structure that 
divides power amongst institutions in order to avoid irrational interference in the economy, whether 
this arises from mass democracy or from the pursuit of private interests. The surge of 
democratisation and consequent reproduction of liberal democratic ideas installed a system of 
political rule in countries where the political (im)balance enabled irrational interference in the 
economy by powerful stakeholders, with the aim of creating and sustaining a neoliberal idea of the 
state where private individuals could pursue their interests without state intervention.  
Furthermore, the establishment of representative democratic systems saw the parallel 
insulation of economic decision-making from democratic bodies. A fitting example would be the 
establishment of institutions, such as independent central banks, to ensure that macroeconomic and 
regulatory policies remain beyond the reach of democratic institutions and in accordance with 
neoliberal rationale.84 Therefore, what Gill identifies is the gradual restructuring of those states in 
the developing world along the lines of a neoliberal rule of law where the state creates the 
conditions for a neoliberal market, including the protection of property rights and constitutionally 
locked in macroeconomic goals, but refrains from market-distorting or political interference. In this 
respect, Gill’s work provides very useful insights as to how neoliberal discourse about the state, 
adopted and reproduced by institutions beyond the state, takes effect in processes of state 
restructuring at the national level. Moreover, new constitutionalism showcases how constitutional 
law can give practical realisation to neoliberal political economic thought, specifically the separation 
and insulation of economic decision-making from political interference.  
Drawing on the discussion above, the relationship between institutions beyond the state and 
constitutional law and the separation and insulation of economic decision-making from political 
interference is identified along the three observations put forward by the new constitutionalism. 
First, the development of institutions beyond the state on a sectoral and functional basis is in itself a 
way of separating economic matters from political or democratic contestation and interference. 
Second, constitutional law locks in neoliberal discourse as constitutions can be used to ensure 
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certain economic conditions. Third, constitutional law can insulate institutions from political 
interference, either through the division of power amongst state institutions or through affording 
institutions independence. These observations indicate how constitutional law can be used to create 
a scrutiny lacuna – an insulated space for economic decision-making where economic actors and 
neoliberal discourse are protected from opposing objectives or ideas.  
3. Neoliberalism and judicial review: a further parameter to the relationship between 
neoliberalism and constitutional law.  
Up until this point, the chapter considered the intersection between neoliberal political 
economic thought, institutions beyond the state and constitutional law by examining how 
constitutional rules contribute to the promotion or practical realisation to the separation and 
insulation of economic decision-making from political interference. Both sections above consider 
how constitutional law can give effect to a legal framework for the neoliberal market to operate; 
whether through the creation of institutions that have a specific mandate, such as the pursuit of a 
macroeconomic target; the division of power between institutions so as to avoid irrational 
interference in the economy; the insulation of institutions from democratic interference; and the 
entrenchment of property rights in constitutional law. Hence, in the sections above, the chapter 
indicated how “the juridical brings form to the economic”.85 However, this is only one side of the 
coin as neoliberalism and constitutional law also intersect at another point.  
In order to fully appreciate the relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law, 
critical scholarship must also understand the ways through which legal reasoning and the exercise of 
judicial review complement the processes identified above. As Wendy Brown indicates: 
“law and legal reasoning not only give form to the economic, but economize new spheres and 
practices. In this way, law becomes a medium for disseminating neoliberal rationality beyond the 
economy, including to constitutive elements of democratic life. More than simply securing the rights 
of capital and structuring competition, neoliberal juridical reason recasts political rights, citizenship, 
and the field of democracy itself in an economic register; in doing so, it disintegrates the very idea of 
the demos. Legal reasoning thus complements governance practices as a means by which democratic 
political life and imaginaries are undone.”86  
In the above quote, Brown extends the scope of inquiry beyond the structuring of markets or 
institutions to consider how legal reason complements the practical realisation of neoliberal political 
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economic thought through constitutional law. To fully understand the relationship between 
neoliberalism and constitutional we need to appreciate the interaction between constitutional 
instruments, such as those mentioned above, and the parallel operation of judicial review. How, in 
other words, the interpretation and application of law complements neoliberal structures of 
governance.  
Conclusion 
In the course of this chapter, I considered the relationship between neoliberalism and 
constitutional law by bringing together often unconnected strands of critical thought. The chapter 
drew on existing accounts on the intellectual history of neoliberalism to identify the main elements 
of neoliberal political economic thought: to separate and insulate economic decision-making from 
political interference; what I term as a scrutiny lacuna. The commitment of neoliberal political 
economy to create and sustain a scrutiny lacuna within which economic decision-making can unfold 
without irrational political interference was traced in the development of economic globalisation 
and the parallel development of constitutionalism beyond the state. Through the creation of 
international economic institutions, legal authority was transferred beyond the state on a sectoral 
and functional basis, separating in this way economic decision-making from political interference at 
the national level. The operation of institutions beyond the state reproduces neoliberal political 
economic thought by promoting the restructuring of states and locking in neoliberal market 
objectives through constitutional law. Thus, the relationship between neoliberalism and 
constitutional law is observed in the separation and insulation of economic decision-making by 
transferring economic deliberation beyond the state; the locking in of neoliberalism through 
constitutional provisions; and the insulation of economic decision-making through institutional 
structures. The chapter continued to identify a further parameter to this relationship by recognising 
the complementary role of judicial review in neoliberal processes. While the chapter does account 
for role of constitutional law in realising neoliberal political economic thought, it is also pointed out 
that constitutional law “necessarily do so”.87 As Parker put it, “constitutionalism is not something 
negative per se; constitutions are themselves open to contest and reform” and may be compatible 
with other political visions. The relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law identified 
above offers an insight into the intersection between constitutional rules and political economy but 
offers only a partial picture of the operation of constitutional law.88 To remedy this shortcoming, and 
avoid a deterministic view of constitutional law, the next chapter identifies the relationship between 
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neoliberalism and European constitutionalism by drawing upon the observations put forward in this 
chapter and continues to identify how neoliberalism is contested through constitutional law. 
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Chapter 2 – European constitutionalism as a space for 
constitutional conflict  
This chapter sets out to consider the relationship between neoliberalism and European 
constitutionalism prior to the Eurozone crisis. More specifically, the chapter considers how central 
elements of neoliberal political economic thought, as identified in Chapter 1, find expression in 
European constitutional law. However, in identifying how the separation and insulation of economic 
decision-making from political interference is achieved through law, the chapter also identifies the 
operation of constitutional objectives that are in direct conflict with neoliberal ideas. What the 
chapter argues, therefore, is that prior to the Eurozone crisis, European constitutionalism was as a 
space for constitutional conflict between neoliberal and opposing ideas, objectives and practices.  
In Chapter 1, I considered the relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law. By 
examining the intellectual history of neoliberalism, I indicated that neoliberal political economic 
thought focuses on the separation between politics and the economy and insulation of economic 
decision-making from political interference, thus proposing the creation of an insulated space for 
institutions to operate – what I identified as a scrutiny lacuna. The intersection between 
neoliberalism and constitutional law was identified at creating and sustaining the conditions 
neoliberals wish to see. Once the relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law was 
identified, the chapter examined how constitutional law separates and insulates economic decision-
making from political interference in the context of constitutionalism beyond the state. Drawing on 
existing critical literature showcasing the relationship between neoliberalism and institutions 
beyond the state, the chapter considered the role of constitutional law in constituting a global 
political economy where the reconfiguration of legal authority sectorally and functionally 
contributes towards the creation of a scrutiny lacuna. This was achieved by examining the new 
constitutionalism, as developed by Stephen Gill. The new constitutionalism showcases three aspects 
of the relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law beyond the state. First, how the 
development of institutions on a sectoral and functional basis is in itself a way of separating 
economic matters from political or democratic contestation and interference. Second, that 
constitutional law can be used as a mechanism to lock-in neoliberal discourse and, finally, to create 
institutions that are insulated from political interference. A fourth parameter to the relationship 
between neoliberalism and constitutional law was also outlined at the end of Chapter 1 – that of 
judicial review. In order to fully understand how neoliberal political economic thought is realised 
through constitutional law, we must also examine how the exercise of judicial review complements 
the practical realisation of neoliberal political economic thought. 
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In this chapter, I draw upon observations from Chapter 1, and consider the extent to which 
European constitutionalism gives effect to the separation and insulation economic decision-making 
from political interference; specifically, the extent to which economic decision-making operates 
within a scrutiny lacuna. In the previous chapter, the relationship between neoliberalism and 
constitutional law was identified in three different sites: the intellectual heritage of neoliberalism, 
the operation of constitutional law beyond the state and in the exercise of judicial review. Similarly, 
in this chapter I examine three different sites of analysis: theories of European constitutionalism; the 
institutional structure of the European Union; and the exercise of judicial review by the ECJ. In each 
of these sites of analysis, I examine how constitutional law contributes to the promotion and 
practical realisation of neoliberal political economic thought. However, as indicated both in the 
Introduction and Chapter 1, constitutional law may “contribute to the promotion or practical 
realisation” of neoliberalism but it does “not necessarily do so”.1 Parallel to the practical realisation 
of neoliberalism through constitutional law, the chapter identifies the existence of conflicting 
objectives that also operate through law. For this reason, the chapter suggests an understanding of 
European constitutionalism prior to the Eurozone crisis as a space whereby multiple constitutional 
objectives operate and, by extension, come into conflict with each other.  
To pursue this argument, the chapter proceeds in three sections. In each section, the chapter 
identifies the role of constitutional law in neoliberal processes establishing the separation and 
insulation of economic decision-making from political interference and opposing constitutional 
objectives. Therefore, in the first section, I consider the extent to which theoretical understandings 
of European constitutional law reflect and consolidate the neoliberal political economic thought, but 
it also accounts for competing objectives. The idea of conflict persists through the second section of 
the chapter, as I examine Europe’s institutional structure; specifically, how the Community and 
intergovernmental methods reflect and consolidate neoliberal visions of the state and government. 
The section continues to examine how certain developments in the institutional structure of the EU 
– including the strengthening of the European Parliament and introducing measures for improved 
citizen input, accountability and transparency in the process of decision-making – create small cracks 
in the wall of insulation. Lastly, the chapter considers how the exercise of judicial review by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) complements the practical realisation of neoliberal 
political economic thought. Once again, I suggest that European constitutionalism can be 
contemplated as a space for constitutional conflict by identifying the operation of other 
 
1 Owen Parker, "Challenging ‘New Constitutionalism’ in the EU: French Resistance, ‘social Europe’ and ‘soft’ Governance”, 
New Political Economy 13, no. 4 (2008), 397-417, 401. Emphasis in original.  
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constitutional objectives countering neoliberalism in the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice. 
1. European integration and the separation of politics from the economy 
From its very inception, the European Union was developed on a sectoral and functional basis. 
As every text-book on the European Union will indicate, the origins of the integration project can be 
traced back to the end of the Second World War where European nations, devastated from the 
destructive effects of two world wars within a few decades, were determined to set up political 
mechanisms to prevent future conflict between them.2 One of the first actions adopted by the six 
founding countries3 was to create a common market for vital raw material, such as coal and steel, 
with the aim of increasing interdependence between European countries.4 In a celebrated and much 
quoted declaration, Robert Schuman indicated how economic integration in the area of coal and 
steel would create a common supply for Europe’s industries that would make any war between 
France and Germany “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible”.5 The development of 
European integration, following the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 
continued with the signing of the two Treaties establishing an Economic Community6 and the Atomic 
Energy Community.7 Ever since, the two communities grew and developed through different 
Treaties and agreements8 leading to what we now identify as the European Union. As a result, 
European integration proceeded on a sectoral basis (economic integration) and with the functional 
aim of setting up a common market. The neoliberal logic of separating politics from the economy 
through the creation of institutions beyond the state informed the development of European 
integration on a sectoral and functional basis since its very inception. As Majone indicates, the 
European Communities’ founding fathers recognised that “in a world of sovereign states, 
international economic integration is feasible only if economics and politics are kept as separate as 
possible.”9 Majone’s remarks about the centrality of separation of politics and the economy are 
indicative of the neoliberal political economic outlook of European integration as the sectoral and 
 
2 Examples of European cooperation in the immediate aftermath of WW II the Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation (1948) which administered international (USA) aid, the Western European Union (1948, 1954) aiming at the 
prevention of another European war and, finally, the Council of Europe (1949), founded in order to protect fundamental 
human rights.  
3 The six founding states are: Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherland and Luxembourg. 
4 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951).  
5Robert Schuman, "Declaration of 9 May 1950: The Schuman Plan for European Integration" 9 May 1950, 1950). 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en. 
6 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (1957). 
7 Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (1957). 
8 Some of the main agreements include the Single European Act (1987); Treaty of Maastricht (1992); Treaty of Amsterdam 
(1997); Treaty of Nice (2001); Treaty of Lisbon (2009). 
9 Giandomenico Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 34.  
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functional division of constitutional authority sustains a continuing separation of economic activity 
from political interference. 
Drawing on the relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law beyond the state 
identified in Chapter 1, the aim of this section is to consider how theoretical developments of 
European constitutionalism “reflect and consolidate real processes”,10 specifically the realisation of 
neoliberal political economic thought including the separation of politics from the economy and the 
insulation of economic decision-making from political interference. Towards this end, I conduct an 
examination of theoretical resources explaining the development of European integration and 
European constitutionalism. Drawing upon long-standing conceptualisations of European 
integration, the section indicates that from its very inception, European constitutional theory 
reflects and consolidates elements of neoliberal political economic thought. By doing so, it positions 
the development of Europe’s constitution within the broader neoliberal political economic project. 
However, the section also identifies how competing claims and constitutional objectives can be 
identified within Europe’s constitution. As a result, European constitutionalism is not interpreted 
solely through the prism of neoliberalism and constitutional law but, instead, as a space for 
constitutional conflict whereby neoliberal political economic objectives may be effectuated and at 
the same time contested. 
1.1. The continuing relevance of ordoliberalism: Constitutionalising the separation and insulation of 
economic decision-making from political interference 
Ordoliberals were one of the first, if not the first, school of constitutional thought to develop a 
comprehensive theory of Europe’s constitution in relation to the common market, providing a 
theory of the constitution that is distinct from national constitutions and the statist constitutional 
model. Before considering the ordoliberal idea of an economic constitution and how it was applied 
to the European Communities, it is important to indicate that ordoliberalism is “not distinct from 
neoliberalism”.11 Instead, it is a variant of neoliberalism in so far as the two schools of thought are 
concerned with the conditions of possibility for functioning markets.12 As indicated in Chapter 1, 
neoliberalism considers “political, social and legal preconditions of functioning markets”13 and in 
doing so considered the position of governments vis-à-vis the market. However, neoliberal thought 
 
10 Emilios Christodoulidis, "A Default Constitutionalism? A Disquieting Note on Europe's Many Constitutions”, in The Many 
Constitutions of Europe, eds. Kaarlo Tuori and Suvi Sankari (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 21-48, 33. 
11 Angela Wigger, "Debunking the Myth of the Ordoliberal Influence on Post-War European Integration”, in Ordoliberalism, 
Law and the Rule of Economics, eds. Josef Hien and Christian Joerges (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017), 161-177, 169.  
12 Thomas Biebricher, "Ordoliberalism as a Variety of Neoliberalism”, in Ordoliberalism, Law and the Rule of Economics, 
eds. Josef Hien and Christian Joerges (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017), 103-113, 105. 
13 Ibid, 105. 
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provided a number of varying responses to its core question – the conditions of possibility for a free 
market – and while the Chicago School may be the most clearly associated body of thought in the 
way we understand neoliberalism today, other varieties also developed during the same period. 
Ordoliberalism is one of them and, for this reason, the neoliberal political economic philosophy as 
outlined in Chapter 1, accounts for the “plural set of ideas that have unfolded over time through 
polycentric controversies from within its ideological realm as well as from outside critiques”.14 
Positioning ordoliberalism within neoliberal political economic thought allows us to understand how 
ordoliberal theoretical developments in European constitutionalism reflect and consolidate real 
processes, specifically the realisation of neoliberal political economic thought including the 
separation of politics from the economy and the insulation of economic decision-making from 
political interference.  
Born in Freiburg, by the economist Walter Eucken and lawyers Franz Böhm and Hans 
Grossmann-Doerth15, ordoliberalism is an ideological movement that responded to the social 
conditions pertaining in Germany at the time of the interwar period, also known as the Weimar 
years. Ordoliberal positions are, therefore, highly influenced by the socio-economic conditions of the 
time and, more importantly, by the failure of the Weimar Republic to maintain social stability. One 
important factor in the production of social instability, according to ordoliberal thought, was the 
misuse of economic freedom both by owners of capital and by owners of labour.16 For example, the 
former engaged in acts of price-fixing or protectionism while the latter engaged in strike action or 
“force the state to concede welfare”.17 In response to this observation, ordoliberals concluded that 
the economy cannot be left to operate freely.18 Instead, of unbounded economic freedom they 
proposed order; ordo in Latin. According to ordoliberal theory, an ordered economy requires a 
strong state to provide the framework for sustaining the “price mechanisms of free competition”.19 
The role of the state is to create and guarantee “the legal framework for a competence-based 
economy [and] withstand the pressures of rent-seeking interest groups calling for market-distorting 
interventions”.20 State intervention is therefore, not completely excluded but is desired only in order 
to correct market imbalances and ensure competition. Consequently, the elements of neoliberal 
political economic thought identified in Chapter 1 of the thesis converge with ordoliberal thinking 
 
14 Wigger, Debunking the Myth of the Ordoliberal Influence on Post-War European Integration, 161-177, 169. 
15 Gerhard Schnyder and Mathias M. Siems, "The Ordoliberal Variety of Neoliberalism”, in Banking Systems in the Crisis: 
The Faces of Liberal Capitalism, eds. Suzanne J. Konzelmann and Marc Fovargue-Davies (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 250-
268.  




19 Kaarlo Tuori, European Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 131. 
20 Ibid, 131. 
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about the state and its relationship to the market. As a variant of neoliberal thought, both the 
separation of politics from the economy and insulation of economic decision-making from irrational 
interference are central elements of ordoliberal thinking.  
The importance of ordoliberal thought for the purposes of our discussion, is the elaborated 
conceptualisation of constitutional law and its relationship to the creation of economic order, most 
noticeable in the ordoliberal concept of an ‘economic constitution’ (wirtschaftsverfassung). As a 
constitutional concept, the economic constitution creates and guarantees (locks-in) a legal 
framework in which the economy can operate and “define the role of government in the 
economy”.21 At the same time, though, the economic constitution carries a normative position in 
favour of an economic model that elevates competition as the main market characteristic. Thus, in 
the ordoliberal tradition, the economic constitution articulates a comprehensive decision 
(Gesamtentscheidung) in favour of an economic system and sets a clear priority of policy objectives; 
what ordoliberals termed as ordnungspolitik. Therefore, the economic constitution firstly sets up the 
conditions for the realisation of a free market based on competition and, secondly, ensures the 
viability of those conditions by setting a clear hierarchy of policy objectives with competition serving 
as the guiding norm.  
Based on the notion of an economic constitution, ordoliberals interpret the Treaty of Rome as a 
framework for a common market and identify competition as the mechanism through which 
economic actors can exercise self-control.22 Such a reading implies “a policy-level conclusion [in 
favour of competition] deriving from the constitutional Gesamtentscheidung for an open market 
economy with free competition.”23 As competition policy is afforded constitutional primacy, other 
policy fields are “expected to succumb to the limitations warranted by the superior policy field”.24 
According to an ordoliberal reading, the Treaty of Rome elevated competition policy to a 
constitutional norm and subordinated all law-making, including national legislation, to the 
constitutional decision for a free market with undistorted competition. 25 As a result, the constitution 
operates to lock-in an economic model and protect economic conditions form of irrational 
 
21 Johannes R. B. Rittershausen, "The Postwar West German Economic Transition: From Ordoliberalism to Keynesianism”, 
IWP Discussion Paper, no. 2007/1 (2007), 11. See also, Lars P. Feld, Ekkehard A. Köhler and Daniel Nientiedt, 
"Ordoliberalism, Pragmatism and the Eurozone Crisis: How the German Tradition Shaped Economic Policy in Europe”, 
Freiburger Diskussionspapiere Zur Ordnungsökonomik 15/04 (2015). 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/111262/1/827491085.pdf. 
22 Manfred E. Streit and Werner Mussler, "The Economic Constitution of the European Community: From ‘Rome’to 
‘Maastricht’”, European Law Journal 1, no. 1 (1995), 5-30, 14. 
23 Tuori, European Constitutionalism, 160. Emphasis added. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid.  
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interference through constitutional rules regulating the degree and nature of state, or private, 
interference.  
Many ongoing debates in European constitutionalism concern the influence of ordoliberalism 
and the extent to which Europe’s constitution can be understood through the scope of ordoliberal 
theory.26 As a major contributor “to German ideational politics”,27 ordoliberals influenced political 
developments during the inter-war period as well as in the aftermath of the Second World War,28 
both in terms of Germany’s domestic politics and in relation to the articulation of a German position 
in negotiating European Treaties.29 While ordoliberals did influence the development of European 
constitutionalism, an ordoliberal reading of Europe’s constitution may not be sustainable, as the 
chapter will discuss later. However, it is important to see how theorising the Treaty of Rome as an 
economic constitution reflects real processes of separation and insulation of economic decision-
making from political interference during the development of European constitutionalism. 
Treaty of Rome provisions echo the centrality of competition and separation of politics from 
economic activity. For example, Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome provides for the creation of a 
“system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted” while a number of other 
Treaty provisions signal the centrality of competition as a market mechanism.30 Moreover, a series of 
‘negative’ integration rules were developed by the Commission and ECJ aiming in the dissolvement 
of barriers between states in order to open up the market and enhance competition. Examples of 
negative integration include policies aimed towards suspending existing barriers to trade, such as 
tariffs,31 but also barriers to the free movement of persons, services and capital.32 As Majone 
highlights, the development of EEC provisions including “rules on state aids to industry and on 
national procurement policies [and] requirements for the removal of distortions of competition 
 
26 Indicatively, see: Josef Hien and Christian Joerges, eds., Ordoliberalism, Law and the Rule of Economics (Oxford and 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2017); Christian Joerges, "The Overburdening of Law by Ordoliberalism and the Integration 
Project”, in Ordoliberalism, Law and the Rule of Economics, eds. Josef Hien and Christian Joerges (Oxford and Portland: 
Hart Publishing, 2017), 179-199; Wigger, Debunking the Myth of the Ordoliberal Influence on Post-War European 
Integration, 161-177. 
27Christian Joerges, "The Rechtsstaat and Social Europe: How a Classical Tension Resurfaces in the European Integration 
Process”, Comparative Sociology 9, no. 1 (2010), 65-85, 69. 
28 As Dale and El-Enany indicate, well-known ordoliberals served in governmental and ministerial positions; Ludwig Erhard 
was Minister of Economic Affairs, Walter Eucken was advisor to the U.S. and French occupying forces, Franz Böhm was 
minister of Cultural Affairs in Hesse and Wilhelm Röpke was advisor to Chancellor Adenauer. See: Gareth Dale and Nadine 
El-Enany, "The Limits of Social Europe: EU Law and the Ordoliberal Agenda”, German Law Journal 14, no. 5 (2013), 613-
650, 616.  
29 Again, Dale and El-Enany indicate the influence of Müller-Armack, who served under Ludwig Erhard in the Ministry of 
Financial Affairs, in developing the German policy papers that were then incorporated, whether partly or in full, in the 
Treaty of Rome. See: Ibid, 616.  
30 See the discussion in: Streit and Mussler, The Economic Constitution of the European Community: From ‘Rome’to 
‘Maastricht’, 5-30. 
31 Article 3(a) TEEC. 
32 Article 3(c) TEEC. 
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caused by state regulation or resulting from the existence of public-owned companies … point in the 
direction of a far-reaching separation of state power from market power.”33 What we observe, 
therefore, is the conceptualisation of an internal market with “a clear demarcation of the private 
and public sphere”34 and the limitation of public intervention in matters concerning the common 
market through competition law. More importantly, though, we observe how the framework of a 
common market is elevated to a constitutional objective of the Community with the effect of 
treating economic provisions as higher, constitutional law.  
Whether the development of competition rules warrants reading the Treaty of Rome as an 
ordoliberal economic constitution is, however, contested. Tuori goes at some length to counter the 
ordoliberal claim that the Treaty of Rome prioritises “a particular model of market economy at both 
national and European levels.”35 Instead, he argues that the Treaty of Rome “manifests neutrality 
with regard to models of economy … [as it does not] prioritize a particular model of market economy 
or a particular variety of capitalism”.36 Support for this argument can be found in a range of Treaty 
provisions that hinder competition, including industrial policy,37 agriculture38 and transport,39 along 
with some exceptions on the existence of cartels40 or abuse of market41 dominance. Moreover, 
several other Treaty provisions contradict the basic ordoliberal premise for a comprehensive 
decision that elevates competition policy above all other considerations. These include provisions 
enabling state monopolies;42 derogations from competition when this was for “undertakings 
entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest”;43 and provisions that do not 
“prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership”.44 As a result, 
Tuori argues that the prioritization of competition is “difficult to reconcile with the Treaty of 
Rome”45 and concludes that competition was “subordinated to the task of establishing and 
maintaining a common (single) market” and not vice-versa.46 Without a conclusive direction set by 
the Treaty of Rome on the kind of economic system to be adopted, the degree of government 
 
33 Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth, 34. 
34 Streit and Mussler, The Economic Constitution of the European Community: From ‘Rome’to ‘Maastricht’, 5-30, 14. 
35 Tuori, European Constitutionalism, 152. 
36 Ibid, 151. 
37 Article 60 TEEC. 
38 Title II – Agriculture, TEEC. 
39 Title IV – Transport, TEEC. 
40 Article 85, TEEC. 
41 Article 86, TEEC. 
42 Article 37 TEEC. 
43 Article 90(2) TEEC. 
44 Article 222 TEC. Commenting on this provision, Tuori indicates that it may be “questioned whether the Court still 
adheres to a neutral position vis-à-vis public ownership. See for a recent ruling on Art.345 TFEU (Previous Art.222 TEEC) 
Joined Cases C-105 and C-107/12 Essent and Others, judgment of 22 October 2013.  
45 Ibid, 158.  
46 Ibid, 159. 
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intervention remained a contested question in the formative years.47 Despite the development of 
competition rules and the resulting separation of economic activity from political interference, an 
ordoliberal reading of the European economic constitution cannot be supported as ordnungspolitik 
is not imposed by the Treaty.48 Looking beyond the Treaty of Rome and the development of 
European constitutionalism through the Treaty of Maastricht, the expansion of Union competences 
in social policy further diluted the ordoliberal vision of a competition-focused common market. 49 
Thus, the economic debate is not foreclosed, as ordoliberals would argue, “in favour of a free 
market economy relying on performance based competition”.50 Instead, debates about the degree 
of government intervention but, also, about the relationship between economic and other 
objectives – whether these are social, cultural or political – remained active throughout the 
development of European constitutionalism.  
It may be true that Europe’s common market cannot be considered as an ordoliberal economic 
constitution par excellence, but the influence of ordoliberalism on European constitutionalism is not 
negligible. The continuing relevance of ordoliberalism in the relationship between neoliberalism and 
European constitutionalism embedding the idea of constitutionally separating economic activity 
from other objectives within Europe’s constitutional framework and provisions. The constitutional 
separation between economic aims, such as the creation of a common market and the protection of 
competition, elevates economic objectives to constitutional norms with the effect of insulating 
economic decision-making from other considerations, including redistribution, social provisions or 
political participation. However, the existence and operation of opposing economic objectives, as 
indicated above, stipulates a persistent conflict regarding the underlying economic theory of 
European integration and, by extension, of European constitutional law.  
1.2. A dual polity: The separation of politics from the economy and Europe’s democratic settlement 
As indicated in the discussion above, one of the main influences of neoliberal thought, including 
ordoliberalism, is the constitutional separation of the economy from political interference. This is 
reflected in the conceptualisation of the European Communities “according to principles of a dual 
 
47 Tuori identifies three competing theories. First, the competition model, akin to the ordoliberal tradition, that distrusts 
regulatory power and hands all organising power to market mechanisms such as competition. Second, the centralized 
model argues for the transferring of regulatory capacities from national to supranational bodies through negative 
integration, replicating in this way state regulatory powers at the Community level. Third, the decentralised model 
supports the retainment of regulatory powers at the national level for the achievement of market-correcting interventions. 
See Ibid, 155.  
48 For a similar argument see also: Richard Hyman, "Trade Unions, Lisbon and Europe 2020: From Dream to Nightmare”, 
LEQS Discussion Paper Series, Paper no. 45. (2011).  
49 Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl, "Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the ‘Social Deficit’of European Integration: 
Reflections After the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval”, European Law Journal 15, no. 1 (2009), 1-19. 
50 Tuori, European Constitutionalism, 136. 
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polity”.51 Based on the neoliberal idea that a market consists of an apolitical institution that should 
be left to operate on its own logic, the European Communities were granted exclusive competences 
in those areas of economic activity that are concerned with market conditions.52 These include, 
trade barriers, rules of competition, or product regulations.53 At the same time, social and fiscal 
policy considerations, as well as redistributive methods through tax rates, were reserved at the 
national level. While this division was premised on the idea that the common market could achieve a 
“balancing act between the market and the social dimension”,54 it also reflects a long-standing 
neoliberal belief that the market operates more efficiently when irrational interference, such as 
redistributive policies, are avoided. Based on the dual polity approach, therefore, a democratic 
settlement is achieved by retaining all those contested social, redistributive or fiscal policies in need 
of democratic legitimation at the national level and shifting all those technical, apolitical policy 
decisions to a supranational centre. 
Due to the dual polity approach, democratic decision-making and legitimation was deemed 
relevant only for the adoption of redistributive politics and, thus, was retained at the national level. 
Instead of operating through a democratic logic of decision-making, the supranational realm was 
embedded with a technocratic logic of decision-making. This was premised on the proposition that 
economic policy could be pursued by technocrats based on economic principles such as the 
improvement of competition or efficiency, immune from any social-policy considerations. 
Consequently, the ability of Union institutions to exercise legal authority rests on the idea of 
effective governance. Fritz Scharpf’s concept of output legitimacy is mostly employed as a way to 
capture this mode of legitimation, nonetheless other terms, such as the functional justification of 
authority, are also used to describe the same process.55 In brief, output legitimacy describes the 
legitimation of power based on the ability of an institution or government to “effectively promote 
the common welfare of the constituency in question”.56 As output legitimacy is orientated towards 
achieving greater efficiency, “policies are claimed to be legitimate not because they express the will 
of the people or their representatives, but because they are supposed to make everyone better 
off”.57 It is contrasted with the idea of input legitimacy whereby the exercise of political power is 
 
51 Joerges, The Rechtsstaat and Social Europe: How a Classical Tension Resurfaces in the European Integration Process, 65-
85, 70. 
52 See Perry Anderson, The New Old World (London: Verso Books, 2009), 102. 
53 Article 3 TFEU (Exclusive competence); Article 4 TFEU (Shared competence); Article 5 TFEU (Competence to support, 
coordinate or supplement); Article 6 TFEU (Competence to provide arrangements within which EU Member States must 
coordinate policy). 
54 László Andor, "Building a Social Market Economy in the European Union" (Manchester Business School, European 
Commission, 20 October, 2011).  
55 Turkuler Isiksel, Europe's Functional Constitution: A Theory of Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 88. 
56 Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?Oxford University Press, 1999), 6. 
57 Isiksel, Europe's Functional Constitution: A Theory of Constitutionalism Beyond the State, 93. 
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legitimated through procedural means set up to ensure citizen participation or representation and 
the curtailment of political force through checks and balances.  
As authority is “justified by a claim to govern effectively”,58 output legitimacy is often linked to 
“specific teloi to be achieved”.59 Any ceding of sovereignty and legal authority by Member States is 
explained and justified on the realisation of a specific telos; in the case of the European Union, the 
telos towards which economic integration is headed is the achievement of a common market where 
public goods can be produced much more efficiently through a collection of states.60 A competitive 
common market, is argued to be better equipped to respond to collective issues such as “the 
pressures of global economic interdependence, project their collective influence abroad, coordinate 
labour and other regulatory standards, and address shared challenges such as environmental 
stewardship.”61 Enhancing competition and regulating economic or financial exchange are means to 
achieving the telos of a common market: to enhance economic conditions and achieve a better 
standard of living. It is the delivery (output) of this telos that acts as the central legitimating function 
of European integration and constitutional structure.62 
Therefore, by disembedding the common market from any social or other considerations, the 
European Economic Community was understood as a “market without a state”63 not in need of 
democratic legitimation. Similarly, economic policy decisions adopted by the Communities are also 
considered as “non-political in the sense that [they are] not subject to political interventions.”64 
What these discussions indicate, in very clear terms, is that the European Union was never meant to 
be democratic,65 to the extent that the whole discussion of a democratic deficit is, in fact, based on a 
misunderstanding.66 Andrew Moravcsik, for example, argues that the functions performed by the EU 
(central banking, constitutional adjudication, civil prosecution, economic diplomacy and technical 
administration) are of “low electoral salience commonly delegated in national systems, for 
normatively justifiable reasons”.67 These normatively justifiable reasons were discussed in the first 
 
58 Ibid, 6. 
59 Ibid, 88. 
60 Ibid, 88. 
61 Ibid, 88. 
62 Anand Menon and Stephen Weatherill, "Transnational Legitimacy in a Globalising World: How the European Union 
Rescues its States”, West European Politics 31, no. 3 (2008), 397-416., 402. 
63 Christian Joerges, "States without a Market? Comments on the German Constitutional Court's Maastricht-Judgement 
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Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law, eds. Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis (Oxford: Oxford University 
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66 Anderson, The New Old World, 101.  
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chapter of the thesis and include: claims to efficiency of market forces and inability of political 
institutions to match market mechanisms; the bias or rent-seeking tendencies of political 
representation; the need for unbiased representation (avoid tyranny of the majority); the ignorance 
or irrationality of citizens in technical matters and, consequently, the need for technocratic decision-
making in advanced capitalist democracies. On that account, Moravcsik’s central claim is that the EU 
was never meant to be democratic – it was not conceived on the basis of plebiscitary of 
parliamentary democracy but on the “real-world practices” and “life facts” of governmental 
practices in “advanced industrial democracies” where “delegation and insulation are wide-spread 
trends”.68 For these reasons, Moravcsik concludes that “forcing participation is likely to be 
counterproductive, because the popular response is condemned to be ignorant, irrelevant and 
ideological”,69 but also bound to fail because “it runs counter to our consensual social scientific 
understanding of how advanced democracies actually work”.70 It must be clarified that my intention 
is to use Moravcsik against Moravcsik, in order to highlight that the separation and insulation of 
economic decision-making from political interference, including democratic participation, is not a 
happenstance or an undesirable by-product of an imperfect Union. Instead, it is a central 
characteristic of the EU’s integration rationale.  
1.3. Sectoral constitutionalism and Europe’s many constitutions: sustaining conflict between opposing 
constitutional objectives 
Tuori’s concept of Europe’s many constitutions takes the sectoral and functional basis of 
integration as its point of departure. The first distinguishing characteristic of European 
constitutionalism identified by Tuori, is the absence of a founding moment and a single source of 
constitutional authority. Instead of identifying a founding constitutional moment, he argues that 
European constitutionalism is a “multi-dimensional and multi-temporal process”71 occurring through 
a series of constitutional moments or constitutional speech acts. 72 Examples include the signing of 
Treaties, Treaty amendments; judgments of national and supranational courts; acts of EU 
institutions such as the Commission, the Council, the ECB; and the constitutional discourse 
 
68 Ibid, 605. 
69 Andrew Moravcsik, "What can we Learn from the Collapse of the European Constitutional Project?" Politische 
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developed by EU lawyers or academics.73 The second characteristic is closely related to the sectoral 
and functional purpose of Europe’s constitutionalism. As each constitutional speech act was 
developed with reference to a particular policy objective, Tuori identifies the development of not 
only one but rather many constitutions. Each of the many constitutions of Europe regulates its 
relationship with a particular policy area or objective. Three sectoral constitutions are identified: the 
economic, the social and the security constitution, regulating the economy, the social welfare of EU 
citizens and security risks respectively.74 Moreover, two framing constitutions are identified – the 
legal and political. In contrast to the sectoral constitutions, where the aim of constitutionalism is to 
regulate a particular policy area, framing constitutions set the framework within which sectoral 
constitutions unfold.  
Tuori’s conceptualisation does not fail to capture the specificity of European constitutionalism. 
However, this is rather “disquieting”75 as the many constitutions of Europe reflect and consolidate 
the separation and insulation of economic decision-making from interference, including political 
interference by democratic bodies. As the European Union is a “policy-oriented transnational polity 
and legal system”76 whose primary aim is to implement a Union-wide policy agenda within its areas 
of competence, sectoral objectives attain a constitutional status that is wholly unfamiliar at the 
national level. In state constitutions, the existence of a body of rules concerning a policy area does 
not “enjoy constitutional dignity.”77 The constitutional arrangement of a nation-state establishes and 
limits the legitimate exercise of power within a polity. The adoption of any legislative, policy or 
regulatory decision is a direct result of the exercise of the authority conferred by the constitution to 
a state institution capable of reaching that decision. However, the result of that decision (taken by 
virtue of constitutional law) is not in any way accredited constitutional status. In the EU, though, 
that relationship is inverted. As the “claim to authority is substantively (functionally) limited”78 
constitutional objectives develop around the achievement of those policies for which the Union has 
competence and, as Chapter 1 indicated, constitutional law acts as a way of constructing a legal 
framework within which specific policy objectives can be reached. For example, the aim of price 
stability within the European Monetary Union gained constitutional status as one of the central 
policy objectives to be achieved by the European Central Bank.79 In any of the Member States such 
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an objective would not enjoy constitutional status, yet within the European economic constitution, 
this is considered as a constitutional principle against which other objectives are measured. This is 
precisely what Gill terms as locking-in of policy objectives through constitutional law but also the 
insulation of an economic principle from either contestation or interference.  
Conceptualising European constitutionalism as the co-existence of many constitutions attests 
that constitutional theory reflects and consolidates neoliberal processes of separation and insulation 
of economic decision-making from political interference. However, Tuori’s conceptualisation also 
allows us to understand European constitutionalism as a space within which different objectives 
have developed in relation to the variety of sectoral and functional aims set by the Treaties. This can 
create two kinds of conflict. Firstly, within each sectoral constitution a variety of objectives may be 
pursued creating in this way conflict between competing theories. This was portrayed earlier with 
reference to the degree of which the Treaty of Rome can be considered as an ordoliberal economic 
constitution. Secondly, constitutional debates and conflicts may arise between the many 
constitutions. For example, Tuori does not exclude or “deny the relevance...of the normative ideas 
of a constitutional democracy (a democratic Rechsstaat).”80 Instead of excluding these normative 
criteria, Tuori understands them as active discourses within European constitutionalism. Therefore, 
conflict could also arise across constitutional objectives. As the next section of the chapter will 
indicate, following the Treaty of Maastricht and the expansion of EU competences to cover a wider 
range of social objectives, claims for greater insulation (economic constitutionalism) conflict with 
claims for greater transparency or democratic input in decision-making (legal and political 
constitutionalism).  
2. Europe’s institutional framework: Insulating economic decision-making while 
sustaining constitutional conflict  
In the previous section, I considered how theoretical discussions about the development of 
European constitutionalism reflect and consolidate the separation and insulation of economic 
decision-making from political interference. Europe’s constitution is, therefore, positioned within 
the relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law, identified in Chapter 1 of the thesis. 
However, the chapter also indicated that while constitutional law can be used to give effect to 
neoliberal political economic thought, it does not necessarily do so as competing constitutional 
claims operate within European constitutionalism. In this section, I will examine how competing 
constitutional objectives manifest in the EU’s institutional structure by evaluating two characteristics 
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of the EU’s institutional framework. Firstly, the claim that “since their founding, supranational 
institutions have been portrayed as necessary for administering questions of policy that are either 
too complex or too vulnerable to distortion to be left to democratically accountable institutions”.81 
Secondly, how the introduction of wider social objectives by the EU and analogous strengthening of 
democratic procedures in the EU’s institutional structure sustain the conflict of constitutional 
objectives. 
2.1. The Community method and the constitutionalisation of conflicting objectives. 
The EU’s institutional architecture combines two very different methods of decision-making, the 
supranational or Community method and the intergovernmental,82 each of which achieves the 
insulation of economic activity from political interference. The Community method rests on a legal 
constitutional logic where the exercise of power is achieved through established legal procedures 
but also according to principles such as limited government, the division of powers and judicial 
review.83 The employment of constitutional law by the Community method is akin to the ordoliberal 
idea of constructing a framework within which the market can operate unhindered from political 
interference. This is achieved through two main parameters. Firstly, the Community methods 
ensures that “each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this 
Treaty”.84 Secondly and more importantly, that every decision adopted by the Community promotes 
“its values, advance its objectives, serve its interests, those of its citizens and those of the Member 
States, and ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions.”85 
Consequently, the rule of law, achieved by the Community method aims to lock-in the sectoral and 
functional objectives set by the Community. 
Central to the idea of protecting the sectoral and functional objectives of the Community was 
the notion of Community interest, as opposed to national interest. Cooperation through the 
Community method would not be achieved on case-by-case instances where each Member States 
entered an agreement to forward or protect national interests. Instead, cooperation amongst states 
would ensure the furtherance of a common cause, goal and interest. In this regard, Community 
institutions were independent from those of the Member States and promoted the interest of the 
community, not the states which comprise them. For this to be achieved, the founding fathers of the 
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EEC envisioned a common political and institutional system that would be established and 
maintained through law. In the words of Jean Monnet, Community institutions were established 
with the aim of being “sovereign within the limits of their competence – that is to say, which are 
endowed with the right to make decisions and carry them out”86 in the interest of the Community as 
a whole.  
Importantly, the interest of the Community has been defined in economic terms. The 
institutional framework of the Community method is oriented towards achieving “a common market 
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States [and] to promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and 
balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and 
closer relations between the states belonging to it”.87 In the formative period under the Treaty of 
Rome, the role of the Commission was central in achieving negative integration through the 
development and enforcement of key common market aims; for example, the elimination of custom 
duties,88 the elimination of quantitative restrictions to intra-Community trade,89 the free movement 
of persons, services and capital,90 and rules against distortion of competition.91 In addition to the 
Commission, the ECJ was also crucial in developing the common market by ruling upon “breaches of 
the treaty by Member States”.92 Therefore, by setting out a definition of the common good, defining 
the purpose of the Union and setting competition as the mechanism through which to achieve it,93 
the Community method insulated economic decision-making from any competing economic, social 
or political objectives.  
Insulation is further achieved through the institutionalisation of a technocratic logic of decision-
making that insulates Community institutions from political contestation. Through the technocratic 
logic of decision-making, the Community method is orientated towards achieving efficient policies, 
not enhance participation. As was indicated in the first chapter of the thesis, the fundamental 
distinction between the democratic and technocratic logics is in their method of legitimation. Whilst 
democratic structures of decision-making are legitimated through participation, the authority of 
technocratic decision-making rests on the ability of experts to reach qualitatively better decisions, 
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usually assessed through notions of efficiency.94 Since the European Communities were conceived 
along the lines of a dual polity whereby democratic legitimacy was retained at the national level, the 
Community method operates according to a technocratic logic.  
The technocratic logic characterising the Community method is evident in the powers vested to 
the Commission and its working methods. By holding the sole right of initiative, the Commission is 
the only institution that can propose legislation. While the Council of Ministers acted as a legislative 
body in the original constitution of the EEC (this was later amended to include the European 
Parliament as a co-legislating body), the Commission always held the sole right to propose 
legislation. The Commission is comprised by expert committees working in small groups to device 
policies that are considered to be efficient and in accordance with the objectives set by the 
Treaties.95 Insulation is therefore achieved by the removal of policy-making from the reach of 
national parliaments and by structuring the Commission’s decision-making logic according to 
technocratic ideas. Insulation also ensured what Gill identified as the locking-in of economic and 
policy objectives set in the Treaties. As an institution, therefore, the Commission was designed to be 
apolitical in the sense that it was not subjected to political pressures.  
Furthermore, the technocratic model of decision-making served as an instrument of legitimation 
for the Community method. The institutional structure of the original European Economic 
Communities was legitimized indirectly through the participation of national governments and, as it 
was indicated earlier, on the capacity of the Community to solve specific issues better than national 
governments.96 Hence, the authority of supranational institutions, such as the Commission and 
European Court of Justice, was framed predominantly “as a technical necessity: it is a way of binding 
the hands of national governments in order to insulate policymaking from partisanship and short- 
term electioneering.”97 Insulation through technocracy was, therefore, a guiding feature of the 
Community method and the institutional framework which it sought to establish. Despite the 
existence of an Assembly, renamed to European Parliament in 1962, it had little power. It was 
comprised of national parliaments and its “only substantive power in the original treaty was the 
power, by a two-thirds majority vote, to censure the Commission and oblige its collective 
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resignation” – a power “too sweeping to be used”.98 While the powers of the Parliament gradually 
increased, as the chapter indicates further in the discussion, the technocratic logic of the Community 
method did not alter.  
However, following the introduction of the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU’s institutional 
framework underwent important changes. The amended Article 2 introduces an array of new tasks 
to be established through the common market, including “a harmonious, balanced and sustainable 
development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, equality 
between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of 
competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of 
life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.” Article 3 introduces 
health and consumer protection, transportation, education, energy, tourism as policy objectives 
aimed at realising the tasks and objectives outlined in Article 2. In response to the expanded 
portfolio of policies adopted by the Union, the Community method was developed in a way that 
would boost the Union’s democratic legitimacy through greater power-sharing between the 
Commission, Council and European Parliament. 
Under the current structure, all legislative measures for those areas of policy-making that are 
under the exclusive competence of the Union99 are adopted through the three supranational 
(Community) institutions: the Commission,100 Council of the European Union (or Council),101 and the 
European Parliament. 102 One of the most important developments in the Community method since 
the Treaty of Maastricht was the empowerment of the European Parliament.103 In an attempt to 
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bolster the Union’s democratic legitimacy and respond to the no demos criticism,104 the European 
Parliament is no longer composed by “representatives of the peoples of the states”105 but 
“composed of representatives of the Union’s citizens”.106 Moreover, changes in the legislative 
process, now crystallised under the Treaty of Lisbon, elevate the Parliament to a co-legislative body. 
Under the ordinary legislative procedure, the right of initiative remains with the Commission.107 
While the European Parliament has no power to initiate legislation, Articles 289 and 294 TFEU state 
that for a legislation to be accepted as law, the proposal needs rubber stamping from the European 
Council (decision by qualified majority)108 and the European Parliament. In addition to legislative 
powers, the European Parliament may now approve budgetary decisions, exercise supervision over 
other EU institutions, cooperate with National Parliaments, request the Commission to submit a 
proposal,109 set up a temporary Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or 
maladministration,110 appoint an Ombudsman,111 approve the President and other members of the 
Commission.112  
Furthermore, principles of ‘good governance’ developed in relation to representative democracy 
have gradually made their way into the EU’s constitutional framework. Article 10 TEU, for example, 
states that “the functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy” and 
outlines ways through which decision-making can be carried out “as close as possible to the 
citizen”.113 Article 11(1) TEU continues to indicate that EU institutions “shall, by appropriate means, 
give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange 
their views in all areas of Union action” while also maintaining an “open, transparent and regular 
dialogue with representative associations and civil society.”114 Towards this end, the Commission is 
required to “carry out broad consultations with parties concerned”.115 The European Parliament and 
Council are required to meet openly when considering or and voting on draft legislation,116 while EU 
citizens (or legal persons) may have access to documents of the Union's institutions, bodies, offices 
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and agencies.117 In addition, the Treaty also improves the accountability of EU institutions to national 
parliaments. For example, national parliaments can request and receive information on legislative 
matters.118 Upon receipt, national parliaments can examine proposals against the principle of 
subsidiarity and, in cases where actions do not fall within the exclusive competence of the Union, 
consider whether proposed actions can be achieved through national or local means.119 
The expansion of the EU’s policy portfolio and accompanied strengthening of democratic bodies, 
such as the European Parliament, poses a challenge to the insulation of economic activity from 
political interference. The expansion of the EU’s policy portfolio was criticized, mainly by 
ordoliberals, as integration through intervention120 due to the increasing ability of Community 
institutions to forward “discretionary policies … incompatible with the principle of undistorted 
competition”.121 Simultaneously, the increasing powers of the European Parliament, but also some 
improvements in transparency and accountability of EU decision-makers creates some cracks in the 
insulating wall between economic decision-making and political interference. While the importance 
of these developments should not be undermined, the Community method retains the key 
characteristics of insulation described above.  
2.2. The intergovernmental method: Insulation through cooperation 
As mentioned earlier, the Community method is relevant only for areas where the Union enjoys 
full or shared competence. Certain policy areas, including economic, foreign or security policy, were 
considered to be sensitive and linked to national sovereignty and were not entrusted to the Union. 
Instead, the EU formalized a second method of decision-making – that of intergovernmentalism. 
Intergovernmentalism was introduced in the Treaty of Maastricht through the so-called three-pillar 
system. The first pillar, the European Community (EEC) was in essence the continuation of the 
existing communities operating under the Community method. The two other pillars, namely 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as a second pillar (Title V) and Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA) cooperation as a third pillar, adopted the intergovernmental method. In contrast with the 
structured and rule-bound methods of decision-making adopted by the Community method, the 
intergovernmental pillars introduced by Maastricht offers a much more informal method of 
decision-making. After Maastricht, therefore, the Community method was not the sole avenue of 
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decision-making operating in the newly formed European Union. 122 The intergovernmental method 
attempts to strike a balance between the need for cooperation and coordination among Member 
States without transferring any additional competences to the Union.123 As a method of decision-
making, the intergovernmental approach relies on the willingness of Member States to adopt 
decisions reached through deliberation with other Member States. The Union, however, cannot 
directly legislate on these matters and it is up to the Member State to enact legislation. Moreover, 
there are no mechanisms for ensuring compliance by the Member State, other than diplomatic 
pressure.  
Contrary to the Community method where insulation of economic decision-making is achieved 
through the creation of a legal framework for decision-making, the intergovernmental method 
achieves insulation through the absence of legal means. As Puetter observes, “the classic community 
method is no longer used to provide the procedural skeleton for collective decision-making, and as 
legal acts are no longer (or only to a very limited extent) used to codify the results of lengthy 
negotiations, ongoing policy dialogue around all key policy initiatives in the new areas of EU activity 
has become a key characteristic of Council decision-making”.124 In the absence of the legal 
framework establish by the Community method, the intergovernmental method rests on 
deliberation and discussion of policy objectives within European institutions and bodies. Consensus 
is reached via the interaction of national executives within European institutions, such as the Council 
of Europe and the European Council, yet no binding decisions are reached. The results of 
intergovernmentalism are transformed into legislation through national instruments. National 
authorities are in a position where their authority to reach policy decisions is limited by the 
commitments to which their governments agreed at the supranational level and their only function 
is to transpose those commitments to national instruments. In the case of intergovernmentalism, 
therefore, insulation is achieved by the de-facto separation of policy decision-making from those 
national bodies with the authority and competence to devise policies. 
3. Insulation and constitutional conflict in the European Court of Justice 
A continuing theme in this chapter is the promotion and practical realisation of neoliberal 
political economic thought through constitutional law. Both sections above indicate how 
conceptualisations of Europe’s constitution and the institutional structure created through 
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constitutional law, reflect and consolidate the neoliberal idea of separation and insulation of 
economic decision-making from political interference. However, the chapter also recognised some 
cracks in the wall of insulation created by competing constitutional objectives. The idea of conflict 
persists as the section considers how ECJ decisions constitutionalise the separation and insulation of 
economic decision-making from political interference but also constitutionalise the protection of 
social or fundamental rights that conflict with neoliberalism.  
3.1 How the constitutionalisation of European Treaties by the ECJ reflects and consolidates 
neoliberalism 
It is common ground amongst constitutional discussions that the ECJ played an important role in 
the constitutionalisation of the European Communities as the Court interpreted European Treaties 
as a “constitutional charter governed by a form of constitutional law”.125 The first step in articulating 
a European constitution was taken in the case of Van Gend en Loos.126 In that case, the Court was 
called to decide whether Article 12 EEC (now Article 30 TFEU), prohibiting the introduction of any 
new customs duties on imports or exports, extended any rights to individuals. In its judgment, the 
Court ruled that not only Member States but also their nationals are the subject of Community law. 
As a result, the Court concluded that Community law “imposes obligations on individuals but is also 
intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage”.127 The Court 
continued to claimed that “rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the treaty, but 
also by reason of obligations which the treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as 
well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the Community.”128 The subjects of 
European law, following Van Gen den Loos, were not only states but also their citizens. The doctrine 
of direct effect established the applicability of Community law in its Member States. More 
importantly, though, it recognises the European legal system as an “autonomous source” 129 of law. 
Soon after, in the case of Costa v. ENEL,130 the Court developed the principle of supremacy. It 
established that the “law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, 
because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however 
framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the 
Community itself being called into question”.131 Consequently, the Court found Community law to 
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override any contrary legal provision, even if this was a constitutional provision of a Member States. 
Following these two cases, the Court continued to assert the constitutional significance of the 
Treaties but also the autonomy of the Community legal order. Characteristically, in Les Verts the ECJ 
equated the Union’s treaties to a Constitutional charter.132 In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft133 
the Court reiterated the principle of supremacy on the grounds of effective and uniform application 
of Community law,134 while in Simmenthal national courts were empowered to strike down any 
national legislation that conflicts with Community law even before a preliminary ruling is filed to the 
ECJ.135  
The development of juridical concepts, such as the doctrine of direct effect and supremacy 
outlined above, “largely respond to the needs and implications of sectoral constitutionalisation”136 
and, therefore, contribute to the separation and insulation of economic decision-making from 
political interference. Take for example the development of direct effect. As indicated above, in Van 
Gend en Loos the Court developed the concept of direct effect and, effectively, established the 
European legal order. The ECJ’s ruling in Van Gen den Loos may have created a European legal order, 
but the purpose for which this was created must not be undermined. The then Advocate General 
Roemer indicated that while some Treaty provisions could have direct effect, Article 12 was not one 
of those Articles.137 Similarly, Conway indicates that there is no textual basis for the conclusion 
reached by the Court.138 However, the ECJ pushed through with establishing direct effect of primary 
Community law.139 According to the Court’s reasoning, it was enough that the Treaty did not 
preclude direct effect and, by having regard to the “spirit, the general scheme and the wording”140 of 
the provision the Court found the doctrine of direct effect. A closer look at the judgment indicates 
that the main rationale and purpose of the Court in Van Gen den Loos “was to secure effective 
implementation of the provisions serving the main objective of the Treaty, namely establishment of 
a common market”.141 As the Court stated: “The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a 
Common Market, the functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the 
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dependent on any other legal provision; and must confer a specific right upon which a citizen can base a claim. 
140 Van Gend en Loos, 12. 
141 Tuori, European Constitutionalism, 137.  
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Community, implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual 
obligations between the contracting states. This view is confirmed by the preamble to the Treaty 
which refers not only to governments but to peoples”.142 The doctrine of direct effect was affirmed 
in subsequent case law143 and even expanded to include cases between private individuals 
(horizontal direct effect)144 even in those Treaty provisions that were directly addressed to Member 
States.145 
In light of this, Van Gend Loos and subsequent direct effect jurisprudence, indicates how 
European constitutional law, developed by the ECJ, responded to the needs of developing a common 
market. Judicial review, in this case, gives form to the economic – it creates and sustains the 
conditions for the common market to develop. As a result, judicial review complements the process 
of sectoral constitutionalisation and, by extent, the separation and insulation of economic decision-
making from political interference. A similar observation can be drawn from the development of the 
doctrine of supremacy but also state liability. In Costa v. ENEL146, the Court made reference to the 
ruling in Van Gen den Loos, not explicitly but by reiterating the establishment of a European legal 
order where Member States have wilfully ceded some of their sovereign power for the purposes of 
creating a Community whose primary objective is economic integration. The doctrine of supremacy 
directly responds to the need for a legal framework with uniform application of legal rules for the 
purposes of realizing a common market. At the same time, the doctrine of supremacy enhances the 
neoliberal political economy of European constitutionalism. The separation of a supranational 
common market from political interference or contestation at the national level is constitutionalised 
by ensuring the supremacy of European law over national legislation. Moreover, supranational 
institutions such as the Commission are afforded an important degree of insulation from political 
interference, not only at the supranational level (as indicated in the discussion above) but also from 
national interference though the common operation of constitutional concepts such as direct effect 
and supremacy.  
In addition to the examples mentioned above, the Court’s approach to the issue of subsidiarity 
further indicates how the separation and insulation of economic decision-making is supported 
through judicial review. Subsidiarity, more generally, expresses the idea that a centralized 
government should have a subsidiary function and refrain from performing tasks that can be dealt 
 
142 Van Gend en Loos, 12. 
143 Case 57-65, Alfons Lütticke GmbH v Hauptzollamt Sarrelouis, ECLI:EU:C:1966:34. 
144 Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale, ECLI:EU:C:1974:140. 
145 See for example Case 43-75, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:56, where Article 119 EEC (now 157 TFEU) on equal pay was found to have direct effect and horizontal 
direct effect.  
146 Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., ECLI:EU:C:1964:66. 
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with at a local level. In EU law, the principle of subsidiarity was first introduced by the Treaty of 
Maastricht in Article 3(b) TEU (now Article 5(3) TEU) and stated that “In areas which do not fall 
within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved by the Community”. Consequently, the Union has to show that any action 
not falling under its exclusive competence can best be achieved at Union level. Conway suggests that 
the Court interpreted the principle of subsidiarity in a way that would not undermine the 
competences of the Union but also the effectiveness of the common market.147 For example, in the 
case of Commission v. Germany the ECJ argued that the multiplicity of national provisions could act 
as “barriers to trade with direct consequences for the creation and operation of the common 
market.”148 Hence, the Court concluded, “harmonisation of such divergent provisions may, by reason 
of its scope and effects, be undertaken only by the Community legislature”,149 broadening in this 
way the scope of Union competences but also reducing any discrepancies between national 
provisions that could hinder economic exchange within the common market. For Tuori, this is an 
indication that the need for economic “effectiveness and uniformity have functioned as a bridge 
linking economic and juridical constitutionalisation”.150 For the purposes of our discussion, the 
Court’s approach to subsidiarity indicates the ongoing migration of economic decision-making to 
supranational institutions afforded insulation from interference, hence enhancing the degree of 
separation and insulation afforded to these institutions.  
A further example of how judicial review responds to the needs of sectoral constitutionalisation 
is the involvement of the ECJ in developing economic integration. 151 As the discussion on 
ordoliberalism earlier in the chapter indicated, insulation of economic decision-making is achieved 
through disembedding the market – the freeing of the market from “extra-economic controls and 
governed immanently, by supply and demand”.152 In the initial stages of European integration, the 
ECJ promoted ‘negative’ integration by developing principles and interpreting treaty provisions 
 
147 Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice, 37. 
148 Case 178/84, Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, ECLI:EU:C:1987:126, [46]. See 
also Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, The Queen, on the application of Alliance for Natural Health and Nutri-Link Ltd. v. 
Secretary of State for Health, ECLI:EU:C:2005:199, [106]–[108]. 
149 Case C-103/01, Commission v. Germany, [46].  
150 Tuori, European Constitutionalism, 138. 
151 See for example: Alec Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Anne-
Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, "Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration”, International 
Organization 47, no. 01 (1993), 41-76; Miguel Poiares Maduro, We the Court: The European Court of Justice and the 
European Economic Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998). 
152 Nancy Fraser, "Marketization, Social Protection, Emancipation: Toward a Neo-Polanyian Conception of Capitalist Crisis”, 
in Business as Usual: The Roots of the Global Financial Meltdown, eds. Craig Calhoun and Georgi Derluguian (New York and 
London: New York University Press, 2010), 137-158. 
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aiming to remove barriers between states, such as tariffs,153 or barriers to the free movement of 
persons, services and capital.154 As Majone highlights, the development of negative integration 
“point in the direction of a far-reaching separation of state power from market power”155 and, 
therefore, the insulation of economic decision-making from political interference.  
The development of competition law by the ECJ indicates how separation and insulation of 
economic decision-making was complemented through the exercise of judicial review. While in this 
area of law the Commission is in charge of “enforcing competition law and competition policy in 
general, and the Court has accorded the Commission a rather wide margin of policy discretion”,156 
the ECJ played an important role by interpreting and developing competition law. The Court’s 
jurisprudence “was by and large in harmony with ordoliberal predilections”157 concerning the 
centrality of competition to achieve the aim of establishing an internal market. Following Article 3 of 
the Treaty of Rome (now Article 3 TFEU), the Court established a strong connection between the 
creation of an internal market and the development of competition rules.158 Moreover, the Court 
reiterated the importance of competition in achieving the objectives set by the Treaties by 
highlighting the centrality of Article 101TFEU (previously Article 81 EC and 85 TEC). Indicatively, in 
Eco Swiss the ECJ argued that Article 101 TFEU, setting out prohibitions to any limits to the internal 
market, is fundamental for achieving the objective of the Treaties but also for the functioning of the 
internal market.159 Continuing along this line of thought, the Court ruled that competition rules 
should be safeguarded and upheld not only for the benefit of consumers but, also, for the benefit of 
competitors and the structure of the common market.160 As the centrality of competition is upheld 
throughout the Court’s jurisprudence, it is no surprise that competition law was expanded to cover a 
 
153 Article 3(a) TEEC. 
154 Articles 28-37 on the free movement of goods, Articles 45-48 TFEU on the free movement of workers, Articles 49-55 
TFEU on the freedom of establishment, Articles 56-62 TFEU on the free movement of services and Articles 63-66 TFEU on 
the free movement of capital. In relation to freedom of goods see Case 7/68 Commission v Italy (Art Treasures), 
ECLI:EU:C:1968:51; In relation to the free movement of workers see Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Württemberg, 
ECLI:EU:C:1986:284; In relation to freedom of establishment see Case C-221/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex 
parte Factortame Ltd and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1991:320; In relation to freedom of services see Joined Cases 286/82 and 
26/83 Luisi and Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro, ECLI:EU:C:1984:35; the definition of capital has been interpreted in an non-
uniform way. See Niamh Nic Shuibhne, The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law: Constitutional Responsibility and the 
Court of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 33. 
155 Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth, 34. 
156 Tuori, European Constitutionalism, 146.  
157 Ibid, 157.  
158 In the case of Metro v Commission the Court ruled that the creation of a single market set out to replicate competitive 
conditions similar to those of domestic markets where the degree of competition may vary depending on market sectors. 
In doing so, the Court also indicated the indispensability of competition from the aim of creating an internal market.  
See: Case 26/76, Metro SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG v Commission of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:C:1977:167. 
159 Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV, ECLI:EU:C:1999:269, [36] 
160 Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P, C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and 
Others, ECLI:EU:C:2009:610. 
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wide array of actions,161 and restricted exemptions based on other factors (such as public policy) on 
a case-by-case basis instead of developing a general rule of application.162 Taken together, these 
examples indicate how the Court developed competition law and, most importantly, position 
competition as a central mechanism through which to achieve the aim of an internal market.163 In 
doing so, the Court actively supports the dis-embedding of the internal market from considerations 
that could restrict competition and limits any distortions to competition to case-by-case basis. By 
interpreting the Treaties in a way that reinforced the separation of the common market from 
national political interference, the ECJ did not only act as the “mask and shield”164 of European 
integration but also complemented the neoliberal political economic thought embedded in the 
process of integration.  
3.3 Social and fundamental rights as a conflicting constitutional objective 
Until this point, the section focused on how judicial review by the ECJ complements neoliberal 
political economic processes. However, evidence of the constitutionalisation of conflicting objectives 
through judicial review can also be found in the ECJ’s jurisprudence. Specifically, cases that re-
embed the market with social considerations contradict the neoliberal idea of separation and 
insulation of economic decision-making from political interference.165 One of the most noticeable 
examples found in the Court’s case-law is the protection of fundamental rights as we can observe 
the conflict between economic and fundamental rights. As, for example, in the case of 
Schmidberger,166 where a haulage company’s rights to free movement of goods (Article 34 TFEU) had 
to be balanced against the fundamental right of activists to freedom of expression and assembly. 
Similarly, in the case of Omega,167 a restriction on the setting up of a laser dome where laser guns 
would be used in a virtual combat between participants was justified on the grounds of the pursuit 
of human dignity. Another notable example comes from the Court’s approach in the area of free 
movement of labour, where social considerations contradicted the idea of separation of the 
 
161 For example, the Court ruled that actions carried out by public authorities that could nevertheless be carried out by 
private entities were subject to competition law. See: Case C-475/99, Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:577; Case T-155/04, SELEX Systemi Integrati v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2006:387; Case T-113/07, SELEX 
Systemi Integrati v Commission and Eurocontrol, ECLI:EU:C:2009:191. 
162 Case C-309/99 Wouters and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2002:98 
163 Even in the post-Lisbon era, where the objective of undistorted competition was removed from the Treaty and 
positioned in a Protocol (Protocol No 27 (TEU), On the internal market and competition) Tuori sees no change in the 
Court’s approach to competition law. See Ibid, 158. 
164 Burley and Mattli, Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 41-76 
165 James A. Caporaso and Sidney Tarrow, "Polanyi in Brussels: Supranational Institutions and the Transnational Embedding 
of Markets”, International Organization 63, no. 4 (2009), 593-620; Deborah Mabbett, "Polanyi in Brussels or Luxembourg? 
Social Rights and Market Regulation in European Insurance”, Regulation & Governance 8, no. 2 (2014), 186-202; Case 
63/1986, Commission v. Italy. 
166 Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich, ECLI:EU:C:2003:333.  
167 Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:614. 
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economy from politics. In the case of Klaus,168 the Court ruled in favour of a Dutch national trying to 
claim benefits in the Netherlands after her period of employment was intermitted by period of 
employment in Spain.169 Similarly, the Court rendered national measures concerning benefits for 
family members incompatible with the Treaty when these precluded a worker from claiming 
benefits in either their home country or their county of employment. Regulation 1408/1971 also 
tackled this issue and the ECJ consistently interpreted the Regulation in favour of worker’s rights.170 
In these cases we can see how the Court made use of considerations other than economic 
competition or efficiency and subjected the reach of the economic constitution to the restrictions 
posed by fundamental rights. 
Some commentators tend to downplay the significance of social and fundamental rights 
jurisprudence as a countermovement to neoliberalism. Dale and El-Enany, for example, argue that it 
is “perfectly plausible that the driving force behind the extension of social rights is not social in 
nature—consideration of EU citizens qua human beings—but economic”.171 In a similar tone, Höpner 
and Schäfer argue that ECJ jurisprudence on non-discrimination is guided by economic ideas of 
increased efficiency achieved through greater equality.172 Furthermore, the limitation of economic 
rights when in conflict with fundamental rights as in the case of Schmidberger or Omega is, 
according to Tuori, not as revealing as it may seem. For Tuori, the framing of the issue is of outmost 
importance: “in conflicts of rights, what needs justification is restricting not a fundamental right but 
an economic right.”173 Tuori’s proposition finds support in the proportionality test employed by the 
Court. By asking whether restrictions to free movement are proportionate to the aim and benefit of 
the justificatory grounds,174 the Court is prioritising free movement over other objectives and is 
willing to allow restrictions only in cases where justificatory grounds are serious enough to excuse 
the curtailment of free movement. All of the above observations challenge the degree to which 
social and fundamental rights jurisprudence conflict with the separation and insulation of economic 
decision-making from political interference. However, the very existence of these cases indicates 
that neoliberalism may be reflected and consolidated through constitutional law, but it is also 
contradicted, conflicted and mitigated through law.  
 
168 Case 482/1993, S.E. Klaus v. Besturr van de Nieuwe Algemene Bednjfsveremging, ECLI:EU:C:1995:349. 
169 Considering a claim under Article 177 TEEC, the Court ruled that "the working life of the person concerned should be 
seen as a whole, and not just from the limited standpoint of a particular job in one country, at one period of time”. 
170 C-228/1988, Bronzino v. Kindergeldkasse. 
171 Dale and El-Enany, The Limits of Social Europe: EU Law and the Ordoliberal Agenda, 613-650, 625. 
172 Martin Höpner and Armin Schäfer, "Polanyi in Brussels? Embeddedness and the Three Dimensions of European 
Economic Integration”, MPIfG Discussion Paper, no. 10/8 (2010). 
173 Tuori, European Constitutionalism, 28. 
174 Ibid, 142. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to consider how the neoliberal idea of separation and insulation of 
economic activity from political interference is constitutionalised in the European Union. Chapter 1 
of the thesis identified four elements in the relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional 
law: the separation of economic activity from politics; the locking-in of neoliberalism through 
constitutional provisions; the insulation of economic decision-making from political interference 
through institutional structures; and the reproduction of neoliberal ideas through legal decisions. 
These elements were reproduced here as a guide to consider the relationship between 
neoliberalism and European constitutionalism. By studying theories of European constitutionalism, 
the EU’s institutional structure and ECJ decisions, the chapter indicated how the separation and 
insulation of economic decision-making from political interference was achieved through 
constitutional law. However, constitutional law also has the capacity to act as a vehicle for 
articulating other, often conflicting, constitutional objectives. In each of the above examples, a 
further dimension to constitutional law was identified – that of articulating constitutional objectives 
that are often in competition to the objective of insulation. Examples discussed include the 
development of social and political notions in the many constitutions of Europe (Section 1), the 
development of democratic processes of decision-making (Section 2) and the development of social 
and fundamental rights by the ECJ (Section 3).  
As many and conflicting constitutional objectives were identified within European 
constitutionalism, the chapter suggests that Europe’s constitution prior to the crisis acted as a space 
for constitutional debate and conflict. This reading resist deterministic accounts of European 
constitutionalism while accepting the constitutive role of law in effecting the neoliberal vision of 
separating and insulating economic activity from interference. By accepting this dual role of law, as a 
vehicle for neoliberalisation but also as a vehicle for countering neoliberalism, the chapter insists on 
retaining the constitutional question open; contestation, in other words, existed prior to the 
Eurozone crisis. Therefore, constitutional law may operate to give legal form to the insulation of 
economic decision-making from political interference, but the constant operation of conflicting 
constitutional objectives prevents the creation of a scrutiny lacuna within European 
constitutionalism prior to the Eurozone crisis. In the remainder of the thesis, I will consider how the 
joint operation of institutional development and of ultra vires review by national and supranational 
courts reinforce the degree of insulation afforded to economic decision-making and how this affects 
European constitutionalism as a space for constitutional conflict.
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Chapter 3 – The constitutional implications of crisis response 
measures: The creation and constitutionalisation of a scrutiny lacuna 
In this chapter, I consider the constitutional implications of the Eurozone crisis and the broader 
significance of this moment for European constitutionalism. As every assessment of change requires 
an understanding of the condition prior to the event through which change is achieved, the 
assessment of constitutional implications arising from the Eurozone crisis relies on the condition of 
European constitutionalism prior to the crisis. Chapter 1 identified how the development of 
constitutionalism beyond the state gives shape to elements of neoliberal political economic though, 
specifically, the separation and insulation of economic decision-making from political interference. 
Chapter 2 continued to examine the extent to which European constitutionalism is influenced by 
neoliberalism and I argued that prior to the Eurozone crisis, European constitutionalism was a space 
for constitutional conflict between the neoliberal objective of separating and insulating economic 
decision-making from political interference and opposing constitutional objectives. Drawing on the 
two previous chapters, I consider how the relationship between neoliberalism and European 
constitutionalism is altered during the crisis; in other words, whether European constitutionalism 
can still be considered as a space for constitutional conflict.  
To achieve this, the chapter focuses on how crisis response measures have been decided. It 
starts by examining how dominant framings of the crisis influenced both the policy approach 
adopted by EU institutions and the ways through which measures were decided. While the 
economic aspect of the Eurozone crisis is beyond the scope of the thesis, it is important to 
appreciate that dominant framings of the economic conditions pertaining at the time influence the 
approach of European institutions and Eurozone members to crisis response measures. In the first 
section of this chapter, I indicate the connection between dominant framings of the crisis, the 
dominance of austerity as a policy approach to response measures, and the development of 
institutional channels for decision-making aimed at circumventing constitutional limitations to 
possible courses of action in order to push through with those response measures considered 
necessary. In the second section, I continue to consider the constitutional implications of developing 
new channels for decision-making. This section reviews three examples: the provision of loans to 
Eurozone members by newly formed financial mechanisms such as the ESM; the strengthening of 
fiscal coordination by legislative provisions; and the development of institutions or institutional 
formations. Each example shows how coordination between European institutions and Eurozone 
members is intensified, thus deepening the insulation of economic decision-making from political 
interference. In this section, therefore, the constitutional implications of the Eurozone crisis are 
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observed in the intensification of coordination and the strengthening of insulation of economic 
decision-making from political interference. As a result, the section identifies how new methods of 
coordination disturb the institutional architecture of the EU, increase the competences of the Union 
to influence fiscal and social policy and disturbance the fragile democratic settlement between the 
EU and its Member States. Lastly, section three considers how the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) deals with the constitutional circumventions and consequent constitutional 
implications identified in section two.  
The chapter argues that the intensification of coordination between European institutions and 
Eurozone members leads to an intensification of insulation afforded to economic decision-making. 
European institutions engaged in economic decision-making during the crisis are insulated from 
political interference that may arise from democratic contestation at the national level but also from 
requirements for practices of good governance. As a result, the chapter identifies the creation of a 
scrutiny lacuna within European constitutionalism. Further, it is argued that judicial responses to the 
constitutional implications of intensified coordination operate to provide legal validation to the 
scrutiny lacuna, leading to its constitutionalisation. For these reasons, the chapter concludes that 
the Eurozone crisis presents a clear neoliberal moment where the separation and insulation of 
economic decision-making takes precedence over all other constitutional objectives, dissolving in 
this way any constitutional conflict operating within European constitutionalism prior to the crisis.  
1. The Eurozone Crisis: Causes, dominant frames and institutional channels for 
decision-making 
Two years after the global financial crisis of 2007, the Eurozone experienced an ongoing 
sovereign debt and financial crisis. In some countries, the crisis was triggered by high sovereign debt 
and spilled over to the banking sector;1 in other circumstances the reverse occurred.2 As the crisis 
unfolded, it challenged the very viability of the common currency.3 The Eurozone crisis, as it came to 
be known, is a complex economic phenomenon with deep, even historical, causes and wide effects.4 
 
1 Owen Parker and Dimitris Tsarouhas, eds, Crisis in the Eurozone Periphery: The Political Economies of Greece, Spain, 
Ireland and Portugal (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). 
2 Most notably, Ireland, Spain and Cyprus. Heather D. Gibson, Theodore Palivos and George S. Tavlas, "The Crisis in the 
Euro Area: An Analytic Overview”, Journal of Macroeconomics 39 (2014), 233-239, 234. In Ireland and to some extent in 
Cyprus, there was a banking crisis that caused a sovereign debt crisis following the government’s decision to bail out the 
banks using public funds. See Efrosyni Panayi and Stavros A. Zenios, "Was the Cyprus Crisis Banking Or Sovereign Debt?" 
The Wharton Financial Institutions Centre, University of Pensylvania Working Paper 14-19 (2014). 
3 Gibson, Palivos and Tavlas, The Crisis in the Euro Area: An Analytic Overview, 233-239, 234.  
4 Mario Baldassarri, The European Roots of the Eurozone Crisis: Errors of the Past and Needs for the Future (Cham: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2017); Costas Lapavitsas, Crisis in the Eurozone (London: Verso Books, 2012); Jean Pisani-Ferry, The Euro Erisis 
and its Aftermath (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Richard Baldwin and Daniel Gros, eds, The Eurozone Crisis: A 
Consensus View of the Causes and a Few Possible Solutions (London: Centre for European Policy Studies Press, 2015). 
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As would be expected, there is no shortage of economic accounts exploring causes, effects and 
responses to the Eurozone crisis.5 While a detailed consideration of economic analyses of the crisis is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, two themes are important to appreciate. First, how the historical 
backdrop of creating a monetary union contributed to the creation of a complex banking and 
sovereign debt crisis, and second, how dominant framings give more weight to the sovereign debt 
aspects of the Eurozone crisis, leading to the adoption of austerity as a dominant response 
mechanism.  
1.1 Fraught foundations: Asymmetries and the absence of a lender of last resort 
The creation of a monetary union was aimed at establishing an optimum currency area where all 
participants would benefit from increased economic efficiency. However, the creation of a common 
currency assumes that participating economies share similar characteristics.6 In fact, the Eurozone 
united economies of divergent types, what the literature identifies as varieties of capitalism,7 and 
despite the implementation of convergence criteria,8 it was well known at the time of the Euro’s 
creation that participating economies “did not fully satisfy all the conditions for a monetary Union.” 9 
From the very outset, therefore, the Eurozone was characterized by differences in economic 
conditions between core and periphery economies, terms that function both geographically and 
financially, as it denotes a distinction between more and less wealthy Eurozone members. 
Moreover, the division also denotes structural differences between the countries, mainly related to 
economic conditions such as the labour market, structures of domestic production or inflation rates, 
but also the balance of trade of each economy with core countries tending toward a positive balance 
while periphery countries tend toward a negative trade balance. These structural asymmetries 
meant that participation in the Eurozone affected each economy differently.  
 
https://www.tau.ac.il/~yashiv/VOX.pdf#page=110; Parker and Tsarouhas, Crisis in the Eurozone Periphery: The Political 
Economies of Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal 
5 The wide and often conflicting accounts of the Eurozone crisis echo George Bernard Shaw’s famous saying, that if all 
economists were laid end to end, they would not reach a conclusion. 
6 Robert A. Mundell, "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas”, The American Economic Review 51, no. 4 (1961), 657-665. 
The theory of monetary integration presupposed two key shared characteristics between participating economies – the 
“similarity of structural characteristics (e.g, labour market institutions, inflation rates, levels of economic development, and 
production structures) among the participants to reduce the incidence of asymmetric shocks, and the existence of 
adequate adjustment mechanisms (e.g, labour mobility and fiscal integration) to lessen the impact of asymmetric shocks, 
should they occur”. See Gibson, Palivos and Tavlas, The Crisis in the Euro Area: An Analytic Overview, 233-239, 234. 
7 David W. Soskice and Peter A. Hall, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
8 The Maastricht convergence criteria, outlined in Article 140 TFEU (ex Articles 121(1), 122(2), second sentence, and 123(5) 
TEC), aimed at measuring a country’s preparedness to adopt the euro. The set of macroeconomic indicators adopted by 
Maastricht are price stability, sound public finances, exchange rate stability and long-term interest rates. 
9 Gibson, Palivos and Tavlas, The Crisis in the Euro Area: An Analytic Overview, 233-239, 234. 
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On the one hand, periphery countries lost their ability to exercise monetary policy and could no 
longer affect their trade balances by devaluing their currency.10 Core countries, on the other hand, 
continued their export-led growth in a renewed context, as periphery countries were now less 
competitive.11 As periphery countries were less competitive, they could no longer pursue demand-
led growth. This was tackled by new opportunities presented within the new currency union as core 
countries exported surpluses to the periphery with low interest rates, leading to a debt-led growth. 
As a result, core countries (mainly Germany, France and the Netherlands) essentially financed 
spending in the periphery and supplied the periphery with goods that they bought with money 
borrowed from the core. While this meant real growth for the core, it also created a hidden risk as 
their demand-led growth depended on financing their customer base. As Regan explains, this circle 
of debt was facilitated by the common currency, freedom of capital and low interest rates.12 More 
importantly, though, “much of the borrowed money in the periphery did not find its way into the 
productive economy, but into non-productive consumption and investment that did little to 
stimulate the export capacities of the periphery”, leading to the creation of so-called bubbles in both 
periphery and core countries.13 Moreover, the periphery experienced inflation “including high wages 
in non-tradable or non-export sectors such as service and public sectors”14 creating more structural 
issues and economic risks for these economies. As Parker and Tsarouhas indicate, “both core and 
periphery states were content to overlook these imbalances as long as there was growth in the 
Eurozone”,15 which led to the exacerbation of asymmetries and the creation of unsustainable debts 
in the periphery. Positioning the crisis within the backdrop of asymmetries predating the monetary 
union and exacerbated after its creation allows us to account for two main components of the crisis. 
Firstly, asymmetries owed to the Euro’s design16 contributed to current-account imbalances,17 which 
 
10 Peter A. Hall, "Varieties of Capitalism and the Euro Crisis”, West European Politics 37, no. 6 (2014), 1223-1243; Aidan 
Regan, "Political Tensions in Euro-Varieties of Capitalism: The Crisis of the Democratic State in Europe”, EUI Working Paper, 
no. 2013/14 (2013). 
11 Owen Parker and Dimitris Tsarouhas, "Causes and Consequences of Crisis in the Eurozone Periphery”, in Crisis in the 
Eurozone Periphery: The Political Economies of Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, eds. Owen Parker and Dimitris 
Tsarouhas (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 1-27, 5. 
12 Regan, Political Tensions in Euro-Varieties of Capitalism: The Crisis of the Democratic State in Europe. 
13 Parker and Tsarouhas, Causes and Consequences of Crisis in the Eurozone Periphery, 1-27, 7. 
14 Ibid. 
15 There is a strong link between neoliberal financialization, including financial deregulation, and the creation of debt in the 
periphery that this chapter will not explore further. For further discussion see: Engelbert Stockhammer, "Neoliberal 
Growth Models, Monetary Union and the Euro Crisis. A Post-Keynesian Perspective”, New Political Economy 21, no. 4 
(2016), 365-379. For a broader discussion on neoliberal financialization, see: Costas Lapavitsas, Profiting without 
Producing: How Finance Exploits Us all (London: Verso, 2014).  
16 According to Parker and Tsarouhas “it was EMU that locked-in German competitive advantages vis-à-vis the periphery, 
established an environment that made borrowing and growing indebtedness easier in the periphery, and (as noted above) 
facilitated the intensification of an already liberalized capital mobility from core to periphery.” Parker and Tsarouhas, 
Causes and Consequences of Crisis in the Eurozone Periphery, 1-27, 11. 
17 Gibson, Palivos and Tavlas, The Crisis in the Euro Area: An Analytic Overview, 233-239, 235. See also: Olivier Blanchard 
and Francesco Giavazzi, "Current Account Deficits in the Euro Area: The End of the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle?" Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity 33, no. 2 (2002), 147-209. 
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in turn bolstered sovereign debt. Secondly, asymmetries explain the disproportionate impact of the 
crisis on periphery economies as opposed to the core.  
Another contributing factor, also associated with the construction of the Euro, is the absence of 
a lender of last resort. In the absence of a fiscal union, the EMU operates solely as a monetary union 
and lacks some of the characteristics of other currency unions. As de Grauwe explains, typically in 
any currency union, a central bank acts as a lender of last resort to ensure and secure the solvency 
of its banking sector and the government (also called the ‘sovereigns’ in economic scholarship).18 
The existence of a lender of last resort enhances market confidence and restricts market panic in 
case a government experiences economic difficulties.19 However, in the case of the EMU, fiscal 
discipline could not be implemented by the European Central Bank (ECB) whose mandate is limited 
to maintaining price stability through “maintaining debt and deficit levels within certain limits”.20 
Consequently, the ECB is constitutionally precluded from exercising the functions of a lender of last 
resort. Article 123 TFEU prohibits the provision of overdraft facilities or any other type of credit 
facility to a Member State or union institution by another Union institution or central bank of a 
Member State. Moreover, Article 125 TFEU, also known as the no-bail-out clause, provides that 
neither the Union nor a Member State shall be liable for or assume the commitments of central 
governments. The combined effect is to remove the ability of any government, union institution or 
central bank to assume the role of a lender of last resort in instances where a sovereign faces 
liquidity issues. The logic behind Articles 123 and 125 TFEU is that fiscal discipline in the EMU is left 
to market forces, which rests on the belief that market mechanisms are adequate to enforce fiscal 
discipline because those sovereigns who do not exercise prudent budgetary policy will not be able to 
obtain capital from the markets. However, the constant flow of capital from core to periphery 
exposed periphery countries to a circle of debt, and when the crisis hit, traditional crisis resolving 
mechanisms such as the lender of last resort were not in place. 21  
1.2 Dominant frames and austerity as the sole solution 
While the Euro’s fraught foundations and structural asymmetries may help explain the crisis and 
crisis response measures,22 as this section indicates, the Eurozone crisis was discussed and analysed 
 
18 Paul De Grauwe, "Design Failures in the Eurozone: Can they be Fixed?" LEQS Paper, no. 57 (2013). 
19 Parker and Tsarouhas, Causes and Consequences of Crisis in the Eurozone Periphery, 1-27, 12. See also, De Grauwe, 
Design Failures in the Eurozone: Can they be Fixed? 
20 Parker and Tsarouhas, Causes and Consequences of Crisis in the Eurozone Periphery, 1-27, 11; “Monetary Policy”, 
European Central Bank, Accessed April 20th 2020, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/intro/html/index.en.html  
21 Richard E. Baldwin and Daniel Gros, "What Caused the Eurozone Crisis?" CEPS Commentary (November 27, 2015, 2015), 
2. 
22 Two emergency financial mechanisms (the EFSM and EFSF) and one permanent financial mechanism (the ESM) were 
established in the aftermath of the crisis. A more detailed discussion of these mechanisms can be found in section 2.1 of 
this chapter.  
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predominantly as a sovereign debt crisis. Against the economic background described above, the 
crisis unfolded soon after the Greek government released the true figure of its debt.23 In light of this 
information, holders of Greek sovereign bonds rushed to offload their assets, which in turn pushed 
Greece’s cost of borrowing to unsustainable levels.24 In the absence of a lender of last resort, 
financial assistance to Greece was not provided quickly, only being initiated after “Germany 
ultimately decided that the potential systemic effects to the Euro of allowing a default were too 
great”.25 A series of bail-out programmes26 were agreed between the Greek government and the 
European Commission, ECB and International Monetary Fund (IMF) – a configuration known as the 
Troika. Despite attempts to control the contagion of an economic downturn, the Greek sovereign 
debt crisis ignited a series of economic effects, with the economies of Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain 
and Ireland following a similar trend up until 2009. In all of these examples, current account deficit, 
government deficit and general government debt (all indicators calculated as percentage of gross 
domestic product) were rising.27 As a result, Portugal’s experience was similar to Greece’s, with the 
high cost of borrowing rendering its debt unsustainable and triggering a sovereign debt crisis.28 For 
Spain, Italy, Ireland and Cyprus, a banking crisis triggered a sovereign debt crisis. Spain and Ireland 
were unable to repay private debt, thus triggering a banking crisis; in Italy, large banks suffered 
losses from the wider effects of the global financial crisis. As banks threatened to collapse, private 
debt was nationalised when governments intervened to support the banking sector, and, the 
banking crisis became a sovereign debt crisis.29 
 
23 On 20 October 2009, the newly elected government announced that the Greek debt was not 3.6 percent of GDP, as 
quoted by the previous administration, but triple that figure at 12.8 percent of GDP. It increased to 13.6 percent in April 
2010. See Kevin Featherstone, "The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU: A Failing State in a Skewed Regime”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies 49, no. 2 (2011), 193-217, 199. 
24 Financial markets increasingly pointed out the possibility of a Greek default, leading to the downgrading of Greek bonds 
by credit rating agencies to ‘junk status’ in April 2010. Demand for Greek government bonds fell dramatically while existing 
bond holders rushed to sell their assets. For further discussion see: Parker and Tsarouhas, Causes and Consequences of 
Crisis in the Eurozone Periphery, 1-27, 9; Featherstone, The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU: A Failing State in a 
Skewed Regime, 193-217, 199-200. 
25 Parker and Tsarouhas, Causes and Consequences of Crisis in the Eurozone Periphery, 1-27, 9. 
26 The first programme (May 2010) “provided bilateral loans pooled by the European Commission (Greek Loan Facility – 
GLF) for a total amount of €80 billion to be released over the period May 2010 to June 2013”. The second programme 
(March 2012), financed by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and IMF, “committed the unreleased amounts of 
the first programme (Greek loan facility) plus an additional €130 billion for the years 2012-14.” When the second 
programme expired in June 2015, the Greek government applied to the ESM for further assistance. The Commission 
approved the application, paving the way for the a further €86 billion in financial assistance over three years (2015-18). 
Following a series of reviews (May 2016, July 2017, January 2018 and June 2018) and the signing of supplementary 
Memorandums of Understanding, Greece completed all programmes concluded with the Troika. After June 2018, Greece 
entered a period of enhanced surveillance under the new rules on fiscal coordination (these will be outlined in due course). 
See https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-financial-
assistance/which-eu-countries-have-received-assistance/financial-assistance-greece_en 
27 Presented in Michael G. Arghyrou and John D. Tsoukalas, "The Greek Debt Crisis: Likely Causes, Mechanics and 
Outcomes”, The World Economy 34, no. 2 (2011), 173-191, 185. Data source, Eurostat and OECD.  
28 Parker and Tsarouhas, Causes and Consequences of Crisis in the Eurozone Periphery, 1-27, 14. 
29 Matthias Matthijs and Mark Blyth, eds, The Future of the Euro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1-17. 
 93 
 Despite the multifaceted and interlinked causes of the Eurozone crisis, sovereign debt became 
the dominant frame through which the crisis was discussed, analysed and, most importantly, 
resolved. 30 It is important to appreciate, as Colin Hay explains, the connection between the framing 
of an event, the identification of appropriate responses based on this framing and, finally, a decisive 
intervention by an actor capable of intervening.31 In his words, “those who are able to define what 
crisis is all about also hold the key to defining the appropriate strategies for [its] resolution”,32 
including the identification of an agent or institution that is more suitable for initiating, delivering 
and ensuring the effectiveness of those responses.33 In the Eurozone crisis, the majority of powerful 
stakeholders, including the Commission, ECB, ECOFIN (Economic and Financial Affairs) Council and 
the European Council, framed the problem as a sovereign debt crisis caused by imprudent 
government spending. Austerity, defined by Blyth as “a form of voluntary deflation in which the 
economy adjusts through the reduction of wages, prices, and public spending to restore 
competitiveness which is (supposedly) best achieved by cutting the state’s budget, debts, and 
deficits”,34 was applied indiscriminately across the macroeconomic adjustment programmes used in 
Eurozone countries. 35 While the effectiveness of austerity as the antidote to the Eurozone crisis is 
highly contested,36 dominant framings of the crisis have led to the continuing implementation of 
austerity policies in those countries where financial assistance was provided by the EU.37  
For our discussion, the link between dominant framings of the Eurozone crisis and the resulting 
policy measures becomes relevant in identifying how crisis response measures are decided and 
 
30 Indicatively, see: Brigid Laffan, "Framing the Crisis, Defining the Problems: Decoding the Euro Area Crisis”, Perspectives 
on European Politics and Society 15, no. 3 (2014), 266-280; Pisani-Ferry, The Euro Erisis and its Aftermath; Nicolas Jabko, 
"The Political Appeal of Austerity”, Comparative European Politics 11, no. 6 (2013), 705-712; Georgios Karyotis and Roman 
Gerodimos, eds, The Politics of Extreme Austerity: Greece in the Eurozone Crisis (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).  
31 Colin Hay, "Crisis and the Structural Transformation of the State: Interrogating the Process of Change”, The British 
Journal of Politics & International Relations 1, no. 3 (1999), 317-344. 
32 Paul 't Hart, "Symbols, Rituals and Power: The Lost Dimensions of Crisis Management”, Journal of Contingencies and 
Crisis Management 1, no. 1 (1993), 36-50, 41. 
33 Colin Hay, "Narrating Crisis: The Discursive Construction of the Winter of Discontent”, Sociology 30, no. 2 (1996), 253-
277, 254. See also Janet Roitman, Anti-Crisis (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); Antoon De Rycker and Mohd Zuraidah 
Don, eds, Discourse and Crisis: Critical Perspectives (Amsterdam / Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2013). 
34 Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
35 Details about macroeconomic adjustment programmes applied to Eurozoen countries (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Greece 
and Cyprus) can be found on the European Stability Mechanism’s website: https://www.esm.europa.eu/financial-
assistance .  
36 Parker and Owen, for example, argue that “the official EU (and most frequently presented) diagnosis of the crisis tended 
to seriously simplify, if not refute, the story of imbalance, financialization and the faulty design of the single currency 
enunciated above. This represented an unwillingness to acknowledge the deeper failures of the neoliberal ideas of efficient 
markets that underpinned the design of the single currency”. See Parker and Tsarouhas, Causes and Consequences of Crisis 
in the Eurozone Periphery, 1-27, 13. On the effects of austerity, see Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji, "The Legacy of Austerity 
in the Eurozone”, Centre for European Policy Studies (2013), 1-6. 
37 Manos Matsaganis and Chrysa Leventi, "The Distributional Impact of the Greek Crisis in 2010”, Fiscal Studies 34, no. 1 
(2013), 83-108. Catherine Moury and André Freire, "Austerity Policies and Politics: The Case of Portugal”, Pôle Sud, no. 2 
(2013), 35-56. Kieran Allen and Brian O'Boyle, Austerity Ireland: The Failure of Irish Capitalism (London: Pluto Press, 2013). 
Alexander Michaelides and Athanasios Orphanides, eds, The Cyprus Bail-in: Policy Lessons from the Cyprus Economic Crisis 
(London: Imperial College Press, 2016).  
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administered. In other words, I am less concerned with exploring the link between framings of the 
problem and policy responses and more concerned with the institutional channels of decision-
making adopted to administer what were considered appropriate responses. In the remainder of 
this chapter, therefore, I will consider the development of policy decisions during the crisis and any 
constitutional implications resulting from the ways through which crisis response measures have 
been decided.  
2. Constitutional implications of the Eurozone crisis: Intensified coordination, 
constitutional circumventions and the insulation of economic decision-making from 
political interference 
As the previous section indicated, dominant framings led to the qualification of austerity and 
structural reforms as necessary and appropriate crisis response measures. Europe’s leaders saw a 
need for greater coordination between various stakeholders that existing channels of 
intergovernmental cooperation and Community decision-making could not address. Herman Van 
Rompuy, then acting as the president of the European Council, captures the spirit of European 
leaders at the time by arguing that “the choice is not between the community method and the 
intergovernmental method, but between a coordinated European position and nothing at all.”38 
Similarly, the comments of German Chancellor Angela Merkel echo the need for a coordinated 
European position; a position that would be common across all stakeholders – “the Union 
institutions, the Member States and their parliaments”.39 It is unclear whether existing channels 
under the Community or intergovernmental methods were, indeed, inadequate to articulate a 
coordinated response or whether the political will to employ those methods was lacking. For the 
purposes of our discussion, though, it is not necessary to examine why existing channels were 
avoided; what matters is the development of institutions during the crisis and how they affected 
what European leaders identified as a coordinated European response. Towards this end, this 
section considers the institutional channels of decision-making that determined and administered 
crisis response measures.  
Drawing upon three examples of crisis response measures, the section will examine how 
coordination between European institutions and Eurozone members was intensified, leading to an 
analogous intensification in the insulation of economic decision-making from democratic 
participation and contestation. Intensification of coordination and insulation, as will be indicated, is 
 
38 Angela Merkel, "Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the Opening Ceremony of the 61st Academic Year of the 
College of Europe in Bruges on 2 November 2010" (Bruges, College of Europe, 2010). 
file:///Users/Michalis/Downloads/europakolleg_brugge_mitschrift_englisch_0.pdf, 7. 
39 Ibid.  
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achieved either through the creation of new financial institutions such as the ESM; the elaboration 
of existing legal structures for fiscal policy coordination; and the development of intergovernmental 
methods for coordination between the Member States. For each, the section will identify how crisis 
response increased the degree of insulation afforded to those institutions tasked with devising crisis 
response measures. Insulation includes the distancing of decision-making from the participation of 
citizens or their representatives, practices of good governance such as accountability or 
transparency and the contestation of measures through judicial review. As insulation is 
strengthened along with intensified processes of intergovernmental coordination, this section of the 
chapter identifies the creation of a scrutiny lacuna during the Eurozone crisis.  
2.1 Assistance to Member States: Lending facilities and strict conditionality 
As indicated earlier, in some Eurozone countries public debt compared to GDP rose to 
disproportionate levels, which lead to national governments loosing access to financial markets.40 
While the Eurozone was faced with the possibility of economic collapse in several Eurozone 
economies, the absence of a lender of last resort significantly reduced the fiscal tools available for 
crisis management. In response, the European Union developed lending facilities for granting 
financial assistance to governments of Member States with financial difficulties. In this first example 
I consider how the creation of financial institutions such as the European Stability Mechanism 
intensifies coordination but also insulates crucial economic decision-making from democratic 
contestation during the crisis.  
As first instance, two emergency financial mechanisms were created to finance the economies 
within the Eurozone facing severe difficulties. The European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 
(EFSM) was established under Article 122(2) TFEU through a Council Regulation,41 financed directly 
from EU budget, and provided financial assistance to Ireland and Portugal and Greece. In addition to 
the EFSM, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) formed a temporary fiscal backstop with 
the capacity of providing loan facilities. The EFSF was established as a private company based in 
Luxembourg by the Eurozone countries in 2010.42 Some two years later, a more permanent financial 
mechanism, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), was established to act as an emergency 
 
40 Greece, for example, lost access to the financial markets in 2010 and Cyprus followed in 2011.  
41 Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilization mechanism [2010] 
OJ L118/1. 
42 As the EFSF was established by Eurozone members (except for Estonia who joined the Euro in 2011, after the EFSF was 
created in 2010), all members are shareholders and contributed variable amounts to form the lending capacity of the 
facility. All shareholders had representatives in the EFSF board with the Commission and ECB also participating as 
observers. Following the creation of the ESM, all activities of the EFSF were taken up by the the ESM. See also: Alicia 
Hinarejos, "The Court of Justice of the EU and the Legality of the European Stability Mechanism”, The Cambridge Law 
Journal 72, no. 02 (2013), 237-240, 237. 
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financial mechanism in situations that threatened the financial stability of the Euro area as a whole. 
The ESM was established as an intergovernmental organisation on the basis of an international 
treaty,43 and is considered to be governed by public international law, not European law.44 Since the 
establishment of the ESM, the EFSM and EFSF no longer grant any new loan facilities even though 
the EFSF continues to operate within the ESM to receive loan repayments from beneficiary countries 
who have already been granted assistance. 
The creation of these financial institutions has been characterised by Advocate General Kokott 
as “not wholly conventional”,45 while academic commentators frequently point out the 
“unorthodoxy of the procedural and institutional fundaments of the ESM”46 - and with good reason. 
Some commentators focus on the outright challenge the financial mechanisms posed to established 
Maastricht principles such as the no-bail-out clause. As indicated earlier, Article 125 TFEU explicitly 
precludes the possibility of Union institutions, or other national governments, assuming the 
commitments of other Member States. Despite the no-bail-out clause, the EFSM was financed 
directly from EU budget while the EFSF and ESM are both established by Eurozone members on the 
basis of an intergovernmental Treaty that sits outside the remit of EU law. As the ESM complements 
the Union’s monetary policy, specifically the enforcement of budgetary discipline on Member States, 
it is argued that established Maastricht principles such as the no-bail-out clause are overlooked. As 
the chapter will indicate in due course, this was the subject of legal proceedings in Thomas Pringle v 
Government of Ireland.47  
While the ESM’s constitutionality is important and will be examined, the ESM’s institutional 
design indicates how coordination and insulation were intensified during the crisis. Decision 
2011/19948 amended Article 136 TFEU and gives the option or ability for Eurozone countries to 
establish their own financial mechanism. However, Article 136 did not form the legal basis for the 
EMU’s permanent loan facility mechanism; instead, it allows Eurozone members to establish their 
own financial mechanism outside the scope of EU law. As these lending facilities were created 
outside the scope of EU law, Hinarejos and Ruffert described them as a kind of “public international 
 
43 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism. 
44 Case C-370/12 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, [155]-[169]. 
45 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 26 October 2012 in Case C-370/12 Thomas Pringle v Government of 
Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General, [1]. 
46 Stanislas Adam and Francisco Javier Parras Mena, "The European Stability Mechanism through the Legal Meanderings of 
the Union's Constitutionalism: Comment on Pringle”, European Law Review 38, no. 6 (2013), 848-865, 849.  
47 Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756. Hereafter cited as Pringle.  
48 The following paragraph was added to Article 136 TFEU following Decision 2011/199/EU:  
“3. The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to 
safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism 
will be made subject to strict conditionality.”  
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Special Purposes Vehicle”.49 A Special Purposes Vehicle indicates the creation, by a mother company, 
of a subsidiary in order to pursue an activity without affecting the mother company. The Special 
Purposes Vehicle analogy indicates how the EU created a separate entity to pursue an economic 
activity outside the remit of the European legal order and – crucially – its constraints. In an 
alternative description of the ESM’s legal standing, suggested by a German lawyer and adopted by 
the German Federal Constitutional court in their ESM judgment, the substitution of EU law for 
international law instruments is understood as a form of ‘Ersatzunionsrecht’ or ersatz legislation. 
This term denotes the inclination of the Union toward international law as the medium through 
which crisis response measures are adopted when European Union law would pose legal difficulties 
or restrictions.50 The ESM lies outside the EU legal order, but is indirectly governed, or at least highly 
influenced, by EU institutions. Article 5(3) of the ESM Treaty enables the Commission, ECB and 
Eurogroup president to sit in on the meetings of the ESM Board of Governors as observers. 
However, the role of the Commission, the ECB and the Eurogroup entails much more than 
observation. As subsequent chapters indicate, decisions on whether to grant ESM assistance are 
based on reports concluded by the Commission and ECB, while the two Institutions are also 
“entrusted”, along with the IMF, to negotiate, sign and monitor the terms of a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the ESM and the state in need of financial assistance.51  
The enhanced role of EU institutions in granting ESM assistance, combined with the fact that the 
ESM’s shareholders and Board of Governors are Eurozone members, indicates how coordination was 
achieved between different stakeholders during the crisis. At the same time, positioning the ESM 
outside the remit of EU law insulates economic decision-making from democratic interference or 
contestation. Crisis response measures decided within the ESM enjoyed immunity from legal 
constraints, many of which were established to ensure democratic decision-making. As Dawson end 
de Witte indicate, the institutional structure of the Union, discussed in the previous chapter, was 
designed to facilitate democratic access or at least transparency of decision-making by EU 
institutions despite elements of “executive dominance” and the insulation of certain policy areas.52 
By circumventing even the existing institutional structure of the EU, the ESM “has significantly 
decreased the authorship and ownership of citizens over the way in which their societies are run.” 53 
 
49 Matthias Ruffert, "The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law”, Common Market Law Review 48, no. 6 (2011), 
1777-1805, 1782; Hinarejos, The Court of Justice of the EU and the Legality of the European Stability Mechanism, 237-240, 
237. 
50 Michelle Everson and Christian Joerges, "Who is the Guardian for Constitutionalism in Europe After the Financial Crisis?" 
LEQS Paper, no. 63 (2013), 11. 
51 Pringle, [18]. Chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis consider the role of European institutions in the ESM, specifically the 
Eurogroup.  
52 Mark Dawson and Floris Witte, "Constitutional Balance in the EU After the Euro-Crisis”, The Modern Law Review 76, no. 5 
(2013), 817-844, 835. 
53 Ibid. 
 98 
More importantly, though, the deliberate positioning of the ESM outside of the EU legal order 
insulates economic decision-making from judicial review. Pursuant to Article 32(3) of the ESM 
Treaty,54 the ESM enjoys "immunity from every form of judicial process" except if the ESM expressly 
waives that immunity. Moreover, the ESM cannot be subjected to the strictures of the CJEU as it 
“operates under international law and is an independent entity”,55 while none of its actions can be 
imputed to any EU institution.56 In positioning the ESM outside the EU’s legal order, European 
institutions and Member States influencing the ESM can act in a scrutiny lacuna that insulates them 
from contestation at different levels, including authorship of measures and the intervention of 
democratic bodies, requirements for accountability, transparency and legitimacy, but also insulation 
from contestation through judicial review.  
A further parameter to the setting up of financial mechanisms by the EU concerns the 
conditionality attached to ESM loans – the provision of debt subject to certain conditions. Financial 
assistance during the crisis was provided on the basis of strict conditionality both to Eurozone and 
non-Eurozone members.57 The first application of conditionality during the Eurozone crisis appeared 
in the bilateral loan between Eurozone members and the Greek government well before the 
creation of financial mechanisms.58 In those agreements, loan instalments were “made dependent 
on compliance by Greece with the conditions contained in a MoU and Council Decision 
2010/320/EU.”59 Shortly after, a macroeconomic adjustment programme60 was agreed between 
Greece and the Troika, setting out the conditions upon which future instalments would be released. 
The Commission and ECB were responsible for carrying out assessments throughout the programme 
 
54 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism. 
55 Jonathan Tomkin, "Contradiction, Circumvention and Conceptual Gymnastics: The Impact of the Adoption of the ESM 
Treaty on the State of European Democracy”, German Law Journal 14, no. 1 (2013), 169-189, 187. 
56 The Commission is under an obligation to ensure that any agreement it negotiates on behalf of the ESM is consistent 
with EU law and the Charter of Human Rights. However, as Chapter 5 considers, this provision is an empty promise, as the 
ECJ showed no willingness to interfere with the Commission’s policy objectives on the grounds of any human rights 
restrictions. See: Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P Ledra Advertising Ltd and Others v European Commission and 
European Central Bank (ECB), EU:C:2016:701. 
57 See for example, the provision of financial assistance to Hungary, Romania and Latvia. Decision 2009/102/EC providing 
Community medium-term financial assistance for Hungary, [2009] OJ L 37/5; Decision 2009/289/EC on granting mutual 
assistance for Latvia, [2009] OJ L 79/37; Decision 2009/290/EC providing Community medium-term financial assistance for 
Latvia [2009] OJ L 79/39. For further details on the terms and development of each financial assistance agreement see: “EU 
Financial Assistance”, https://ec.europa.eu/, Accessed July 15th 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-financial-assistance_en  
58 Loan Facility Agreement between Euro-area Member States and KfW, the Hellenic Republic, The Bank of Greece acting 
as agent on behalf of the Hellenic Republic, 8.5.2010 (Greek Loan Facility Agreement) 
59 Michael Ioannidis, "EU Financial Assistance Conditionality After 'Two Pack'“, Zeitschrift Für Ausländisches Öffentliches 
Recht Und Völkerrecht (Heidelberg Journal of International Law) 74 (2014), 1-44, 70; Council Decision 2010/320/EU of 
10.5.2010 addressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to 
take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit (2010) OJ L145/6. 
60 The ESM defines a Macroeconomic Adjustment Programme as: An extensive programme of policy reforms aimed at 
addressing problems in a programme country’s economic and fiscal situation. It is negotiated between the institutions and 
the country. The implementation of policy reforms set out in the macroeconomic adjustment programme is a precondition 
for receiving disbursements of ESM loans. https://www.esm.europa.eu/glossary/M 
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period61 and released instalments based on the successful meeting of conditions that were set out in 
the adjustment programme.62 The subsequent development of the EFSM, EFSF and ESM replicated 
this model of conditionality63 and formally introduced it into Union law.64 With the introduction of 
Regulation 472/201365 as part of the “two-pack” legislative initiative (discussed later on), the 
involvement of EU institutions in conditionality was formalised. Consequently, all loan facilities to 
European states during the crisis were and are contingent upon the fulfilment of budgetary and 
macroeconomic conditions.66 
Conditionality serves the dual function of enhancing coordination and insulation during the 
crisis. Any state requesting assistance must first enter into negotiations with the Troika and issue a 
unilateral statement of intent, also known as a Memorandum of Understanding, stating the 
measures the state is willing or planning to adopt should the loan be approved. Following this 
statement of intent, a competent body approves the provision of financial assistance depending on 
the financial institution from which the loan is provided.67 For the EFSF, the body providing formal 
approval was the Council; for the EFSF, it was the Eurogroup Working Group; and for the ESM, the 
Commission and ECB, acting as agents of the ESM Board of Governors, negotiate and conclude 
agreements with national governments while the ESM Board of Directors provides final approval for 
the financial assistance facility. 68 In each case a Council Implementing decision is issued, laying out 
the terms of conditionality.69 The involvement of European institutions in shaping the terms of loan 
agreement is not limited to the legal framework set out above. Indicatively, the Commission is 
tasked with the economic “assessment of the country’s public debt and financial needs, and the risk 
posed by the country’s financial situation to the euro area as a whole”.70 Loan conditions are 
 
61 As the Loan Facility Agreement stated, the Commission could perform on-the-spot checks and inspections (Recital 12 of 
the Preamble to the Greek Loan Facility Agreement) while the Greek government was obliged to provide all relevant 
information and facilitate the work of persons instructed to carry out those inspections (Art. 10 lit. (b) Greek Loan Facility 
Agreement.) 
62 Ibid, 70. 
63 EFSF Framework Agreement; Regulation 407/2010/EU establishing the EFSM; ESM Treaty. 
64Article 136(3) TFEU; Regulation 473/2013: On common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and 
ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area. As the chapter indicates, conditionality 
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determined based on the Commission’s assessment, thus forcing social change in debtor countries. 
As future instalments are subject to the “positive assessments in quarterly reviews, [conducted by 
the Troika], mainly of the compliance with the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding on 
Specific Policy Conditionality”,71 creditors retain a strong leverage in determining the course of 
social, economic and macroeconomic policy. This is evident in all the examples of financial assistance 
provided to Eurozone members. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus implemented macroeconomic 
adjustment programmes to restructure a sectors including the economy, healthcare, pension 
systems, education and labour law.72 In Cyprus, for example, the programme outlined reforms that 
included a downsizing of the banking sector, fiscal policy objectives and structural reforms in the 
public sector, housing market, the tourism and energy industries as well as conditions related to 
fiscal policy.73  
Debt conditionality showcases the high degree of coordination between EU institutions and 
Eurozone members. Coordination does not necessarily signal the voluntary implementation of 
measures by the debtor, rather it indicates how economic pressure is exerted upon debtor members 
of the Eurozone by EU institutions or other Eurozone members in order to implement austerity as 
the main crisis resolution mechanism. By shifting coordination within the ESM and enforcing crisis 
response measures through conditionality, the economic assessment and decision-making of 
creditors (EU institutions and Eurozone members) is conducted within a highly insulated 
environment. As conditionality is attached to the provision of financial assistance, national 
parliaments have little if any say in how social policy is conducted. Democratic contestation at the 
national level is therefore fenced off by forcing these conditions on debtor Eurozone members. In a 
forceful critique of conditionality, Dawson and de Witte indicate how insulation of debt 
conditionality from democratic contestation is achieved:  
“Despite the economic reasoning behind austerity policies, the legal entrenchment of such 
policies is neither the result of inter-personal political exchanges between different visions of ‘the 
good’, or a process of open political contestation that could legitimise it, nor an attempt to set up 
mechanisms for future normative reassessment. This is, rather, the constitutionalisation of raw 
political power and temporary policy preferences. To put it more bluntly, the austerity drive not 
only overlooks the procedural demand that the citizen’s voice be incorporated in devising criteria 
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of distributive justice, but also overlooks the fact that priority accorded to one policy choice must 
be legitimised by the articulation of, and mediation between, alternatives.”74 
The above observation indicates the high degree of insulation within which intensified 
coordination occurs, but also highlights the constitutional implications of such a development. 
Through the rejection of “any alternative policy choice that prioritises public spending over 
austerity”75 conditionality infiltrates the core of competences reserved for Member States. 
Redistributive policies such as pensions or conditions of employment carry a fiscal burden that 
defines the social conditions under which citizens live. As national parliaments have little power left 
to determine the social conditions under which their citizens live,76 insulation of economic decision-
making is intensified to the extent that a broader constitutional question arises concerning the 
current state of the democratic settlement between EU and its Member States. It is this specific 
constitutional question that section three of this chapter will examine.  
2.2 Intensification of fiscal coordination  
Following the introduction of a common currency and the creation of the European Monetary 
Union, authority over economic policy was split between national and Union institutions. Monetary 
policy is an exclusive competence of the Union under article Article 3(1)(c) TFEU as indicated by 
Article 127 TFEU, which states that the competence to decide on monetary policy is assigned to the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB), comprised of the ECB and national central banks of the 
Eurozone members, with the aim of retaining price stability. Fiscal policy, though, remained an 
exclusive competence of Member States. However, Member States refused to reduce their fiscal 
independence “on grounds of subsidiarity, greater democratic legitimacy, and added competitive 
advantages”.77 Nevertheless, due to the ever-increasing integration of national economies under the 
common market and currency, fiscal independence would be limited through a system of 
coordination. Prior to the Eurozone crisis, fiscal policy coordination consisted of two main 
components: the excessive deficit procedure and the multilateral surveillance procedure.78  
According to Article 126(1) TFEU, Member States have an obligation to avoid excessive deficits, 
“defined as government borrowing above 3 per cent for the ratio of planned or actual government 
deficit to GDP at market prices, or an excessive debt, defined as the total gross debt of a Member 
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State at nominal value outstanding at the end of the year and consolidated above 60 per cent for the 
ratio of government debt to GDP at market prices”.79 With the introduction of the Stability and 
Growth Pact in 1998, an agreement between Member States to strengthen budgetary surveillance 
and coordination of economic policies by the Commission and Council, requirements under the 
excessive deficit procedure outlined in Article 126 TFEU became more specific.80 As Amtenbrink 
notes, economic policy coordination committed Member States to achieving a balanced or surplus 
budget through “broad economic policy guidelines (BEPGs) adopted by the Council on a 
recommendation by the European Commission and conclusions of the European Council in the 
shape of recommendations”.81  
Under the multilateral surveillance procedure, the commitment of Member States to achieve a 
balanced or surplus budget was ensured through the Stability and Convergence Programmes 
submitted annually by Member States to the Council and European Commission.82 Through the 
Stability and Convergence Programmes, Member States were required to “take into account broad 
economic policy guidelines adopted by the Council on a recommendation by the European 
Commission and conclusions of the European Council in the shape of recommendations”.83 These 
recommendations included a wide range of economic policy objectives, including budgetary policy, 
financial market integration and labour related issues such as wages.84 Pursuant to Article 121(4–5) 
TFEU and Articles 5, 6, 9, and 10 of Regulation 1466/97 the Council was responsible for ensuring 
Member States’ compliance with the excessive deficit procedure. If the Council detected a 
“significant divergence of the budgetary position of a Member State, the Council was originally 
responsible for issuing a so-called early warning to a Member State in order to prevent the 
occurrence of an excessive deficit”.85 In 2005, Regulation 1466/97 was reformed86 to improve both 
Member State compliance and the Council’s ability to monitor their progress. Both these aims were 
to be achieved through the introduction of “country-specific medium-term objectives”87 that 
required Member States to comply with customised objectives and allowed the Council to assess 
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their progress over shorter periods. However, as the European budgetary reference values were 
neither legally binding nor accompanied by an enforcement mechanism, Member States did not 
always comply with them, before or after the 2005 reform.88 The excessive deficit procedure may 
have established an enforcement mechanism and provided for financial sanctions under Article 
126(2)-(11) and Regulation 1467/97, but the imposition of sanctions was, as Amtenbrink indicates, 
more a “theoretical possibility”89 than an actual enforcement mechanism. France and Germany, for 
instance, were in contravention of the targets set, but the Council could not obtain the qualified 
majority, as required in Article 126(8) and (9) TFEU, to put forward the excessive deficit procedure.90 
In addition to fiscal coordination, the absence of a lender of last resort, as discussed above,91 
seek to ensure that Member States remain committed to a balanced budget and, in case they were 
in deficit, “refinance themselves at market conditions, whereby the markets would signal any 
negative developments in the creditworthiness of a country by means of the interest rate, forcing 
the country concerned to adjust its policies.”92 Since the crisis, there has been fierce debate about 
whether too much trust was put on the market as a corrective agent or whether the Maastricht 
principles were doomed to fail because their fundamental presuppositions were wrong or because 
the monetary union could not proceed without fiscal union.93 What matters, however, for our 
discussion, is that fiscal coordination was achieved before the crisis. While the degree of legitimation 
concerning fiscal policy coordination could be challenged, the adoption and ratification of national 
budgets through national proceedings acted as a reiteration of the democratic settlement that 
Member States agreed to.94 In the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, though, this balance was 
significantly distorted.  
As sovereign debt was framed as a major cause of the crisis, the EU established a renewed 
framework for fiscal oversight, hoping to prevent the further accumulation of national debt and 
reduce existing deficit levels. To achieve this, the Union strengthened the legislative framework 
through which economic governance and budgetary surveillance is exercised. A series of six 
Regulations and Directives,95 the so-called ‘six-pack’ was introduced pursuant to Articles 121, 126 
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and 136 TFEU. The six-pack reformed the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), and as Craig notes, was 
designed “to render economic union more effective by tightening the two parts of the schema, 
surveillance and excessive deficit, the details of which were contained in the Stability and Growth 
Pact.”96 Two additional Regulations,97 known as the ‘two-pack’, further strengthened the EU’s 
budgetary surveillance. Finally, budgetary surveillance and discipline was further strengthened with 
the introduction of the ‘Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union’ (TSCG).98 Article 3(1) of the Treaty requires contracting parties to maintain a 
balanced budget, indicating the need for general government not to exceed 3% of their gross 
domestic product at market prices and the annual structural balance of the general government to 
be at a country-specific medium-term objective as defined by the Stability and Growth Pact.  
The overall aim of the new fiscal framework is to “enhance budgetary oversight by focusing on 
its timing, the format of national budgetary determinations and the need for these to be 
independently verified”.99 Toward this end, the newly established European Semester establishes a 
“comprehensive economic and fiscal policy planning cycle” over a 6-month surveillance period 
whereby Member States are forced to adhere to mid-term goals.100 Based on supranational policy 
targets outlined in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines,101 and country-specific policy objectives 
outlined in national Stability and Convergence Programmes,102 the European Commission issues 
economic policy targets, recommendations and guidelines that “Member States are expected to 
implement in their national economic policy.”103 In order to ensure compliance with the economic 
policy and fiscal targets set in previous budgets, Member States are required to report back to Union 
institutions annually.104 In essence, the European Semester ensures that any budget decision is 
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approved by Union institutions before ratification by national parliaments, as the Commission may 
request a re-drafting of national budgets in cases where it observes a “particularly serious non-
compliance with the budgetary policy obligations”105 set out in the Stability and Growth Pack.  
The introduction of a strengthened surveillance framework indicates the deepening of fiscal 
coordination and of the insulation afforded to the economic rationale of austerity as national 
parliaments are put under “severe constraints”106 with regard to budgetary decisions. For example, 
the European Semester ensures that there is an early discussion at an EU level, involving all four 
major EU institutions, on matters such as “fiscal policy, macroeconomic imbalances, financial sector 
issues, and growth-enhancing structural reforms” before national budgets are up for debate.107 As 
Craig indicates, “the objective of these temporal reforms is to ensure that the EU can comment in a 
timely and orderly manner on forthcoming budgetary proposals from the euro-area Member 
States”.108 Moreover, substantive surveillance measures such as medium-term budgetary 
objectives109 act as an “alert system” for the Council and Commission to intervene through the 
strengthened excessive deficit procedure110 in case Member States diverge from their budgetary 
objectives. While these measures enhance the ability of EU executive bodies to survey objectives 
and ensure “that national fiscal planning is in accord with the requirements of economic union”,111 
they further reduce national parliaments’ ability to effectively coordinate or influence the course of 
their economies. As Dawson observes, the effects of the European Semester are felt most by those 
countries with imbalanced budgets. Countries such as Germany or Finland face “relatively little 
scrutiny of their budgets” while countries like Spain, Portugal, Cyprus or Greece face intrusive 
intervention through supervision by the Commission as a way of addressing budget deficits.112 This 
leads Dawson to conclude that “post-crisis, a state’s freedom from EU intervention in the economic 
field is largely conditional on its fiscal health”.113 Through a series of legislative changes, therefore, 
the EU “consciously” designed a system of fiscal coordination that “ensure that EU budgetary 
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principles are embodied in national budgets prior to their approval by national parliaments”.114 The 
European Semester locks in fiscal discipline and economic decision-making about state budgets is 
insulated from democratic contestation.  
Thus, we see how the existing legal framework of fiscal coordination was developed to ensure 
further insulation of the fiscal policy orientation preferred by the EU. National governments have 
little space to manoeuvre, which as Dawson says, has “limited the capacity of national parliaments 
and the European Parliament to control the executive, transforming the sole democratically 
unaccountable institution of the Union, the Commission, from an independent initiator of policy 
proposals into the discharger of national budgets”.115 Through the intensification of policy 
coordination, vital economic decisions are further insulated from democratic interference and 
contestation.  
2.3 Policy coordination and institutional development  
The final example of intensified coordination and insulation of economic decision-making during 
the crisis is institutional development. As European leaders pushed for a coordinated European 
response to the crisis, existing institutions expanded their scope. One example is the emergence of 
the European Council “as the centre of political gravity”.116 A formal institution of the EU comprised 
of all Heads of State or Government of Member States, the European Council has the capacity to set 
the general direction and priorities of the Union, but not to legislate.117 Throughout the Eurozone 
crisis, heads of states meeting in the European Council engaged with “economic stabilization issues, 
the rescuing and re-regulation of the financial sector as well as policies towards Member States at 
the brink of financial collapse.” 118 These meetings concluded with the issuing of European Council 
decisions, expressed through conclusions and resolutions that may not carry any binding legal effect 
but do have significant political weight. As a result, the European Council during the Eurozone crisis 
deviated from its role as a body shaping the overall political direction of the EU and instead 
determined economic policy to the extent that some commentators identified the creation of 
“informal or de facto competencies which did not exist before.”119 This allowed European leaders to 
enhance their coordination of economic policy and determine crisis response measures. Enhanced 
coordination of this kind ensured the insulation of economic decision-making from democratic 
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participation and contestation, especially in the countries most affected by the policy decisions 
made at this level.  
A similar observation is made with regard to the Council of Europe. Deliberation and 
coordination of policy responses during the crisis also occurred at the Economic and Financial Affairs 
Council configuration (ECOFIN). Contrary to the European Council, where no minutes are taken and 
there is no transparency of deliberation, EU Council meetings are minuted and the position of each 
Member State is recorded. However, as Puetter observed, during the Eurozone crisis, alternative 
methods of deliberation came into being. Instead of debating in a formal setting, ECOFIN members 
transferred their discussions to informal settings like breakfast meetings120 and had discussions that 
were not recorded. Developments in the working methods of existing EU institutions indicate how 
intensified methods of coordination intensify the insulation of decision-making from democratic 
contestation. 
Both examples outlined above indicate the intensification of coordination between Heads of 
State (European Council) and ministers of finance (ECOFIN), but it was the Eurogroup that emerged 
as the centre of policy deliberation and coordination. The Eurogroup was established in order to 
enhance coordination between Eurozone members as Europe was preparing to enter the third and 
final stage of the European Monetary Union. To increase coordination on issues such as 
macroeconomic developments, national budgets, structural policies and cost-price trends, the 
European Council created an informal forum for finance ministers to discuss issues related to the 
new currency among themselves.121 As an informal forum, the Eurogroup lacked any legal standing 
in EU law and was founded upon the “European Council’s December resolution on economic policy 
and coordination rather than on secondary law or a treaty provision”.122 However, since its first 
meeting, the Eurogroup has undergone a process of “formalisation of its working methods”123 and 
gained institutional support through the involvement of the Commission. Importantly, in 2003 the 
Eurogroup Working Group, itself a subgroup of the Economic and Financial Committee of the Council 
of Europe, was created and granted the responsibility of preparing policy discussions within the 
Eurogroup while also ensuring follow-up.124 In addition, as of January 2005 the rotating presidency 
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model was replaced by a permanent arrangement while the forum obtained legal recognition under 
Article 136, 137 and Article 1 Protocol 14 of the TFEU, even as it retained its informal status.  
As Hodson indicates, these developments in the Eurogroup’s institutional structure went hand in 
hand with the greater responsibilities assumed by the forum. Pursuant to changes in the EMU’s 
fiscal rules in 2005, the Eurogroup had an increasingly important role in economic governance. This 
led commentators to argue that the Eurogroup has “become a kind of caucus within the Council in 
which the important discussions...take place and lead to decisions that are thereafter endorsed by 
the wider Ecofin”.125 The process of formalisation in addition to de-facto decision-making powers 
granted to the Eurogroup by Article 136 TFEU126 transformed the forum “from a mere talking shop 
into what increasingly looks like a policy-making institution”.127 Uwe Puetter has pointed out the 
central role of the group in steering economic governance, subtitling his book on the Eurogroup: 
“how a secretive circle of finance ministers shape European economic governance”.128 By setting a 
common agenda and policy line amongst Eurozone members, the forum orients economic policy, 
always with the support of the Council and Commission, effectively exercising informal 
governance.129 Even before the crisis, therefore, the Eurogroup had evolved into an important forum 
for policy coordination, enhancing the intergovernmental setting within which fiscal and other 
economic policy decisions were discussed and agreed.  
With the outbreak of the financial crisis, the Eurogroup gained a significance that was 
disproportionate to its informal status. Acting as a formation of the Council, the Eurogroup brought 
together key stakeholders such as Ministers of Finance, the Commission, the ECB and the IMF. 
During its planned monthly meetings and in emergency meetings, the forum not only continued to 
act as a meeting-place for Eurozone ministers, but actively participated in the deliberation and 
negotiation process of EFSM, ESFSF or ESM debt conditionality.130 Issues such as the terms of 
Memorandums of Understandings, loan values and repayment periods and assessments of 
economic targets and objectives for debtor countries were discussed and decided. Despite the 
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Eurogroup’s importance, the forum’s working methods remain highly occluded. Its informal setting 
means that the Eurogroup is not subjected to any principles of good governance, including 
accountability and transparency as these are outlined in the Treaty.131 The Eurozone ministers also 
sit as the ECOFIN Council configuration in which formal procedures of decision-making also apply, 
but when they sit as the Eurogroup, they enjoy a significant degree of insulation from transparency 
and accountability. While, Eurogroup statements setting out crisis response measures may not be 
legally binding on the Member State to which they are addressed, they have significant political 
weight.  
The Eurogroup’s development as an institution remains under explored. While some significant 
contributions have been made to the literature,132 the Eurogroup’s impact on crisis decision-making, 
the potential reconfiguration of competences between Union and Member States and, equally 
importantly, the Court’s role in constitutionalising this new institutional development are a blind 
spot in legal constitutional discussions. Chapters 4 and 5 aim to shed light on the Eurogroup’s 
development and constitutional impact, but for now, I want to point to the way that deliberation 
and decision-making was transferred to an informal body of the Union where neither the 
Community nor the intergovernmental method applies, intensifying in this way both coordination 
and insulation of economic decision-making.  
Coordination between government executives, European institutions and international creditors 
was achieved within the Eurogroup, leading to the conclusion and handing-down of crisis response 
measures that Eurozone members in need of financial assistance could not evade. So coordinated 
were the creditor countries and European institutions that debtor countries had little, if any, say in 
developing crisis response measures. In this context, coordination indicates the response from the 
creditors rather than the agreement of creditor countries to conditionality measures. Moreover, 
shifting coordination within the Eurogroup, a body with no formal decision-making powers, led to 
greater insulation and let government executives and European institutions coordinate their actions 
and hand down crisis response measures to debtor countries without using any formal legal means. 
Instead debt conditionality coupled with political and economic power are used to transpose the 
measures from the supranational sphere they are decided within to the national sphere in which 
they take effect. National parliaments are forced to transpose these measures into law despite the 
absence of a formal (legal) obligation to do so. In other words, existing legal instruments such as 
Decisions, Directives or Recommendations are avoided, thus ensuring that the EU is not recognised 
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as the real author of crisis response measures. The exchange between Eurogroup and national 
Parliaments is further explored in the next chapter with reference to Cyprus.  
2.4 Intensified coordination and the creation of a scrutiny lacuna 
Taken together, the intensified coordination between EU institutions, Eurozone members and 
international creditors and the increased insulation afforded to economic decision making indicate 
how crisis response measures are decided within a scrutiny lacuna. A scrutiny lacuna denotes an 
insulated space in which deliberation, and, in some cases, decision-making occurs. Scrutiny lacunae 
are not just insulated from interference by democratic bodies such as national parliaments, although 
this is one of their major characteristics. They are also insulated from the practices of good 
governance, including transparency, accountability or minute-taking. Another central characteristic 
of scrutiny lacuna, as indicated mainly in the examples of the ESM and institutional development, is 
the absence of formal legal means to transpose decisions adopted at the supranational level to 
national legislation. Decisions are not legally binding and recipients of those decisions, in this case 
Eurozone members in need of financial assistance, have no formal legal obligation to follow those 
decisions. However, as the next chapter will show, even in the absence of formal legal connection 
between crisis response measures decided within informal institutions such as the Eurogroup, these 
measures carry significant political and economic weight that is analogous to a formal legal 
connection between the author and the body implementing that decision. A scrutiny lacuna, 
therefore, denotes a space for deliberation and decision-making in which institutions and 
governments enjoy great degree of insulation and can effectively exercise economic governance. 
The carving out of a scrutiny lacuna is motivated by the need to effect a specific kind of, as indicated 
in the first section of this chapter. The scrutiny lacuna was carved out to circumvent those 
constitutional limitations – whether the division of competences, the need for transparency and 
accountability, or restrictions in the nature of financial instruments – that precluded or slowed down 
the imposition of the common position reached between creditor countries, the IMF and European 
institutions. 
3. Constitutional review during the Eurozone crisis 
The constitutional implications of the scrutiny lacuna did not go unchallenged. In a series of 
cases challenging different aspects of crisis response measures, the European Court of Justice had to 
review highly controversial political decisions in the context of a severe economic crisis. In this 
section of the chapter I want to consider how the constitutional implications of the Eurozone crisis, 
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as described above, were transposed into justiciable issues before supranational courts.133 As there 
are multiple constitutional parameters to the Eurozone crisis, a number of cases appeared before 
national and supranational courts, each challenging different aspects of the crisis response 
measures. Two broad categories of cases can be identified in the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union.134 First, cases challenging conditionality measures under adjustment 
programs on the basis of their compatibility with fundamental or social rights. Second, cases 
challenging the legality of crisis response measures against existing constitutional provisions and 
principles, including the division of competences and democratic settlement achieved between the 
EU and its Member States. By reviewing responses to these sets of cases, I consider how the Court 
discharged its duty to observe that the law is applied by interpreting the Treaties,135 but also how it 
performs its functions as a constitutional authority. The section argues that by exercising a light 
review, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) did not interfere with the intensification of coordination, 
thus constitutionalising the scrutiny lacuna created by institutional and legal developments outlined 
above.  
3.1 Cases challenging conditionality measures under adjustment programs on the basis of their 
compatibility with fundamental or social rights 
The first set of cases was concerned with the compatibility of conditionality provisions, under 
Memorandums of Understanding and macroeconomic adjustment programs, with social or 
fundamental rights. The key issues addressed by these cases136 are “whether MoUs adopted in the 
context of the ESM and the national measures adopted pursuant to them have to comply with EU 
law, as well as whether judicial review is possible or likely at the EU level.”137 The ECJ has 
consistently “declined jurisdiction to review the legality of national measures taken pursuant to 
MoUs attached to assistance granted by the EFSF, EFSM, or otherwise, claiming the lack of a link to 
EU law.”138 According to the ECJ, acts adopted by Member States under any agreement concluded 
with the ESM are “extraneous to the EU legal order”,139 consequent of the mechanism’s 
 
133 An important series of cases has also unfolded in national courts. These cases will be examined in Chapter 6 of the 
thesis.  
134 Alicia Hinarejos, "The Role of Courts in the Wake of the Eurozone Crisis”, in Beyond the Crisis: The Governance of 
Europe's Economic, Political, and Legal Transformation, eds. Mark Dawson, Henrik Enderlein and Christian Joerges (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 112-136; Karatzia, An Overview of Litigation in the Context of Financial Assistance to 
Eurozone Member States, 573-590. 
135 Article 19 TEU. 
136 Cases include claims brought by individuals, and associations of individuals, regarding the Greek, Portuguese, and 
Cyprus bailouts. See Ibid, 575. 
137 Hinarejos, The Role of Courts in the Wake of the Eurozone Crisis, 112-136, 120. 
138 Ibid, 121. See, for example: Case T-541/10, Anotati Dioikisi Enoseon Dimosion Ypallilon (ADEDY) and Others v. Council, 
ECLI:EU:T:2012:626. 
139 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl delivered on 21 April 2016 in Opinion in Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P Ledra 
Advertising Ltd and Others v European Commission and European Central Bank (ECB), [52]-[53]; Pringle, [161]. 
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intergovernmental composition, irrespective of the active involvement of EU institutions and the 
requirement for conditionality of ESM loans under EU law.140 The ECJ’s refusal to impute any 
decision by the ESM to EU institutions persists throughout the case-law, “even when Council 
decisions have implemented the contents of the MoU”.141 As a result, the ECJ foreclosed any 
avenues for the annulment of conditionality measures.142  
The Court’s justification is unclear.143 It could be based on the position adopted by some 
Eurozone governments in these proceedings, namely, that Member States enter voluntarily into 
adjustment programmes in exchange for a loan facility.144 Voluntary undertakings of this kind “would 
not necessarily qualify as implementation of EU law, or even be within its scope…even if they are 
reflected in an EU measure”.145 Moreover, the Court’s approach is considered inconsistent with 
previous case-law in which it readily drew a connection between acts adopted by Member States 
when EU institutions acted as their agents.146 Despite the apparent contradictions and absence of 
thorough justification, the Court’s position remains that if the Commission and ECB acted as agents 
of the ESM, no action concluded by the mechanism can be imputed to those institutions. ESM 
conditionality remains, therefore outside the remit of EU law and the jurisdiction of the ECJ. The 
Court did, however, stress the role of national courts in exercising judicial review of such 
conditionality measures – a course of action considered in more detail in Chapter 6.  
It must be stated that after the Ledra case,147 the Court can review the compatibility of 
conditionality against fundamental human rights. In Ledra, Cypriot depositors affected by the bail-in 
submitted a claim for compensation under Article 268 TFEU and 340 TFEU against the Commission 
and the ECB for “losses equivalent to the diminution in value of their bank deposits”.148 Moreover, 
 
140 Pringle, [155]-[169]. The precedent set by Pringle was subsequently adopted in a series of cases including: Case T-
541/10 Anotati Dioikisi Enoseon Dimosion Ypallilon (ADEDY) and Others v Council of the European Union, 
ECLI:EU:T:2012:626; Case T-215/11 Anotati Dioikisi Enoseon Dimosion Ypallilon (ADEDY) and Others v Council of the 
European Union, ECLI:EU:T:2012:627; Case C-128/12 Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte and Others v BPN – Banco Português 
de Negócios SA, ECLI:EU:C:2013:149; Case C-264/12 Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins v Fidelidade 
Mundial — Companhia de Seguros SA, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2036; Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P Ledra Advertising Ltd 
and Others v European Commission and European Central Bank (ECB), EU:C:2016:701. 
141 Ibid, 121. See: Case C-665/13, Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins v Via Directa — Companhia de 
Seguros SA, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2327. 
142 It is still possible for national courts to review the legality of conditionality when these measures are repeated in Council 
decisions. This issue will be examined in Chapter 6.  
143 Ibid, 121. 
144 Case T-541/10, ADEDY and Others v Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:T:2012:626, [28]. 
145 Ibid, 121-122. 
146 Case C-316/91, European Parliament v Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:1994:76, [9]; Joined cases C-181/91 
and C-248/91, European Parliament v Council of the European Communities and Commission of the European Communities, 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:271. 
; Anastasia Poulou, "The Liability of the EU in the ESM Framework”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 
24, no. 1 (2017), 127-139, 134. 
147 Joined Cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 P Ledra Advertising and Others v. Commission and ECB, EU:C:2016:701. Hereafter 
cited as Ledra.  
148 Ibid, 129. 
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the applicants also brought an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU by which they “sought 
to annul the disputed passages of the MoU that were signed by the Commission under the powers 
conferred upon it by the ESM Treaty”.149 Despite ruling the application inadmissible, the ECJ argued 
that both the ECB and Commission are required to ensure that the MoUs concluded by the ESM are 
fully consistent with the measures of economic policy coordination provided for in the TFEU.150 
However, this requirement is restricted to measures of economic policy coordination and does not 
include the whole spectrum of EU law. In addition, the Court ruled that even when acting as agents 
of the ESM pursuant to the relevant Treaty, the Commission and ECB continue to be bound by EU 
Treaties. Accordingly, the Commission is bound by Article 17(1) TEU which tasks it with overseeing of 
the application of EU law. Consequently, in acting as an agent of the ESM, the Commission “should 
refrain from signing an MoU, whose consistency with EU law it doubts”.151 The case has been 
celebrated as a breakthrough for the protection of human rights in cases of post-crisis financial 
assistance. What commentators seem to overlook, however, is that in assessing acts of the 
Commission or ECB, the ECJ engages in a balancing act. According to the ECJ, “the adoption of a 
memorandum of understanding…corresponds to an objective of general interest pursued by the 
European Union, namely the objective of ensuring the stability of the banking system of the euro 
area as a whole”.152 Consequently, in considering the claims of Cypriot depositors in Ledra, the Court 
concluded that any restriction on the appellants’ right to property did not constitute a 
disproportionate and intolerable interference with the substance of that right.153 This balancing 
exercise which requires that any restriction to a right be proportionate to achieving a broader 
objective waters down Ledra’s much celebrated innovation. Despite the introduction of a principle 
that could align debt conditionality with fundamental or social rights, the Court’s unwillingness to 
interfere with economic governance persists. As a result, conditionality measures remain outside the 
ambit of judicial review, at least at the supranational level, due to Court’s unwillingness to examine 
the link between EU institutions and the ESM.  
 
149 Ibid.  
150 Article 13(3) of the ESM Treaty 
151 Ibid, 132. 
152 Ledra, [71]. 
153 Ledra, [74]. 
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3.2 Cases challenging the legality of crisis response measures against existing constitutional provisions 
and principles. 
The second set of cases deal with the legality of crisis response measures against existing 
national or supranational constitutional provisions. Two examples stand out,154 Pringle155 and 
Gauweiler,156 which both highlight the broader constitutional significance of crisis response 
measures, including the expansion of competences by the EU. Pringle began as an appeal to the High 
Court of Ireland, brought by Irish MP Thomas Pringle to challenge the ratification of the ESM Treaty 
in Ireland. Pringle requested a declaration on two points concerning the content of the ESM Treaty 
as well as the process by which it was established. He sought, first, a declaration on whether the 
amendment of Article 136 TFEU by Art.1 of Decision 2011/199/EU157 “constitutes an unlawful 
amendment”.158 In order to amend Article 136 TFEU the simplified revision procedure was followed 
under Art.48(6). However, the simplified revision procedure only applies to “internal policies and 
actions” of the Union and not increase the Union’s competences. Pringle claimed that the 
amendment enables Eurozone members to establish a financial mechanism and increases, in this 
way, the competence of the EU in economic policy. Therefore, the first declaration sought by Pringle 
may have focused on a procedural matter but requires the Court to assess whether the ESM 
constitutes an increase of EU competences. Pringle also asked whether by adopting the ESM treaty 
Ireland would undertake obligations incompatible with the Treaties on which the European Union is 
founded. The Irish Supreme Court referred the matter to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, calling 
the ECJ to consider whether the ESM Treaty constituted an expansion of EU competences and 
whether participating states breached EU law by establishing the ESM.  
In a nominal judgment delivered by the Full Court (27 judges) the ECJ confirmed the competence 
of Member States to conclude a transnational treaty such as the ESM. Unfortunately, the Court dealt 
with the first issue raised by Pringle (whether the ESM Treaty constituted an expansion of EU 
competences) in summary. According to the judgment, Article 136(3) TFEU confirms that, Member 
States have the power to establish a stability mechanism and “that amendment does not confer any 
 
154 Other similar cases include the Estonian Supreme Court decision (Constitutional Case No. 3-4-1-6-12, Judgment of 12 
July 2012) and the decision by the French Constitutional Court (Decision no 2012-653 DC, judgment of 9 August 2012). For 
an analysis see: Samo Bardutzky and Elaine Fahey, "Who Got to Adjudicate the EU's Financial Crisis and Why? Judicial 
Review of the Instruments of a Postnational Legal Order: Adjudicating the Practices of the Eurozone”, in The 
Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints, eds. Maurice Adams, Federico Fabbrini and Pierre Larouche 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014), 341-358; Amtenbrink, New Economic Governance in the European Union: Another 
Constitutional Battleground? 207-234  
155 Pringle.  
156 Case C-62/14 Peter Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400. 
157 Decision 2011/199, European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the Euro. 
158 Pringle, [2].  
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new competence on the Union”.159 While the Court acknowledged the role of Union institutions, 
primarily the Commission and ECB, in the ESM, it did not dwell on their role. Through this purely 
formalistic reading of the Treaty, which contradicts with the Court’s purposive reading of Article 125 
TFEU examined below, it could summarily conclude this point. 
In considering whether the ESM Treaty constituted a breach of any obligations by Member 
States against EU law, the Court examined two issues: whether Member States encroached on the 
Union’s exclusive competence to monetary policy and whether Member States breached any EU 
law. Both the issues concerned “the relationship between an intergovernmental mechanism, such as 
the ESM, and the EU treaties [but also] on whether Member States can allocate tasks to EU 
institutions outside the EU framework”.160 In examining the first issue, whether the amendment of 
Article 136 TFEU encroached on the Union’s exclusive competence to monetary policy by granting 
competences in this area to Eurozone members,161 the Court drew a distinction the operation and 
objectives of the ESM and the EMU respectively. According to the Court’s assessment, ESM’s 
objective is to safeguard the stability of the eurozone by providing financial assistance, an economic 
policy instrument, while the Union’s objective is to maintain price stability through monetary policy 
instruments. The two objectives may complement each other, but the Court drew a distinction 
between them and subsequently ruled that the ESM fell outside the EU’s exclusive competences. 
The Court also considered whether the ESM encroached on the EU’s competence to coordinate 
economic policy, and concluded that it “complemented the EU’s competence in economic policy 
without encroaching on it”.162 Member states could, therefore, establish a financial mechanism so 
long as the mechanism’s activities did not contradict EU law on policy coordination. Since 
conditionality did not “coordinate national economic policies but ensured compliance with EU 
law”,163 it became an essential requirement for ESM loan facilities. 
The second issue addressed in Pringle was the ESM’s compatibility with established EU Treaty 
provisions. More specifically, Article 125 TFEU provides that neither the Union nor a Member State 
can be liable for, or assume commitments of, other central governments, thus preventing the 
existence of a lender of last resort within the Eurozone. As the Court accepted, the aim of the said 
article is to encourage Member States to follow “sound budgetary policy” and “remain subject to the 
logic of the market when they enter into debt, since that ought to prompt them to maintain 
 
159 Pringle, [73]. 
160 Hinarejos, The Role of Courts in the Wake of the Eurozone Crisis, 112-136, 114. 
161 Pringle, [52].  
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budgetary discipline”.164 However, the Court added, compliance with budgetary discipline 
“contributes at Union level to the attainment of a higher objective, namely maintaining the financial 
stability of the monetary union”.165 This second, more general, meta-objective allowed the Court to 
infer that Article 125 TFEU “does not cover all forms of financial assistance.”166 Instead, as a financial 
mechanism that would be activated only when it is “indispensable for the safeguarding of the 
financial stability of the euro area as a whole and subject to strict conditions”, it was not in 
contravention of the no-bailout clause.167  
Continuing from the precedent set in Pringle, the ECJ considered the legality of the Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme whereby the ECB could acquire government bonds in the 
secondary market (that is from investors who have already acquired bonds from governments) in 
order to continue funding Eurozone members if and when it deemed necessary to do so.168 
Gauweiler, initiated at national level in Germany, claimed that the ECB was acting beyond its 
mandate in its OMT programme. Two arguments were put forward by the applicants, first, that the 
programme “should be viewed as a tool of economic, not monetary, policy” and, second, that it 
“violates the prohibition of monetary financing (Article 123 TFEU)”.169 In exercising its jurisdiction to 
review EU law that could be ultra vires, the German Federal Constitutional Court’s (GFCC) 
“preliminary response was to consider the Outright Monetary Transactions Programme illegal under 
EU law”.170 However, the Court fell short of actually ruling the measures illegal, as this would spark a 
constitutional crisis between the GFCC and the ECJ – an issue that will be considered in more detail 
in Chapter 5. Instead, the GFCC referred the matter to the ECJ and provided some alternatives on 
what it saw as a way for the ECJ to enable the continuance of OMT. 171 Specifically, the Court argued 
that the ECJ could “either declare the OMT scheme contrary to EU law, or provide a more limited 
interpretation of the Programme that is in accordance with the Treaties.”172 Depending on the ECJ’s 
interpretation, the Court reserved judgment as to whether the Outright Monetary Transactions 
programme violated the constitutional identity Germany’s Basic Law.  
In response, the ECJ considered two main issues arising from the German Court’s reference, 
whether the Outright Monetary Transactions programme was a measure of economic policy and, 
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therefore beyond the competences of the ECB and whether the programme was incompatible with 
the prohibition of monetary financing under Article 123 TFEU. Employing a similar approach to 
Pringle, the ECJ considered the objectives and instruments employed by the programme to 
determine whether it should be seen as falling within the ambit of economic or monetary policy. 
Since the programme contributed to the overall aim of price stability, the Court argued, it fell within 
the competences of the ECB even though it could have indirect effects on economic policy. In 
considering whether the programme contravened Article 123 TFEU, the Court accepted that buying 
bonds in the secondary market would be equivalent to the direct buying of the bonds if there was no 
distinction between the two acts. In this case, conditionality applied to the buying of any bonds by 
the ECB acts as a way of distinguishing the two acts. According to the Court’s reasoning, the aim of 
both Article 123 TFEU and debt conditionality is to ensure prudent spending by Member States. By 
attaching conditionality to OMT provisions, therefore, the ECB was not in contravention of Article 
123 TFEU. Through this purposive interpretation of both Treaty provisions and ECB measures, the 
Court was therefore able to validate another contested crisis response measure.  
3.3 Exercising a light touch of review: Constitutionalising the scrutiny lacuna 
Drawing on the Court’s approach to both sets of cases discussed above, commentators conclude 
that there is an unwillingness to interfere with matters that are considered to be either political or 
technocratic – or simply too sensitive to the survival of the Eurozone. 173 Despite the significant 
constitutional challenges raised by litigants, especially with regards to the ESM and OMT, the Court 
seems unwilling to “endanger the existence of the currency union by standing in the way of an 
emergency mechanism that had widespread political support.”174 In Pringle, the Court engaged in 
“complex judicial acrobatics”175 in order to validate the creation of the ESM. In Gauweiler, the Court 
applied similar reasoning to overcome a constitutional challenge for the ECB’s ultra vires acts. In the 
group of cases challenging conditionality, the ECJ did not draw any links between EU legal order and 
the ESM. Following the line of argument set out in Pringle, the Court systematically foreclosed 
avenues for substantive judicial review of crisis response measures by positioning the ESM outside 
the remit of EU law. By restricting its own jurisdiction, the Court exercised a light touch of review 
and sent constitutional questions back to national courts. By affirming the operation of decision-
making outside its own jurisdiction, the Court constitutionalised the scrutiny lacuna established by 
institutional practices and developments.  
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I considered the constitutional implications of crisis response measures by 
examining institutional channels of decision-making and how Europe’s court system responds to 
measures and methods of decision-making. The chapter indicated how framing the crisis as one of 
sovereign debt shaped the EU’s crisis response measures. In order to administer those response 
measures deemed necessary, European institutions and creditor Member States sought to operate 
in a highly insulated environment, as evidenced by discussions of European leaders calling for a new 
method of coordination, also termed as the Union method. The chapter proceeded to examine three 
examples of crisis response measures to show, firstly, the intensification of coordination in devising 
and exercising economic policy and, secondly, a corresponding increase in the insulation of 
economic decision-making. In doing so, the chapter argued that institutional developments and 
configurations, from the ESM to the Troika and Eurogroup, coupled with a reinforced fiscal 
coordination legal framework created a scrutiny lacuna. This altered the division of competences 
and democratic settlement between EU and Member States. The chapter then examined how 
Europe’s courts considered cases challenging crisis response measures and the resulting 
constitutional alterations, arguing that by adopting a non-interventionist approach, the Court 
constitutionalised the scrutiny lacuna. This scrutiny lacuna extends to the ability of citizens or 
democratic institutions to either review or influence crisis response measures and the ability of 
citizens or institutions to challenge the constitutionality of measures through courts.  
What this chapter observes, therefore, is a clear neoliberal moment where institutions engaged 
with economic decision-making are afforded a significant degree of insulation to the extent that they 
operate within a scrutiny lacuna. In an attempt to salvage the common currency, European 
institutions circumvented constitutional limitations while constitutional review validated the 
scrutiny lacuna created by institutional practices. This transformed European constitutionalism from 
a space for constitutional conflict, as explained in Chapter 2, to an insulated space for economic 
decision-making. The constitutional significance of the Eurozone crisis is identified in the primacy of 
the neoliberal political economic idea of insulation whereby economic decision-making is insulated 
from all other considerations. Elevating the protection of the monetary union as the sole 
constitutional objective of the EU during the crisis has significant constitutional implications for both 
the Union and its Member States. It dissolves any conflict between the many constitutional 
objectives within the EU’s constitutional framework, affects the division of competences between 
the EU and its Member States and diminishes the role of constitutional courts in both the EU and 
Member States.  
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To further explore the constitutional implications of the creation and constitutionalisation of a 
scrutiny lacuna, the thesis considers in more detail the two aspects of the scrutiny lacuna as 
identified in this chapter: the increased insulation of economic decision-making from interference 
consequent of institutional development and the subsequent validation of a scrutiny lacuna through 
judicial review. Before examining how constitutional review constitutionalises the scrutiny lacuna 
(Chapters 5 and 6), the thesis proceeds to examine the Eurogroup’s development as an institution, 
an issue that remains under explored. While some significant contributions have been made to the 
literature,176 the Eurogroup’s impact on crisis decision-making, the potential reconfiguration of 
competences between Union and Member States remains a blind spot in legal constitutional 
discussions. Given the Eurogroup’s significance for deliberation of crisis response measures, any 
consideration of the constitutional parameters of the Eurozone crisis is incomplete if the Eurogroup 
blind spot is not addressed. The next chapter considers how the forum developed into a body of 
deliberation and decision-making during the Eurozone crisis with specific reference to the example 
of Cyprus.
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Chapter 4 – How the Eurogroup shaped crisis response measures 
in Cyprus: A case of institutional development 
In this chapter, I consider how the Eurogroup was transformed from an informal forum for 
discussion to a deliberation and decision-making body during the Eurozone crisis. Drawing on the 
example of Cyprus, the chapter examines the Eurogroup’s role in devising crisis response measures 
and how Eurogroup Statements outlining policy measures are given legal effect through national 
measures. The chapter contributes towards expanding our understanding of institutional 
development by closely examining the Eurogroup’s evolution through the crisis.  
As indicated in Chapter 3, European institutions and creditor Eurozone members sought to 
operate in a highly insulated environment in order to push through with those measures deemed 
necessary for safeguarding the common currency. This led to the development of a new method of 
coordination, what EU leaders termed as the Union method. The three examples studied in the 
previous chapter (the creation of financial institutions by the EU; the strengthening of fiscal 
coordination; and institutional development), indicate that the Union method is an amalgamation of 
Community and intergovernmental channels aimed at coordinating a European response to the 
Eurozone crisis. Through these examples, I argued that coordination between European institutions 
and Eurozone members was intensified in order to push through with the policy approach framed as 
necessary. Intensified coordination transferred deliberation and decision to ad-hoc bodies or 
institutional configurations such as the Troika or the Eurogroup, disenfranchising in this way national 
democratic bodies from deliberating over crisis response measures or mechanisms. The effect of 
intensified coordination was to create and highly insulated space for economic decision-making – 
what I termed as a scrutiny lacuna. The aim of this chapter is to deepen our understanding of 
institutional development and the resulting scrutiny lacuna through an in-depth examination of the 
Eurogroup as an economic decision-making body – the Eurogroup.  
The first section of this chapter offers a detailed consideration of the Cypriot economic crisis in 
order to provide a context for the bail-in resolution and to set out the reasons the Eurogroup 
insisted on this financial instrument as Cyprus’ only viable option. This section continues from 
Chapter 3 where a connection was drawn between dominant framings of the crisis and austerity as 
the dominant policy approach adopted by European institutions and Eurozone members alike. 
Similarly, this chapter points out how dominant framings of the Cypriot financial and banking crisis 
lead the Eurogroup to insist on a bail-in resolution. Section two conducts a detailed review of 
economic deliberation during the initial stages of the crisis in Cyprus. Drawing on existing economic 
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and political commentary, I consider the role of the Troika and the Eurogroup in devising their 
responses to the crisis in Cyprus. In section three, I undertake a close reading of two plenary sessions 
minutes in the Cypriot House of Representatives to consider the role of the House in adopting a bail-
in resolution for the Cypriot crisis.  
The chapter argues that the Eurogroup acts as a decision-making body by deliberating about, 
and deciding on, appropriate economic measures to be adopted by Eurozone members in need of 
financial assistance. In this sense, the result of coordination between European institutions and 
Eurozone members does not simply indicate the reaching of a common position but, instead, a 
decision-making process where a conclusive position is reached through a Union body that the 
Member State to which that decision is addressed is obliged to follow. The chapter also argues that 
the Cypriot House of Representatives was faced with a fait accompli and that its role was limited to 
translating the policy decisions contained in the Eurogroup statement to legal provisions at the 
national level. By acknowledging the role of national parliaments as instruments of legitimation for 
decisions adopted by Union executives, I oppose the oft-cited position that crisis response measures 
were voluntary undertakings in exchange for financial assistance.1 The chapter contributes towards a 
better understanding of the scrutiny lacuna and the ways through which economic decision-making 
is insulated from political interference, mainly from the national level. This contribution extends our 
understanding of the relationship between neoliberalism and European constitutionalism at the 
institutional level.  
1. The Economic Crisis in Cyprus 
The economy of Cyprus was among the many in the Eurozone affected by the global financial 
crisis and one of the last to receive financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) or the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). Up until 2008 the finances of this small 
economy were in good order.2 When it entered the European Union in 2004, Cyprus was the most 
prosperous new entrant and a net contributor to the EU budget.3 In the four-year period between 
entry into the Union and into the Eurozone (2008), its GDP consistently rose by at least 4%, topping 
4.8% in 2007;4 the economy averaged a 2% inflation rate and had low unemployment rates 
 
1 Case T-541/10 Anotati Dioikisi Enoseon Dimosion Ypallilon (ADEDY) and Others v Council of the European Union, 
ECLI:EU:T:2012:626, [28]. 
2 Athanasios Orphanides, "The Euro Area Crisis: Politics Over Economics”, Atlantic Economic Journal 42, no. 3 (2014), 243-
263; Athanasios Orphanides and George Syrichas, The Cyprus Economy: Historical Review, Prospects and Challenges 
(Central Bank of Cyprus, 2012). 
3 Alexander Apostolides, "Beware of German Gifts Near Elections: How Cyprus Got here and Why it is Currently More Out 
than in the Eurozone”, Capital Markets Law Journal 8, no. 3 (2013), 300-318, 10. 
4 Alexander Michaelides, "Cyprus: From Boom to Bail-in”, Economic Policy 29, no. 80 (2014), 639-689, 644.  
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(estimated at 4% ).5 In 2007, public finances indicated a 3.3% surplus, while the 60% debt-to-GDP 
ratio was expected to fall below 50% by the end of 2008.6 However, by May 2012 public finances 
had deteriorated so much that Cyprus lost access to financial markets and needed assistance from 
the European Stability Mechanism or the European Financial Stability Facility.7 In March 2013, the 
newly elected government signed a controversial agreement with the Troika in order to prevent two 
major banks from collapse.  
While a detailed discussion of the conditions under which a fairly stable and well-performing 
economy was led to a major crisis is beyond the scope of this chapter, I will consider the main 
components of the Cyprus crisis. As previously discussed, there is a causal connection between 
framing the crisis, responding to it and the institutions seen as capable of devising and administering 
crisis response measures. Drawing on this idea, this section examines dominant framings of 
economic conditions leading to the crisis as part of the broader environment or context within which 
crisis response measures are decided. In doing so, I focus on three main components of the crisis: 
the economic conditions under which the crisis occurred and that increased the magnitude of the 
blow; the loss of government funding due to loss of access to markets and private funding due to the 
Greek PSI; and a major delay on the part of the Cypriot government in taking action that increased 
the magnitude of the problem.  
1.1 Towards a sovereign debt and banking crisis 
For a small Mediterranean island with a population of just over one million, Cyprus’ banking 
sector hit above its weight. The sector’s total assets were calculated at 896% of GDP in 2010 
compared to an EU average of 357% in 2009.8 The disproportionate size of Cyprus’ banking sector 
partly derives from the so-called ‘Cyprus business model’; a strategy aimed at attracting foreign, 
sometimes non-Eurozone, corporations to the island. There are a number of reasons for foreign 
corporations to establish headquarters in Cyprus. In addition to the good standard of living, Cyprus 
offers a skilled workforce oriented toward the provision of legal and financial services. Due to the 
 
5 Apostolides, Beware of German Gifts Near Elections: How Cyprus Got here and Why it is Currently More Out than in the 
Eurozone, 300-318, 10. These figures can be found at: “World Outlook Database, October 2012 Edition”, World Outlook 
Database, IMF, Accessed January 8th 2020, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/weodata/index.aspx  
6 European Commission, Economic Forecast, Spring 2008European Commission (Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs),[2008]), 80. 
7 For further discussion see Michaelides, Cyprus: From Boom to Bail-in, 639-689; Athanasios Orphanides, "What Happened 
in Cyprus? the Economic Consequences of the Last Communist Government in Europe”, in The Cyprus Bail-in: Policy 
Lessons from the Cyprus Economic Crisis, eds. Athanasios Orphanides and Alexander Michaelides (London: Imperial College 
Press, 2014); Athanasios Orphanides, "What Happened in Cyprus”, SAFE Center of Excellence Policy Letter Series, no. No. 6 
(2013); Orphanides and Syrichas, The Cyprus Economy: Historical Review, Prospects and Challenges; Efrosyni Panayi and 
Stavros A. Zenios, "Was the Cyprus Crisis Banking Or Sovereign Debt?" The Wharton Financial Institutions Centre, University 
of Pensylvania Working Paper 14-19 (2014).  
8 Constantinos Stephanou, "The Banking System in Cyprus: Time to Rethink the Business Model”, Cyprus Economic Policy 
Review 5, no. 2 (2011), 123-130, 123. 
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island’s colonial past, the legal system is based on English law and the civil service is trilingual with 
English, Turkish and Greek the three official languages. However, the real attraction was and is 
Cyprus’ low corporate tax rate and high interest rate on deposits. Indicatively, up until 2004 income 
tax for offshore companies was as low as 4.25%. It increased to 10% upon Cyprus’ entry into the EU, 
a tax that applied to both domestic and foreign corporations registered in Cyprus.9  
The combination of low corporate tax and high interest rates for deposits attracted foreign 
capital to Cypriot banks and led many foreign companies (mainly from Europe, Ukraine and Russia) 
to register in Cyprus. In an attempt to “maximize their tax efficiency and foreign investment credits” 
these companies would either lend or transfer money to their international operations, transforming 
the island into a “centre for capital flows (in and out)”.10 As a result, the financial sector was 
disproportionately large, and, along with tourism, was one of the main components of the island’s 
economy. 
The Cyprus business model is not distinctively Cypriot; it replicates Dutch and Luxembourgian 
financial services practices. Where it differs is not in its logic, but in way it grew and the subsequent 
effects on domestic debt levels. As indicated in the PIMCO report11 on the Cypriot banking sector, 
the disproportionate allocation between deposits and loans fuelled a domestic debt bubble. 
Deposits, of which “34% come from non-residents that operate in Cyprus in part due to the current 
system of tax and business incentives, 19% from Greece and 7% from other countries”,12 comprised 
71% of all bank liabilities. While deposits were mainly foreign, loans were mainly concentrated in the 
domestic market. PIMCO calculates this concentration at 62%. Further, following Cyprus’ 2008 entry 
into the EMU, Eurozone deposits were considered domestic, increasing the banks’ ability to offer 
loans. As a result, domestic debt, as a percentage of GDP, rocketed from 247% in 2005 to 340% in 
201313.  
With the increase of foreign deposits, whether due to business activities of foreign companies or 
the domestication of Euro-area deposits, a domestic debt bubble was created. The situation with 
domestic borrowing was further complicated by borrowers’ inability to service their loans. Private 
 
9 Currently, corporate tax stands at 12.5% and along with Hungary (9%) Ireland (12.5%) and Lithuania (15%) is one of the 
lowest in the EU.  
10 Apostolides, Beware of German Gifts Near Elections: How Cyprus Got here and Why it is Currently More Out than in the 
Eurozone, 300-318, 12. 
11 Following the banking crisis, Central Bank of Cyprus commissioned PIMCO, an investment management firm, to conduct 
a due diligence report of the banking system of Cyprus. The results were published in March 2013 and provided a basis for 
economic analysis of the crisis in Cyprus. See PIMCO, Independent due Diligence of the Banking System of Cyprus (London: 
PIMCO Europe Ltd, 2013). 
12 Ibid, 8-9. 
13 “Private sector debt consolidated - % of GDP”, Eurostat, Accessed January 8th, 2020. 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/graph.do?tab=graph&plugin=1&pcode=tipspd20&language=en&toolbox=data  
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borrowing was based less on the ability of a lender to service the loan but on collateral backing, 
usually real estate. As the real estate market had been on the rise for decades, this approach did not 
appear dangerous. However, once the market plunged, loans could not be paid and banks could not 
secure the loans through their collateral, because prices fell and demand for real estate plunged. As 
a result, the banking sector experienced liquidity problems - a key factor of the Cyprus crisis. 
Another important contributor to the conditions leading up to the crisis was the deterioration of 
public finances after 2008. For the first time since independence, the communist party (AKEL) 
controlled the presidency, altering the state’s attitude towards public spending and almost doubling 
Cyprus’ national debt (from 48% in 2008 to 86% in 2012).  
The second major component of the Cyprus crisis was the restructuring of Greek government 
debt. In 2010 the Private Sector Involvement (PSI) doctrine was introduced, stating that “whenever a 
euro area Member State faced liquidity pressures (as opposed to solvency concerns), losses would 
be imposed on the private creditors of the sovereign debt of that Member State before the other 
euro area governments agreed to provide any temporary assistance”.14 As Orphanides explains, the 
“introduction of credit risk in sovereign debt raised the cost of financing for most euro area Member 
States”,15 adversely affecting periphery countries. The introduction of the PSI not only raised the 
cost of borrowing for Cyprus, its implementation in the case of Greece was a turning point in the 
Cyprus banking crisis. In order to render the Greek debt more manageable and address liquidity 
issues, a debt-restructuring scheme for Private Sector Investment (PSI) was agreed at a European 
level in February 2012. He majority of Greek private bond holders agreed to a 53.5% reduction in the 
face value of bonds, forgiving a debt of €107 billion. Of that amount, €3.5 billion16 or 23% of GDP,17 
was losses incurred by Cypriot banks. Due to the high level of capital losses incurred by Cypriot 
banks, a “recovery without government support”18 was nearly impossible. As the Cypriot 
government bought a large number of shares in “Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co. Ltd” (Laiki) in order 
to assist with its recapitalisation, the Cypriot banking crisis immediately became a sovereign debt 
crisis.  
 
14 Orphanides, The Euro Area Crisis: Politics Over Economics, 243-263, 252. 
15 The PSI doctrine contributed to the increase in the cost of borrowing and, in some instances, loss of access to the 
market, for example in Ireland and Portugal. At the same time, demand for safer Eurozone bonds (such as the German 
bond) increased. Ibid, 252. 
16 Stavros A. Zenios, "Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in the Cyprus Crisis: ELA, PIMCO and Delays”, in The Cyprus Bail-in, eds. 
Alexander Michaelides and Athanasios Orphanides (London: Imperial College Press, 2016), 9-32, 11. Others estimate the 
losses to be at €4.6 billion and 25% of GDP. See Orphanides, The Euro Area Crisis: Politics Over Economics, 243-263, 260. 
17 When expressed as percentage of GDP, the impact of Greek PSI disproportionately affects the Cypriot banking sector and 
is a result of the speculative tendency of Cypriot banks. However, some commentators argue that the government could 
have negotiated a lower contribution by Cypriot banks but failed to do so due to political reasons. Ibid, 260; Zenios, Self-
Fulfilling Prophecies in the Cyprus Crisis: ELA, PIMCO and Delays, 9-32, 18. 
18 Apostolides, Beware of German Gifts Near Elections: How Cyprus Got here and Why it is Currently More Out than in the 
Eurozone, 300-318, 313.  
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The third factor contributing to the crisis in Cyprus was the delay by the Cypriot authorities in 
taking action. The delay affected both the banking and sovereign debt crisis in Cyprus. In terms of 
the sovereign debt issues, it was clear that as soon as the government lost access to the financial 
markets in 2011 it would face further liquidity problems. While the need for important decisions was 
obvious, the government resorted to interim solutions, for example a €2.5 billion loan from the 
Russian Federation, that both postponed a resolution and magnified the problems.19 Similarly, a 
delay in taking actions for the unfolding banking crisis extended the problems faced by the banking 
sector. Although Cyprus applied for assistance from the Troika in June 2012, a final agreement was 
not reached until nine months later. During the period of inertia, the two largest banks, Laiki bank 
and “Trapeza Kyprou Dimosia Etaira Ltd” (“Bank of Cyprus”: BoC), continued to operate by relying on 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). The reliance on emergency liquidity from the Central Bank of 
Cyprus caused a major flight of deposits, increasing the amount of ELA debt in both banks (Laiki and 
the BoC). The provision of ELA by the Central Bank of Cyprus, with the financial support of the 
European Central Bank (ECB), kept the Cypriot banking sector on life-support during this period of 
inertia but also increased the exposure of the banking sector to debt while deposits continue to 
fall.20 As a result, the risk of a collapse in the banking sector grew along with the growth of ELA.21  
In summary, the factors contributing to the crisis are the following. The banking system was 
disproportionately large compared to the rest of the economy. Domestic private debt could not be 
serviced, increasing the exposure of the banks while public finances were also kept in a disorderly 
manner. To further complicate matters, the government of Cyprus invested heavily in Laiki bank to 
avoid its collapse and did little to deal with the negative economic conditions, which led to the 
magnification of the problem. As a result, both the state and the banks “were headed for a crisis, 
independently of each other”.22 The “perfect crisis”, as Zenios described it, a combination of a 
sovereign debt and a banking crisis hitting at the same time was imminent and was soon triggered 
 
19 For an explanation of how the delay caused a deterioration in public finances see Michaelides, Cyprus: From Boom to 
Bail-in, 639-689, 642-643.  
20 Ibid, 662-663; 672-673.  
21 The provision of ELA funding from the Central Bank of Cyprus and ECB to both Laiki and the BoC is highly questionable; 
indeed economists challenge the ability of Laiki to serve its debt past June 2012. Zenios, a leading Cypriot economist, 
concludes that ELA was granted to an insolvent Laiki. Furthermore, the transfer of ELA from CPB to BOC as part of the 
resolution agreement is also under scrutiny as the transfer of debt was not supported by an analogous transfer of assets. 
Additional data may exist but are kept confidential. While a precise estimation of the financing gap is difficult to calculate 
with publicly available data, there is consensus as to the existence of a gap. Zenios and Xiouros have calculated the gap to 
be between 0.5-3.5 billion Euro. Zenios was part of the Special Investigation Commission and had access to confidential 
documents, but his current conclusions are based on what public available information. (See Zenios, Self-Fulfilling 
Prophecies in the Cyprus Crisis: ELA, PIMCO and Delays, 9-32, 18-19). For further issues arising from the provision of ELA to 
an insolvent bank see: Costas Xiouros, "Handling of the Emergency Liquidity Assistance of Laiki Bank in the Bailout Package 
of Cyprus”, in The Cyprus Bail-in, eds. Alexander Michaelides and Athanasios Orphanides (London: Imperial College Press, 
2016), 33-103; Ian Jack and Tom Cassels, "Cyprus: An Analysis of the Impact of the Resolution Methodology on 
Stakeholders’ Claims Including the Emergency Liquidity Assistance”, Capital Markets Law Journal 8, no. 4 (2013), 450-463. 
22 Panayi and Zenios, Was the Cyprus Crisis Banking Or Sovereign Debt? 
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by a “public debt crisis in Greece and subsequently, through contagion, by non-performing loans in 
Cyprus and Greece”.23 As the crisis unfolded, measures were adopted to address both the 
recapitalisation of the Cypriot banking sector and the sovereign debt.  
1.2 ‘Resolving’ the crisis: Eurogroup agreements 
Measures were taken to tackle both the banking and sovereign debt crisis. An estimated €17 
billion were needed in order to address the public debt and the financial aspects of the crisis, with 
€7 billion going to the recapitalisation of the financial sector and ten to “government debt expiration 
[and] projected government deficits”.24 The Eurogroup position was clear: only €10 billion could be 
given out in the form of a loan from the Troika (including therefore the participation of the EFSF or 
ESM and the IMF) – the €7 billion required for the recapitalisation of the banking sector should be 
raised by the sectors’ own means. In reality, what this meant was a depositor bail-in. The term ‘bail-
in’ refers to a financial instrument used before the bankruptcy of a financial institution. Unlike a bail-
out, where a defaulting institution is recapitalized through external means provided by either 
national governments or investors, the bail-in requires a financial institution to recapitalize through 
its own means. The bail-in is usually employed in so that debt holders (investors) share the burden 
of a defaulting banking institution. However, in the case of Cyprus, the definition of creditor was 
extended to include depositors, thus requiring all creditors (bondholders and depositors) of a bank 
to bear the burden of the institution’s failure by having their debt (bonds and deposits) written off.25 
This was the first time in the Eurozone that uninsured depositors were called to recapitalize a 
bank,26 and it meant overturning the deposit insurance provided by European law27 and threatening 
the stability and reliability of the European banking system as a whole.  
1.2.1 First Agreement 
An initial agreement, recorded in the Eurogroup statement dated 16th March 2013, included a 
tax levy, termed a “horizontal haircut”, of 6.75% for deposits below €100,000 and 9.9% for 
uninsured deposits over €100,000, applicable to all banks and every depositor. Public opinion was 
fiercely against a bail-in resolution. Political parties, following public sentiment, developed a rhetoric 
 
23 Stavros Zenios, "The Cyprus Debt: Perfect Crisis and a Way Forward”, Cyprus Economic Policy Review 7, no. 1 (2013), 3-
45, 29. 
24 Apostolides, Beware of German Gifts Near Elections: How Cyprus Got here and Why it is Currently More Out than in the 
Eurozone, 300-318, 1. At a later stage, the ex-Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus Athanasios Orphanides challenged 
these figures. A report by BlackRock investment management company indicated different needs and, according to 
Orphanides, this miscalculation or overestimation is what required the bail-in. As a result, the bail-in’s need and soundness 
as a policy decision are put to question.  
25 "Definition of a Bail-in”, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=bail_in; "The Economist Explains: What is a Bail-in?", 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-2. 
26 Michaelides, Cyprus: From Boom to Bail-in.  
27 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes OJ L 
135, 31.5.1994, p. 5–14. 
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of heroic resistance against the Troika’s so-called national attack. This first agreement was opposed 
by all political parties – even the ruling party, the Democratic Rally (DY.SI), which abstained – and 
was unanimously rejected by the House of Representatives on March 19th. The absence of a working 
alternative though, forced the government back to another Eurogroup meeting. With the banks 
closed and the island’s economy paralysed, an agreement had to be reached. Despite fierce public 
criticism and the House of Representatives’ rejection, it was soon clear that no other solution would 
be accepted. The Cypriot government had a stark alternative: either bail-in or bankruptcy.  
1.2.2 Second Agreement 
Faced with the risk of an economic collapse, the Cypriot government gave in to the demands of 
the Eurogroup and agreed to a depositor bail-in.28 A second – and, some have argued, harsher –
agreement was reached in the Eurogroup meeting of March 25th. It provided for the splitting of each 
of the island’s two largest banks - Laiki and the Bank of Cyprus. Laiki, which was in deeper financial 
trouble, would be “resolved immediately”.29 Crucially, and this is a point we will return to later on, 
the resolution of Laiki would be achieved by a decision of the Central Bank of Cyprus under the new 
Bank Resolution Framework. The Eurogroup agreement stated that Laiki would be split into two 
parts, a ‘good’ bank and a ‘bad’, but what essentially occurred was a tripartite division into a good, a 
bad and a ‘Greek operations’ bank.30 The Greek subsidiaries of both Laiki and the BoC were disposed 
to Bank of Pireaus in an undervalued and much criticised agreement.31 The ‘bad’ Laiki was made up 
of all “equity shareholders, bondholders and uninsured depositors”32 and was led to liquidation, 
meaning that all the above-mentioned parties, whether investors or depositors, lost their property. 
The bail-in, was achieved by including all uninsured deposits in the ‘bad’ Laiki. The ‘good’ Laiki was 
comprised of all insured deposits but was also burdened with the ELA debt.33 Under the resolution 
agreement, the good Laiki would be folded into the BoC including the toxic ELA debt. Under the 
Eurogroup agreement, the BoC would also be subject to restructuring. While the agreement states 
that “uninsured deposits in BoC will remain frozen until recapitalisation has been effected, and may 
subsequently be subject to appropriate conditions”, several months later a decision was reached 
between the Troika and the Cypriot authorities to implement a 47.5% haircut (bail-in) on BoC’s 
 
28 Orphanides, What Happened in Cyprus. 
29 Eurogroup Statement on Cyprus, March 25th 2013. 
30 Jack and Cassels, Cyprus: An Analysis of the Impact of the Resolution Methodology on Stakeholders’ Claims Including the 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 450-463, 451.  
31 See the discussion in Apostolides, Beware of German Gifts Near Elections: How Cyprus Got here and Why it is Currently 
More Out than in the Eurozone, 300-318, 5. Also, Jack and Cassels, Cyprus: An Analysis of the Impact of the Resolution 
Methodology on Stakeholders’ Claims Including the Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 450-463. 
32 Eurogroup Statement on Cyprus, March 25th 2013. 
33 This is estimated at €9.2 billion. As Jack and Cassels point out, the “mechanism for ELA is obscure and ELA terms –
including the size of the facility, its timing, use, interest rate, maturity and collateral provided – are kept confidential”, 
making it difficult to calculate the exact amount or determine the loan’s soundness. See Ibid, 451.  
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uninsured deposits in order to assist the bank’s recapitalisation.34 Following the bail-in, Cyprus 
would receive a €10 billion loan subject to a Memorandum of Understanding that would introduce 
and regulate a series of strict austerity measures.35  
2. The Eurogroup’s role in the crisis: From a forum to a decision-making body 
As indicated above, crisis response measures adopted in Cyprus can be divided in two 
categories: those directed towards recapitalising the banks and those addressing issues of 
government debt and liquidity. In the first instance, recapitalisation of the banking sector was 
achieved through own means, meaning a depositor’s bail-in. In the second instance, financial 
assistance was granted to the government of Cyprus by the ESM on strict conditionality as outlined 
in the Memorandum of Understanding and the more comprehensive Economic Adjustment 
Programme for Cyprus.36 While these two broad categories of crisis response measures deal with 
different aspects of the crisis, financial assistance from the ESM was conditional upon the effective 
recapitalisation of Cyprus’s banking sector through own means.37 In this section, I consider the 
process of crisis coordination between EU institutions and Eurozone members by examining the 
Eurogroup’s role in reaching a bail-in resolution for the case of Cyprus.   
I will examine the process of deliberation and decision-making by surveying the position of five 
main stakeholders in reaching the bail-in decision: the government of Cyprus, other Eurozone 
members, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. It must be reiterated that the Treaties stipulate that the Eurogroup is an informal body where 
Eurozone ministers meet to discuss matters of the monetary union. In addition to these ministers, 
both the Commission and ECB are present in Eurogroup meetings. Despite the presence of Union 
institutions and government ministers, the Eurogroup’s informal status means it has no formal 
decision-making powers, is not accountable to any other body, and its president cannot be called 
before any Parliament - national or supranational.38 While the Eurogroup has played an important 
role in policy coordination in the past, raising doubts about the extent to which it remained within 
 
34 "Final Haircut of 47,5% at the Uninsured Deposits of Bank of Cyprus”, last modified 27/7/2013, accessed 15/11, 2016, 
http://yiangou.com.cy/news-read/89. 
35 Even though it is a rather insignificant amount, especially compared to other examples where financial assistance was 
granted, it amounts to 56% of the country’s GDP. See Apostolides, Beware of German Gifts Near Elections: How Cyprus Got 
here and Why it is Currently More Out than in the Eurozone, 300-318, 1. 
36 The Memorandum of Understanding can be found at the Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, available at: 
"Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus”, European Commission, last modified January 27, 2017, accessed January 8, 
2020, https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/op149_en.htm. 
37 The opening line of the Eurogroup’s Statement on March 25th 2013 indicates this: “The Eurogroup has reached an 
agreement with the Cypriot authorities on the key elements necessary for a future macroeconomic adjustment 
programme”. 
38 Rene Repasi, "The Role of the Eurogroup in the Economic Governance Framework" (European Parliament, European 
Research Centre for Economic and Financial Governance, 5 May, 2015). 
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the bounds of informal policy discussions, 39 it was not until the Eurozone crisis that it became the 
centre of gravity for Eurozone policy coordination. Due to the executive nature of Eurogroup 
meetings and lack of transparency, identifying with certainty the position and influence of each 
stakeholder is difficult. It is not possible to impute the decision for a bail-in to a particular 
stakeholder or institution acting within the Eurogroup, even though certain actors played key roles 
in the negotiations. I am not interested in whether the decision can be imputed to a specific 
institution or actor within the Eurogroup, but whether the Eurogroup as an institution in its own 
right can be considered a decision-making body of the Union. I do not understand decision-making 
as simply indicating the reaching of a common position but as the reaching of a conclusive position 
by a Union institution that the Member State to which that decision is addressed is obliged to follow. 
In what follows, I set out three reasons the Eurogroup suggested this kind of resolution as a 
condition for providing financial assistance to Cyprus. Though I refer to different actors or 
stakeholders within the Eurogroup, I consider the Eurogroup a unitary body40 and argue that the 
Eurogroup acts not only as a body of coordination but a body of economic deliberation and decision-
making. 
2.1 Banking sector recapitalisation and loan sustainability  
Economic analysis by the Troika (European Commission, ECB and IMF) 41 and from the 
independent international consulting firm PIMCO42 assessed the financing needs for both the 
banking sector and the Cyprus government. Both found that the amount required to recapitalise the 
banking sector amounted to about €10 billion, while a further €10 billion was needed to address the 
sovereign debt crisis. There were two main conclusions about what needed to happen. The Cyprus 
banking sector was deemed too big for the island’s small economy and thus had to be adjusted. As a 
result, the above assessments suggested that any loan exceeding €10 billion would be 
unsustainable. Based on the above conclusions, the Eurogroup took a firm position, agreeing with 
the Commission and ECB that the two largest banks, Laiki and the Bank of Cyprus, were insolvent 
and could not recover without some form of financial assistance. However, a bail-out was 
 
39 Uwe Puetter, Eurogroup: How a Secretive Circle of Finance Ministers Shape European Economic GovernanceManchester 
University Press, 2006). 
40 Such an approach is not uncommon. The Eurogroup itself issues statements that express a common position, and 
references to the Eurogroup as a body expressing a common position held by its members and EU institutions is customary 
in EU discussions.  
41 Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus. See also Anastasia Karatzia, "Cypriot Depositors before the Court of Justice 
of the European Union: Knocking on the Wrong Door?" King's Law Journal 26, no. 2 (2015), 175-184, 179-80. 
42 PIMCO, Independent due Diligence of the Banking System of Cyprus. PIMCO results were cross-checked by a series of 
other studies. While some disagreement was expressed, mainly about the over-calculation of the banking sector’s needs 
for recapitalisation, the PIMCO report continued to act as a guiding instrument for determining the liquidity needs for both 
banking and the government. See Zenios, Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in the Cyprus Crisis: ELA, PIMCO and Delays, 9-32, 23.  
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immediately ruled out, because a €20 billion loan was considered unsustainable.43 Whether or not a 
loan of this kind and therefore a bail-out would indeed have been unsustainable is a matter of 
economic debate. What matters for our discussion is the entrenched position held by the three 
institutions that any loan over €10 billion would be unsustainable, and that debt sustainability was a 
key factor in shaping the Troika’s position.  
Gerry Rice, the director of the External Relations Department, made the IMF’s position clear 
shortly after the Eurogroup agreement was reached. Rice stated that the Eurogroup strategy was 
“clear” and insured “debt sustainability”.44 Several other public statements followed suit. Christine 
Lagarde, Managing Director of the IMF, stated that the agreement would allow Cyprus to “service 
debt obligations” by reducing public debt to a “manageable” position.45 Moreover, a leaked 
confidential ECB report indicated that some creditors would not contribute to the recapitalisation of 
the financial sector, mainly for political reasons.46 Hence, with the banking sector unable to recover 
and the Troika unwilling to finance the bail-out of banks or any programme that exceeded what it 
deemed to be a sustainable loan agreement, the Eurogroup considered a depositor’s bail-in the only 
viable solution.47  
2.2 The lack of political willingness to bail-out banks and the consolidation of the bail-in  
The second reason for the Eurogroup insisting on a bail-in resolution was the absence of political 
will to finance yet another costly bail-out.48 Among the Eurogroup members refusing a bail-out was 
Germany – the leading force within the Eurogroup. Indicatively, German Finance Minister Wolfgang 
Schaeuble claimed in an interview with public broadcaster ARD, that "It was the position of the 
German government and the International Monetary Fund that we must get a considerable part of 
the funds that are necessary for restructuring the banks from the bank’s owners and creditors – that 
means the investors”.49 German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that the Cyprus “business model is 
 
43 European Commission, Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus 
44 "Transcript of a Press Briefing by Gerry Rice, Director, External Relations Department, International Monetary Fund”, 
IMF,, accessed May 20, 2018, http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/54/tr032813. 
45 "Press Release: IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement with Cyprus on a €1 Billion Extended Fund Facility Arrangement”, 
IMF,, accessed May 20, 2018, May 20th, 2018. http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr13103. 
46 Harald Schumann and Nikolas Leontopoulos, "SPECIAL REPORT: How the Troika and Piraeus Bank Sealed Cyprus΄s Fate”, 
The Press Project, February 24, 2015. See pages 7-8 of the ECB report attached to this article.  
47 An additional factor seemed to be the composition of deposits and high level of interest depositors had received in 
previous years. Large sums of foreign deposits, some from Russia, helped shape a view within the Eurogroup that deposits 
in Cyprus were largely comprised of foreign capital of uncertain origin. These allegations were never verified and overlook 
the fact that despite large sums of foreign capital, the majority of deposits was held by Cypriot nationals and local 
businesses. These were the people who were hit the hardest. Such political expediencies outline also the economistic, 
detached and often inhumane approach adopted by these creditors.  
48 The examples of Greece, Ireland and Spain preceded Cyprus.  
49 "Schaeuble Says Decision to Tax Small Deposits was Taken by Cyprus, European Commission and ECB”, eKathimerini, last 
modified 17/03/2013, accessed 4/3/2015, 2015, 
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dead.”50 Consensus among the Eurogroup was that Cyprus should abandon or at least radically alter 
its unsustainable business model based on low corporate tax and the attraction of large foreign 
deposits.51 The question, though, was who was to pay. Germany had a clear answer: those who 
benefited from the unsustainable business model.52  
In addition to the disciplinary function of the bail-in, some commentators, taking into 
consideration the upcoming elections in Germany, read these statements as part of the Chancellor’s 
pre-electoral campaign. German participation in any European support programme requires the 
vote of the Bundestag and the ruling party (CDU) “relied on support from the main opposition party 
(SPD) to pass the legislation”.53 The Cyprus question became a hot topic in the German election, with 
the press pointing out the issue of Russian depositors and creating the impression that a loan to the 
island would be equivalent to “giving away German taxpayer money to Russian oligarchs.”54 
Similarly, the SPD was pressuring the Government not to accept a costly bail-out that would favour 
Russian depositors – a narrative that is not only controversial, but even misleading. Merkel, already 
facing attacks for having directed billions of Euros toward sustaining other economies such as 
Greece, adopted the same rhetoric during her electoral campaign, proclaiming that “anyone having 
their money in Cypriot banks must contribute in the Cypriot bailout. That way those responsible will 
contribute in it, not only the taxpayers of other countries, and that’s what’s right”.55 The German 
position found resonance with other powerful members such as Finland and the Netherlands,56 who 
used their “leverage”57 to achieve a bail-in resolution. They had similar concerns about the 
sustainability of a debt over €10 billion, and they also disagreed with Cypriot banking practices.58 
Therefore, the absence of political willingness to bail-out failing banks in Cyprus contributed towards 




50 "Angela Merkel has A Brutal Message for Cyprus — but it's the Key for Getting A Deal”, Business Insider, last modified 
22/3/2013, accessed 21/11/2016, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/merkel-the-cyprus-business-model-is-dead-
2013-3?IR=T. 
51 See Wolfgang Schaeuble’s statement in Reuters dated 5 April 2013 as quoted in Orphanides, The Euro Area Crisis: Politics 
Over Economics, 243-263, 258: “We don’t like this business model and we hope it is not successful … In the case of Cyprus 
we have leverage that we don’t have with other tax havens.” 
52 Apostolides, Beware of German Gifts Near Elections: How Cyprus Got here and Why it is Currently More Out than in the 
Eurozone, 300-318. 
53 Orphanides, The Euro Area Crisis: Politics Over Economics, 243-263, 258. 
54 Ibid, 258. 
55 Apostolides, Beware of German Gifts Near Elections: How Cyprus Got here and Why it is Currently More Out than in the 
Eurozone, 300-318, 3, 7; See also, "Merkel: Cypriot Depositors must Share Responsibility”, Ekathimerini, 17/3/2013, 2013. 
56 See "Three Years After the Bail-in”, capital.com.cy, last modified 7/3/2016, accessed 23/11/2016, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rC5jyCov0So; "Cyprus Depositors’ Fate Sealed in Berlin”, Financial Times, last 
modified 17/3/2013, accessed 21/11/16, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/f890566a-8f24-11e2-a39b-00144feabdc0. 
57 See Wolfgang Schaeuble’s statement in Reuters dated 5 April 2013 as quoted in Orphanides, The Euro Area Crisis: Politics 
Over Economics, 243-263, 258. 
58 Sarris, Three Years After the Bail-in. 
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2.3 Securing other interests and objectives 
The third factor contributing to the Eurogroup’s position was the protection of other interests or 
objectives. As mentioned, the ECB kept the Cypriot economy on life support by allowing the Central 
Bank of Cyprus to continue providing ELA to Laiki.59 This granted the ECB major leverage over the 
negotiations. With a short press release on the 21st of March, days after the House of 
Representatives rejected the first Eurogroup agreement, the ECB brought the negotiations to a 
decisive point. By announcing that “The Governing Council of the European Central Bank decided to 
maintain the current level of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) until Monday, 25th March 2013”60 
the ECB steered negotiations to a decisive point. At that point, the Cyprus government had to sign 
an agreement – any agreement. The ECB was, therefore, instrumental in the timing of the 
agreement, but its main concern was to avoid incurring any losses from providing Laiki with 
emergency liquidity. As the main debtor was heading for liquidation, the ECB was threatened with a 
€9.2 billion loss. In a move that shifted losses to the depositors, ELA was attached to the ‘good bank’ 
and transferred to the Bank of Cyprus along with Laiki’s healthy operations. The ECB thus ensured 
that ELA debt would be repaid. Crucially, a depositor’s bail-in for the Bank of Cyprus ensured the 
liquidity of that institution and, by extension, its continuing ability to service its loan to the ECB. 
Moreover, the ECB secured its position in case of collapse by altering the order of priorities and 
positioning the ELA before any secured or uninsured deposits.61  
In addition to securing ELA repayment, the ECB and Commission were also concerned about 
‘ring-fencing’ the Greek banking sector from any contagion. A leaked ECB report entitled “Ring-
fencing of Cypriot banks’ branches in Greece” indicates that the ECB was preparing to limit the 
effects of a bail-in resolution.62 In order to avoid a banking crisis in Greece caused by the collapse of 
Cypriot banks, Union institutions wanted to prevent a further banking crisis in Cyprus, cut the ties 
 
59 Much criticism has been directed toward the ECB for this decision as it continued to finance a failing bank at the expense 
of its main shareholder – the Cypriot state. Zenios, Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in the Cyprus Crisis: ELA, PIMCO and Delays, 9-
32; Xiouros, Handling of the Emergency Liquidity Assistance of Laiki Bank in the Bailout Package of Cyprus, 33-103. Laiki had 
been insolvent long before March 2013. A combination of factors led this once successful bank to collapse. First, 
questionable lending practices after the bank’s merger with Greece-based Marfin. Second, the exposure of the bank to 
Greek sovereign bonds and the subsequent restructuring of Greece’s public debt led to losses of 2.3 billion Euros. 
Consequently, the bank was on the verge of collapse, which forced the Cypriot government to bail-out the bank by 
acquiring 84% of its shares for 1.8 billion Euros.  
60 "Governing Council Decision on Emergency Liquidity Assistance Requested by the Central Bank of Cyprus”, European 
Central Bank,, accessed May 25, 2018, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr130321.en.html. 
61 As Jack and Cassels indicate, The new Restructuring Framework (discussed in the next section) introduced while the 
banks were closed acts to “materially change the order of priorities” by granting priority to the ELA over insured and 
uninsured depositors despite previous remarks and practices indicating the opposite. Importantly, at the point of 
insolvency, “just as priority became of practical relevance” insolvency laws were altered in a way that could be called ex 
post facto. See Jack and Cassels, Cyprus: An Analysis of the Impact of the Resolution Methodology on Stakeholders’ Claims 
Including the Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 450-463, 452-454. 
62 Schumann and Leontopoulos, SPECIAL REPORT: How the Troika and Piraeus Bank Sealed Cyprus΄s Fate. 
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between Cypriot banks and their Greek operations and prevent a bail-in of Greek depositors. In 
response to the threat of an exacerbated Cyprus banking crisis, a bail-in of Cypriot depositors would 
ensure the liquidity of Cypriot banking institutions. To cut ties between Cypriot banks and their 
operations in Greece, all Greek operations of Laiki and the Bank of Cyprus were sold to Pireaus Bank 
in a much-discussed transaction.63 Greek depositors were excluded from the bail-in even though 
they had deposits in the two Cypriot banks. Once again it was Cypriot depositors who were 
burdened in order to minimise the exposure of other institutions (such as the ECB) or protect other 
interests.  
2.4 The Eurogroup as a decision-making body 
As we have seen, the Eurogroup evolved well beyond its original purpose to become a body of 
coordination, deliberation and, ultimately, decision-making. The forum provided a space for 
economic deliberation where a variety of actors and stakeholders met not only to discuss important 
matters such as crisis response measures, but also to reach decisions about what should be done. By 
examining the various factors contributing to adopting a bail-in resolution, along with the position of 
each stakeholder, we can observe the process of coordination, deliberation and decision-making 
within the Eurogroup. The case of Cyprus lets us see how the Eurogroup evolved from an informal 
body for discussion to an executive body for economic policy decision-making. Eurozone ministers, 
the ECB, Commission and IMF acted within the Eurogroup to promote their opinions and secure 
their interests. More importantly, it is within the Eurogroup that coordination occurred, and 
consensus was reached between the various parties operating within the forum. The bail-in as a 
crisis resolution mechanism and the ways it was achieved were decisions reached by the Eurogroup. 
Since coordination occurs within the forum and a unified European response is crystallised, the 
Eurogroup evolves from a mere talking shop to a decision-making body. 
3. Hollowing out democracy: The Cypriot House of Representatives during the crisis. 
In the previous section, I indicated how the Eurogroup evolved to a body of coordination, 
deliberation and decision-making. I now turn my attention to the Cypriot House of Representatives 
to consider its role in the bail-in. The sequence of events is important in determining the role and 
influence of the Cypriot House of Representatives in accepting a bail-in resolution. On Friday, March 
15th, after completing their normal operations, the banks closed. They were due to reopen on 
Tuesday the 19th due to a public holiday on Monday. In the meantime, the Eurogroup would 
convene on Saturday, with the fate of Cyprus and the so-called ‘rescue-package’ on the agenda. By 
 
63 Alexander Michaelides and Athanasios Orphanides, eds, The Cyprus Bail-in: Policy Lessons from the Cyprus Economic 
Crisis (London: Imperial College Press, 2016). 
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the end of the Eurogroup meeting of March sixteenth, the forum made it clear that any assistance 
from the EU would include a bail-in resolution. Due to the nature of the resolution and in order 
“facilitate the implementation of this agreement”, the Ministry of Finance “deemed it necessary to 
declare the nineteenth and the 20th of March 2013 as a bank holiday”.64 In the meantime, the 
Cypriot House of Representatives was to convene on the 19th of March to decide whether or not to 
accept the terms of the Eurogroup agreement.  
The task for this extraordinary plenary was to discuss the “Fee Upon Deposits in Credit 
Institutions Law of 2013”65 – the bill outlining the Eurogroup’s terms for a loan. It is common 
procedure, before a plenary session, for the relevant committee to convene in order to discuss the 
proposed bill and draft a consultation for the House that is then read out in the meeting. In this case, 
a five-minute break was called in order to abide by the formalities, as the consultation by the 
Parliamentary Committee on Financial and Budgetary Affairs had been prepared prior to the 
meeting. In its rather brief report, the Committee provides useful insights as to the realities of 
decision-making during this crisis moment. Its report makes clear that the bill is a direct result of the 
negotiation process, with the Committee recognising the conditionality of a bail-in resolution by 
pointing out that “the passage of the bill has been put as a necessary precondition for financial 
assistance to Cyprus”.66 Immediately after this, the Committee resorts to the threat of economic 
breakdown if the bill is rejected. Its narrative unfolds in the following way. Without the levy (bail-in) 
Cyprus will not receive a loan (rescue package) and the ECB would oppose the continuation of 
emergency liquidity (ELA) to Cypriot banks. When the banks reopen, fearful depositors will attempt 
to withdraw their deposits, and due to the absence of emergency liquidity, the banks would not be 
able to repay the depositors. The banks would then go bankrupt, triggering the state guarantee of 
deposits, but the Cyprus Deposit Protection Schemes would not be able to cover the €34 billion of 
guaranteed deposits, leaving no alternative but the adoption of a new national currency. This would 
mean exiting the Eurozone and would cause a deep recession during which the country would face a 
collapse in the value of the new currency. Hence, the bill had to be passed to ensure financial 
stability and avoid a socio-economic breakdown.  
Faced with such grave prospects, one would expect a fierce discussion in the House of 
Representatives focusing on the measures, their effectiveness, soundness, limitations, challenges 
and, most importantly, working alternatives. As the previous chapters have indicated, it is through 
the process of democratic debate and consideration of alternatives that such policy decisions gain 
 
64 Ministry of Finance, "Announcement by the Ministry of Finance: Bank Holiday Declaration - 18/3/2013”, Press and 
Information Office, Republic of Cyprus19/03/2013, 2013. 
65 «Ο περί Τέλους επί των Καταθέσεων σε Πιστωτικά Ιδρύματα Νόμος του 2013». 
66 Minutes of the Sitting of March 19th 2013, 24, B sess, (): 1413-1439, 1416. 
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their democratic legitimacy.67 But instead of deliberating and considering alternatives, the House 
developed a narrative of resistance, deeming the bill an outright attack on the Cypriot constitution, 
the rule of law and the House of Representatives. The bill was accused of wearing away the “legal 
and political foundations” of Cyprus and the EU itself. There was talk of a “foreign rule” trying to 
impose “debtocracy”, the “loss of independence and submission of the people”,68 even a new form 
of “colonial rule”.69 Behind the plain theft of deposits, Cypriot politicians saw geopolitical interests in 
the German election timing and even a plot by ‘foreign forces’ to destroy the financial sector in 
order to gain from the removal of capitals.70 To this act of aggression and imposition the House 
voted ‘NO’. March 19th would go down in history, or so the narrative developed on that day 
suggests, as the day when the House of Representatives delivered a heroic response that 
safeguarded its own sovereign power and reinforced Cyprus’ constitutional formation. The House’s 
narrative of resistance indicates the position it found itself in. It was not called to decide how to 
respond to the crisis but to ratify and give legal cover to a decision that had already been taken. 
Three days later, sentiments in the House of Representatives were very different. The aura of 
resistance gave way to sheer pragmatism as banks remained closed for a week and no viable 
solution was on the table. On March 22nd, a series of important bills was scheduled for discussion: 
the “Establishment of a Solidarity Fund Law of 2013”, the “Imposition of Restrictive Measures in 
Transaction in Case of Emergency Law of 2013” and the “Resolution of Credit and Other Institutions 
Law of 2013”.71 The solidarity fund attempted to establish a mechanism through which the 
government could generate the 7.5 billion Euros needed to cover the financial sector’s needs. 
Although valiant, the effort was feeble, and the fund never really achieved its purpose. By virtue of a 
declared state of emergency threatening social order or security, the second bill conferred on the 
Minister of Financial Affairs and/or the Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus the power to impose 
temporary control on capital flows. Strict capital controls restricting the scope and nature of 
transactions (for example, only 150 Euros could be withdrawn each day from ATM’s and sending 
money abroad was forbidden or restricted) were immediately imposed pursuant to this law. 
However, it is the final of the three bills that is most important. It set out a new restructuring 
framework within which the two failing banks would proceed to either liquidation or restructuring. 
The purpose of this new framework was to allow the Central Bank of Cyprus to act as a Resolution 
 
67 Mark Dawson and Floris Witte, "Constitutional Balance in the EU After the Euro-Crisis”, The Modern Law Review 76, no. 5 
(2013), 817-844, 826. 
68 House of Representatives of Cyprus, Minutes of the Sitting of March 19th 2013, 1413-1439, 1421. 
69 Ibid, 1422. 
70 Ibid, 1425-1428. 
71 «Ο περί Ίδρυσης Εθνικού Ταμείου Αλληλεγγύης Νόμος του 2013»; «Ο περί της Επιβολής Περιοριστικών Μέτρων στις 
Συναλλαγές σε Περίπτωση Έκτακτης Ανάγκης Νόμος του 2013»; «Ο περί Εξυγίανσης Πιστωτικών και Άλλων Ιδρυμάτων 
Νόμος του 2013». 
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Authority capable of deciding and implementing measures directed toward the resolution of credit 
institutions. The Central Bank of Cyprus was vested with the authority to essentially decide on the 
liquidation terms of any credit institution provided that the losses of the institution were not greater 
than they would be if the institution were subjected to direct liquidation (the ‘no creditor worse off’ 
principle).  
In its evaluation and subsequent consultation, the Parliamentary Committee on Financial and 
Budgetary Affairs pointed out that due to the ECB’s decision on March 21st to end the ELA if an 
agreement was not reached, the resolution of Laiki Bank was the only available option. In the 
subsequent discussion, sentiment was wholly different and the speeches less tendentious. Some 
elements of the previous discussion remained alive – the feeling of attack and betrayal, for 
example72 – party leaders accepted the ‘faith’ of Cyprus as it was set by the Troika. It is important to 
note that, unlike in the previous bill, the House was not required to vote in specific measures. 
Instead, the proposed legislation would set up the framework through which a bail-in could be 
achieved. By vesting the Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus with authority to act as Resolution 
Authority, the House was in essence accepting the terms of the Troika. “We are aware of the 
repercussions”73 of this bill, the leader of the Democratic Party said, while the leader of the 
governing party, the Democratic Rally, was even more explicit. He clearly stated that this bill would 
set in motion Laiki’s liquidation and that unsecured “depositors will have to wait for several years”74 
before they can know how much of their deposits would be seized. By laying the foundations for an 
upcoming liquidation process, the House transferred powers to the executive branch: The President 
of the Republic was to negotiate the terms and the Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus would 
execute the results of the Eurogroup meeting.  
Following the passing of a new banking resolution framework, the government was equipped to 
negotiate a depositors’ bail-in. In the Eurogroup meeting of March 25th, the final terms of the 
agreement were drafted (the second agreement, as outlined in section 1 of the chapter), obtaining 
the status and force of law pursuant to the issuing of two decrees by the Central Bank of Cyprus: 
Decree on the bailing-in of BoC, Regulatory Administrative Act No 103 and Decree on the sale of 
certain operations of Laiki, Regulatory Administrative Act No 104.75 It was therefore by executive 
 
72 Minutes of the Sitting of March 22nd 2013, 25, B sess, (): 1461-1496, 1471-1478. 
73 Ibid, 1471-1478. 
74 Ibid, 1471-1478. 
75 ‘Decree No 103’, EE, Annex III(I), No 4645, 29.3.2013, p. 769 to 780; ‘Decree No 104’, EE, Annex III(I), No 4645, 29.3.2013, 
p. 781 to 788. And in Greek: Το Περί διάσωσης με ιδία μέσα της Τράπεζας Κύπρου Δημόσια Εταιρία ΛΤΔ Διάταγμα του 
2013, Κανωνιστική Διοικητική Πράξη Αρ. 103 (To peri diasosis me idia mesa tis Trapezas Kyprou Dimosias Etaireias Ltd 
Diatagma tou 2013, Kanonistiki Dioikitiki Praxi No 103 / 2013); Το Περί πώλησης Ορισμένων Εργασιών της Cyprus Popular 
Bank Public Co Ltd Διάταγμα του 2013, Κανωνιστική Διοικητική Πράξη Αρ. 104 ( to Peri tis Polisis Orismenon Ergasion tis 
Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co Ltd Diatagma tou 2013, Kanonistiki Dioikitiki Praxi No 104 / 2013 . 
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decree that Laiki was led to liquidation and the BoC to restructuring and depositors were forced to 
contribute to the two banks’ recapitalisation.  
Arising from the above discussion is one simple yet crucial claim: that the measures were 
conceived and devised by or within the Eurogroup. In a series of statements, President Anastasiades 
explicitly stated that these measures have been handed down during the Eurogroup meeting76 - a 
position also adopted by the Committee.77 In the two meetings discussed above, it was pointed out 
that the liquidation of Laiki was planned well before March. Twice speakers made reference to the 
preparation of the new Resolution Framework, indicating that it had been ready well before March 
and was simply waiting for approval.78 The opposition leader Andros Kyprianou hinted at similar 
allegations in the meeting of March 19th, claiming that when his party, AKEL, was in power, it refused 
to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Troika precisely because of their demands for a 
depositor’s bail-in.79 Similar statements were made by senior officials. Michalis Sarris, then Minister 
of Finance, described the negotiation procedure: “There was not much to be decided...we found 
ourselves in a plight situation, our credibility and negotiating power were non-existent. If something 
could have been done, it would only have been possible 18 months before”. 80 In March, Sarris adds, 
everything had already been predetermined by the leaders of the Eurogroup. The decision for a bail-
in, an alternative fiscal mechanism the Eurogroup was keen to see implemented, was already 
taken.81 Commenting on the drafting of the Resolution Framework, ex-Governor of the Central Bank 
of Cyprus Athanasios Orphanides indicated that the bill was finalised sometime in 2012 and only 
presented to the House after they rejected the first agreement.82 A leaked ECB document, dated 27 
January 2013 entitled “Ring-fencing of Cypriot banks’ branches in Greece” which discusses ways to 
secure the Greek banking sector from the possible effects of a bail-in in Cyprus, further supports this 
statement.83  
The level of discussion and deliberation conducted within the House of Representatives is in 
stark distinction with the discussions at the Eurogroup. Although there is no official transcript of 
Eurogroup discussions, the resulting documents84 outline detailed and highly technical policy 
 
76 See for example Nicos Anastasiades, "Address to the Nation by the President of the Republic, Mr Nicos Anastasiades”, 
Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 17/3/2013, 2013. 
77 House of Representatives of Cyprus, Minutes of the Sitting of March 19th 2013, 1413-1439, 1417. 
78 House of Representatives of Cyprus, Minutes of the Sitting of March 22nd 2013, 1461-1496, 1473, 1477-1478.  
79 House of Representatives of Cyprus, Minutes of the Sitting of March 19th 2013, 1413-1439, 1429. 
80 Sarris, Three Years After the Bail-in. It is not an exaggeration to say that Cyprus acted as a guinea pig whereby a new 
approach for managing financial crises was tested and on which the new directive “establishing a framework for the 
recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms” was based (Directive 2014/59/EU). 
81 Ibid.  
82 Nansia Palala, “A road map for the bail-in already existed”, Simerini, August 7th 2016, Accessed April 20th 2020, 
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83 Schumann and Leontopoulos, SPECIAL REPORT: How the Troika and Piraeus Bank Sealed Cyprus΄s Fate. 
84 For example Eurogroup statements and the Economic Adjustment Programme on Cyprus. 
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measures, indicative of the degree of deliberation and decision-making occurring within the forum. 
In contrast, discussions at the national level lack the level of economic deliberation found in the 
Eurogroup. Reading through the plenary minutes reveals a complete absence of economic 
deliberation. Perhaps what was left unsaid is more important than the petty-political rhetoric of 
resistance performed by the House – there was no discussion of policy measures or alternative 
possibilities apart from the reading of a fear-lead report. Moreover, the sequence of events, with 
the House rejecting a bail-in agreement only to approve it days later, indicates the weakness of 
national bodies relative to the Eurogroup. As deliberation and decision-making had already taken 
place within the Eurogroup, national procedures operated to transpose already taken decisions into 
law and legitimise executive decisions adopted at the Union level. Procedurally, the democratic 
settlement established through European integration is retained as national bodies rubber-stamp 
policy measures adopted at a Union level. Substantively, we observe the migration of decision-
making from national bodies to Union institutions in a way that distorts the constitutional 
settlement of the EU and its Member States.  
Conclusion: The ultimate constitutional question arising from the Cypriot case 
In this chapter I argued that the Eurogroup became a body of deliberation and decision-making 
during the crisis. Due to its informal nature, the Eurogroup had always acted as an insulated space 
without requirements for transparency or accountability. During the crisis, however, what was 
already an insulated space for economic coordination was transformed into a body of economic 
decision-making. What changed during this period is the intensity of activity within the forum. 
Instead of cooperation in fiscal policy, we observe the coordination of fiscal policy measures. Instead 
of consensus, we see the employment of political pressure to inflict a crisis response approach or 
measure on Eurozone members in need. Moreover, the Eurogroup acted as a space where 
numerous EU institutions met and shaped and expressed a unified European position. During this 
process of intensification of coordination, the Eurogroup underwent an institutional development. 
No longer an informal forum for discussion, it is now an institution capable of reaching binding 
economic decisions at a Union level that Member States are obliged to follow. We saw this again in 
the third section of this chapter, with the role of the Cypriot House of Representatives limited to 
affirming and giving legal effect to Eurogroup decisions. As a result, national parliaments have been 
completely disenfranchised from organising responses to the crisis and are called on solely to 
transpose economic policy decided by European institutions into national measures and ensure their 
continuing application. In other words, national parliaments act as a mechanism for the formal 
legitimation of supranational informality.  
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Multiple conclusions can be drawn from the in-depth study of institutional development 
conducted in this chapter. First, we observe an increase in the competences of the European Union 
to decide on economic matters, as the Eurogroup can directly influence decisions in what is, 
according to the division of competences, a matter of national significance. Second, we see the 
continuing reconfiguration of legal authority as economic deliberation and decision-making 
continues to migrate from national institutions to supranational institutions or, in this case, 
institutional configurations. As a result, the insulation of economic decision-making is intensified due 
to the ongoing separation of economic decision-making from the national sphere where political 
contestation is most likely to occur. Third, the continuing shift from legally recognisable routes such 
as the Community methods toward legally ambiguous and informal formations such as the 
Eurogroup, further increases the degree of insulation afforded to supranational institutions. 
Procedural rules established to ensure some form of democratic participation or at least 
transparency, are circumvented, allowing economic decision-making to be conducted in a highly 
insulated environment. Ultimately, economic decision-making occurs within a scrutiny lacuna as 
democratic interference or contestation is minimised. Moreover, as national parliaments are 
disenfranchised from their power to decide appropriate fiscal policies, the threat of interference by 
national institutions to the decisions already adopted at a Union level is minimal, further insulating 
economic decision-making. The fourth conclusion concerns the relationship between neoliberalism 
and European constitutionalism. As institutional development intensifies the degree of insulation 
afforded to economic decision-making and further separates politics from the economy, the 
possibility for competing constitutional objectives to take effect is minimised. In other words, the 
circumvention of constitutional barriers silences all other considerations, whether social 
considerations, the articulation of alternative policy approaches or political considerations like 
greater democratic participation. By minimising interference with the chosen crisis response 
approach, European institutions intensify the neoliberal character of Europe’s political economy.  
Institutional development resulting in a scrutiny lacuna is not a ‘momentary lapse of reason’85 on 
the part of EU institutions; it is not an exceptional circumstance where normality has been 
suspended in order to reinstate constitutional order.86 Instead, it is a moment where the fragile 
democratic balance achieved by the division of competences is distorted, thus transforming the 
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86 For a discussion on state of exception see: Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, trans. George Schwab (Chicago & London: The 
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15, no. 5 (2014), 985-1027; Michelle Everson and Christian Joerges, "Who is the Guardian for Constitutionalism in Europe 
After the Financial Crisis?" LEQS Paper, no. 63 (2013). 
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constitutional identity of the EU. The constitutional question that arises, therefore, is not so much 
the bypassing of procedures or the blurring of fiscal policy competences but an outright challenge to 
the ability of constitutional law to constitute and limit the exercise of public power. This is, indeed, 
an “existential”87 moment for the EU and its Member States. As constitutional circumventions 
manifest through changes in the division of competences on which the EU is constructed, 88 
constitutional courts are required to review these developments. Therefore, the next two chapters 
consider how courts have responded to the constitutional imbalance and consider the extent to 
which the scrutiny lacuna is constitutionalised by the operation of constitutional review. 
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Constitutional Review”, ARENA Working Paper 2/2017 (2017). 
88 Michael A. Wilkinson, "The Specter of Authoritarian Liberalism: Reflections on the Constitutional Crisis of the European 
Union”, German Law Journal 14 (2013), 527-558; Michael A. Wilkinson, "Authoritarian Liberalism in the European 
Constitutional Imagination: Second Time as Farce?" European Law Journal 21, no. 3 (2015), 313-339; Christian Joerges and 
Maria Weimer, "A Crisis of Executive Managerialism in the EU: No Alternative?" Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper, 
no. 2012-7 (2012). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2190362; Jürgen Habermas, "The Crisis of the 
European Union in the Light of a Constitutionalization of International Law”, European Journal of International Law 23, no. 
2 (2012), 335-348. 
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Chapter 5 – Cypriot depositors before the European Court of 
Justice: Constitutionalising the scrutiny lacuna 
“Not all cases are equally important; they are not equally interesting intellectually and they are 
not of equal significance in terms of political significance”,1 but sometimes the features of a case 
coalesce to bring together a judgment with momentous significance. The case of Mallis and Malli v 
Commission and ECB2 could have been one of those cases. In this direct action for the annulment of 
an EU act, Cypriot depositors challenged the legality of the Eurogroup’s statement dated March 25th, 
2013 announcing the bail-in resolution for the Cypriot banking sector. The applicants in Mallis 
argued that EU institutions were directly involved in the deliberation and decision of crisis response 
measures with the effect of expanding the Union’s competences. The case required the Court to 
consider the involvement of the European Commission, European Central Bank and Eurogroup in 
deciding a bail-in resolution for the Cypriot banking sector and whether the involvement of EU 
institutions constitutes an expansion of competences by the Union. In this chapter, I consider 
whether, and how, the Court of Justice of the European Union tackled the development of a scrutiny 
lacuna during the crisis by engaging in ultra vires review.  
The questions I raise here rely heavily on observations and conclusions put forward in previous 
chapters. Specifically, in Chapters 3 and 4, I outlined how the Eurozone crisis effected a series of 
constitutional developments and changes. Chapter 3 indicated how crisis response measures 
intensified insulation of economic decision-making from democratic participation and contestation. 
Chapter 4 took a closer look at institutional development through an in-depth examination of 
decision-making during the crisis in Cyprus and showed how the Eurogroup became a body of 
deliberation and decision-making. Both chapters point out the stark choice faced by governments 
and parliaments in countries with economic difficulties. As all loan agreements are subject to strict 
conditionality, EU Member States must choose between transformative austerity measures or face 
significant economic uncertainty, even collapse. In these situations, the economic leverage held by 
EU institutions and creditor Member States is employed to pursue a course of action based on what 
Chapter 3 identified as a dominant framing. Economic deliberation and decision-making about 
national fiscal and social policy is conducted by EU institutions. Conditionality serves as a way of 
locking-in crisis response measures in debtor states by ensuring the continuing compliance of those 
 
1 Paul Craig, "Pringle: Legal Reasoning, Text, Purpose and Teleology”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 
20, no. 1 (2013), 3-11, 3.  
2 Case T-327/13, Mallis and Mallis v. Commission and European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2014:909. These were then 
appealed in: Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P, Konstantinos Mallis and Others v. Commission and European Central 
Bank, ECLI:EU:C:2016:702. 
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countries in receipt of financial assistance with prescribed policy responses. National governments 
and parliaments are locked in a relationship of dependence, forcing them to continue with social and 
structural reforms decided by EU institutions.  
Together the chapters highlight how increasing coordination between EU institutions and 
Eurozone members increases the degree of insulation afforded to economic decision-making at the 
supranational level to the degree that a scrutiny lacuna is created. The creation of a scrutiny lacuna 
around economic decision-making means that democratic institutions and by extension citizens have 
no way to scrutinise crisis response measures and their effects. In addition to the institutional and 
democratic aspect of scrutiny lacuna, there is also a legal dimension. Existing legal instruments such 
as decisions and directives were not employed by EU institutions. Informal coordination lead to the 
issuing of informal announcement of measures such as the Eurogroup statements and of broad 
declarations of measures such as Council Decisions addressed to specific countries. The absence of 
formal legal connection between supranational decision-making and national provisions 
implementing crisis response measures meant that EU institutions, acting behind the cloak of 
informality, could exercise de-facto legal authority. Constitutionally, the situation described above 
translates to an increase of EU competences, the alteration of both the EU and Member States’ 
constitutions and a shift in the democratic settlement between EU and Member States. 
As the constitutional implications of the crisis touch the very core of Europe’s constitutional 
arrangement, the question of constitutional review soon follows. As indicated in Chapter 3, 
numerous cases challenging crisis response measures were brought before the CJEU but in none of 
those cases did the Court recognise any legal connection between EU institutions and crisis response 
measures. In that chapter, I argued that the CJEU’s light touch of review constitutionalised the 
scrutiny lacuna created by intensified coordination. The aim of this chapter is to continue the inquiry 
into how the Court of Justice of the European Union tackled the development of a scrutiny lacuna 
during the crisis by engaging in ultra vires review. For this reason, the chapter conducts a close 
reading of Mallis and Malli v Commission and ECB3 in order to consider how the CJEU responded to 
the expansion of de-facto decision-making capacities of the Eurogroup and, by extension, to the 
disturbance of democratic settlement in the Union. The majority of discussions on this case 
approach the issues from the perspective of the private litigant, considering the rights of third 
parties and how these can be protected through judicial review.4 While this consideration is 
 
3 Case T-327/13, Mallis and Mallis v. Commission and European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:T:2014:909.  
4 Rene Repasi, "The Role of the Eurogroup in the Economic Governance Framework" (European Parliament, European 
Research Centre for Economic and Financial Governance, 5 May, 2015); Anastasia Karatzia, "An Overview of Litigation in 
the Context of Financial Assistance to Eurozone Member States”, Hungarian Yearbook of International Law and European 
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significant, I approach the question from the view of European public law, focusing on the exercise 
of ultra vires review by the ECJ and considering the effects of the Court’s approach in Mallis.  
The first section will address the issue of constitutional review in the EU, focusing on the 
extension of competences through acts ultra vires. Constitutional review is broadly understood as 
the ability of a Court to review and strike down legislation or administrative actions deemed 
incompatible with the constitution. In this section, I focus on the branch of legal review concerned 
with whether a legislative or administrative action goes beyond the competence of the author to 
decide such matters, in other words, ultra vires review. I consider the jurisdictional battle between 
the CJEU and national constitutional courts in determining which Court has the authority to have the 
final say on the constitutionality of acts considered to be ultra vires. In the second section, I consider 
the judgment delivered by the CJEU (General Court, Advocate General and ECJ) in Mallis and identify 
the constitutional significance of the CJEU’s judgment. Finally, section three examines the limits of 
judicial review by suggesting an alternative interpretation of the issues raised in Mallis. By 
reconstructing some of the key arguments put forward by the Court, this section indicates that the 
Court could have employed existing interpretive tools and case law to admit the case of Mallis and in 
doing so exercise ultra vires review. This section completes the examination of the Eurogroup 
initiated in Chapter 4 and supplements the proposition that it acts as body of deliberation and 
decision-making by presenting the legal effects of Eurogroup statements.  
In this chapter, I argue that by exercising a light touch of review, the CJEU refused to intervene 
in informal methods of coordination thus providing legal validity to constitutional changes effected 
by institutional development – what I term as the constitutionalisation of a scrutiny lacuna. 
Ultimately, I identify how the exercise of judicial review operates as yet another insulating 
instrument and argue that the ECJ limits the reach of its own jurisdiction in a way that severely 
undermines the exercise of ultra vires review in the European Union. These arguments contribute to 
number of debates identified by the thesis. Firstly, the argument put forward by the chapter 
contributes to assessing the constitutional implications of the Eurozone crisis. Secondly, it expands 
our understanding of the Eurogroup’s institutional development and its constitutional significance. 
Thirdly, the chapter contributes to assessing the wider implications of constitutionalising a scrutiny 
lacuna on the exercise of constitutional review in the EU and the relationship between neoliberalism 
 
Law (2016), 573-590; Anastasia Karatzia, "Cypriot Depositors before the Court of Justice of the European Union: Knocking 
on the Wrong Door?" King's Law Journal 26, no. 2 (2015), 175-184; Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou and Anastasia Karatzia, 
"Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Cyprus Bail-in Litigation: A Commentary on Mallis and Ledra”, European Law Review, 
no. 2 (2018), 249-268; Anastasia Poulou, "Austerity and European Social Rights: How can Courts Protect Europe's Lost 
Generation?" German Law Journal 15, no. 6 (2014), 1145-1176. 
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and European constitutional law. Finally, the chapter contributes to our understanding of the 
relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law.  
1: Ultra Vires Review in the EU. A battle for jurisdictional authority between the ECJ 
and national constitutional courts  
As previous chapters have indicated, among the many issues raised by the Eurozone crisis is the 
extension of Union competences through institutional development. This section is concerned with 
the exercise of constitutional review in the EU. Conventionally, constitutional review is understood 
as the power of a Court to declare legislation or administrative actions incompatible with the 
constitution, with the effect of either being without effect or sent back to the legislature for revision. 
One branch of constitutional review focuses on the authorship of measures, that is, their origin 
(author) and whether a given author has the authority to exercise that kind of decision-making. In 
the EU, the question is one of competences to decide. Constitutional courts and the ECJ have been 
exploring for some time now the question of constitutional review in instances where acts of Union 
institutions violate existing constitutional arrangements. In this section, therefore, I consider who is 
the final arbiter of constitutionality in Europe with regards to acts ultra vires or acts that distort the 
constitutional arrangement of the EU with its Member States.  
1.1. National constitutional courts and their continuing claim to rule an act of the EU ultra vires 
Ever since the doctrine of supremacy was established by the ECJ, national courts, especially 
constitutional courts, have challenged the jurisdictional hierarchy of the ECJ in considering matters 
of constitutional significance.5 In broad strokes, national constitutional courts argue that an act of 
the Union that affects their own constitutional identity, as for example the expansion of 
competences by the EU through secondary legislation or ECJ case law, is directly reviewable in 
national constitutional courts.6 The ECJ consistently responds that only Union courts have 
jurisdiction to declare an act of the Union unlawful or ultra vires.7 Over the years, a vivid exchange 
between national constitutional courts, mainly the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht – BVerfG) and the ECJ has developed around this issue.  
In an attempt to balance both the supremacy of EU legal order and the authority of national 
constitutional courts to review any constitutional changes affecting the constitutions of Member 
 
5 The development of constitutional concepts by the ECJ, including the doctrine of supremacy, were discussed in Section 3 
of Chapter 2.  
6 For the latest reiteration of this position see: BVerfg, Judgment of the Second Senate of 05 May 2020 – 2 BvR 859/15 -, 
paras (1-237). 
7 Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Reselase No 58/20, Press release following the judgment of the German 
Constitutional Court of 5 May 2020, Luxembourg, 8 May 2020.  
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States, the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has diachronically asserted its authority to review any 
unilateral EU act affecting the constitutional settlement between EU and a Member State, in this 
case Germany. The FCC does not challenge the supremacy of the EU legal order but insists that this 
supremacy “does not stem from an autonomous source of law but has its basis in an authorization 
located in national constitutional law.”8 Such a claim rests on the principle of conferral. So long as EU 
supremacy rests on the constitutional authorization of its Member States and not on the self-
proclaimed independence of the EU legal order, the FCC claims a jurisdictional authority to review 
whether EU acts transgress into the competences reserved to Member States. 9 In other words, as 
the FCC is tasked with ensuring that the German constitution is observed, it retains an authority to 
review whether EU acts remain within the limits of the competences conferred upon the Union. The 
FCC identifies three areas where it can exercise constitutional review of EU law, instances where 
there is a violation of fundamental rights,10 where union acts are considered ultra vires11 or where 
national constitutional identity is challenged.12 Each of these will be considered in turn.  
With regards to fundamental rights review, the FCC stated that it would exercise review of EU 
acts as long as the EU and ECJ did not guarantee and protect the same fundamental rights as 
German Basic Law.13 While the Court accepted the guarantees provided by the EU, and did not 
exercise fundamental rights review,14 it continued to reassert its right to review acts if and when 
they contravened fundamental rights. The FCC’s promise to do so in coordination with the ECJ may 
be seen as an attempt to ease tensions between the two courts without ceding any of the FCC’s 
authority. Following the Banana Market judgment,15 the Court refused to review the compatibility of 
single EU acts with fundamental rights and limited its own authority to “the review of whether EU 
law and institutions provide for an adequate level of rights protection in general”;16 a position 
affirmed in subsequent case law.17 
The doctrine of ultra vires rests on the fundamental principle that the “limits of Union 
competences are governed by the principle of conferral”18 and “competences not conferred remain 
 
8 Mehrdad Payandeh, "Constitutional Review of EU Law After Honeywell: Contextualizing the Relationship between the 
German Constitutional Court and the EU Court of Justice”, Common Market Law Review 48, no. 1 (2011), 9-38, 12.  
9BVerfg, Judgment of 22 October 1986, 2 BvR 197/83, [339]; BVerfg, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009 – 2 
BvE 2/08 -, paras (1-421), [231]. 
10 BVerfg, Order of the Second Senate of 07 June 2000 – 2 BvL 1/97 -, paras. (1-69).  
11 BVerfg, Judgment of 12 October 1993 – 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2 BvR 2159/92.  
12 BVerfg, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009 – 2 BvE 2/08 -, paras (1-421).  
13 BVerfg, Judgment of 22 October 1986 – 2 BvR 197/83; BVerfg, Judgment of 22 October 1986 – 2 BvR 197/83. 
14 BVerfg, Judgment of 22 October 1986 – 2 BvR 197/83. 
15 BVerfg, Order of the Second Senate of 07 June 2000 – 2 BvL 1/97 -, paras. (1-69). 
16 Ibid, 14.  
17 BVerfg, Order of the Second Senate of 27 January 2010 – 2 BvR 2253/06 -, paras (1-26) 
18 Article 5(1) TEU (Previously Article 5 TEC).  
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with Member States”.19 Accordingly, any Union action must occur within the bounds of those 
competences transferred by Member States and according to the principles of subsidiarity20 and 
proportionality.21 The Treaty on European Union (TEU) sets a clear distinction between the limits of 
Union competences and the use of those competences.22 As Craig notes, an act ultra vires could 
arise in instances where the EU fails “to adhere to the limits to its competence embodied in the 
founding Treaties”.23 Such failure could arise by acting in an area where it is “not accorded power at 
all” or acting in areas “where it is prima facie granted power, but violates subsidiarity”.24 An ultra 
vires act is, therefore, a transgression of existing constitutional limits as set by the division of 
competences and can “take the form of EU regulations, directives or decisions that are ultra vires 
the Treaty articles on which they are based, or it may alternatively take the form of an ultra vires 
interpretation of Treaty provisions or rules made thereunder by the EU courts”.25 What remains 
unclear, though, is which court has jurisdiction to review and annul an action ultra vires – an issue 
considered in the Maastricht judgment of the FCC.26 For the Maastricht Treaty to be ratified by the 
German state, the Federal Constitutional Court needed to review its content and decide whether it 
was compatible with the German constitution. In its judgment, the FCC reinstated its position that it 
was within its jurisdictional authority to review whether Union acts remained within the 
competences conferred to the Union by Member States. When the Court deemed that Union acts 
overcame the competences vested to the Union, the Court reserved its authority to rule such acts 
inapplicable at the national level. In essence, the FCC restated its authority to act as the guardian of 
constitutionality at the national level and, by extension, to police the jurisdictional boundaries set by 
the principle of conferral. Despite these proclamations, the FCC fell short of ruling any act of the 
Union ultra vires.  
Before considering the ECJ’s response to the FCC’s comments in the case of Maastricht, a 
complementary ground of review should also be outlined. Following Maastricht, the FCC 
emphatically reaffirmed its role as ultimate protector of constitutionality in the ratification of the 
Treaty of Lisbon.27 In that case, the Court added to the possible grounds for reviewing acts of the EU 
cases where EU legal acts could be in contradiction with the constitutional identity of the German 
Constitution. Put simply, the FCC states that any action taken by EU institutions that distorts the 
 
19 Article 5(2) TEU. 
20 Article 5(3) TEU. 
21 Article 5(4) TEU. 
22 Article 5(1) TEU. 
23 Paul Craig, "The ECJ and Ultra Vires Action: A Conceptual Analysis”, Common Market Law Review 48, no. 2 (2011), 395-
437, 397. 
24 Ibid, 426.  
25 Ibid, 397. 
26 BVerfg, Judgment of 12 October 1993 – 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2 BvR 2159/92. 
27 BVerfg, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009 – 2 BvE 2/08 -, paras (1-421).  
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constitutional arrangement between the EU and its Member States may be reviewed. What we see 
here is a reiteration of the principle of conferral and the need to respect the foundational idea of the 
EU’s legal order as “an association of sovereign states to which sovereign powers are transferred”.28 
Moreover, constitutional identity review can be used to ensure that “sufficient space is left to the 
Member States for the political formation of the economic, cultural and social living conditions”29 of 
their choosing. It remains uncertain as to how the Court may choose to apply this ground of review, 
however, it seems that it can serve “as a basis for review with regard to actions of the EU organs and 
institutions.”30 As a ground of review, it is closely associated with ultra vires and can be 
complimentary or alternative to ultra vires review.  
1.2. Holding tight: The ECJ’s response to national constitutional courts  
As would be expected, the ECJ consistently rejects any challenge to its authority to determine 
questions of EU law, including ruling any acts of the Union ultra vires. In Foto-Frost, the Court 
articulated its supremacy based on the need for uniform application of Community law: “the main 
purpose of the powers accorded to the Court by Article 177 [of the EEC Treaty] is to ensure that 
Community law is applied uniformly by national courts. That requirement of uniformity is 
particularly imperative when the validity of a community act is in question. Divergences between 
courts in the Member States as to the validity of Community acts would be liable to place in 
jeopardy the very unity of the Community legal order and detract from the fundamental 
requirement of legal certainty”.31 The Court’s sole competence to pronounce an act of the Union 
invalid was exemplified in a series of cases.32 More recently, the Court accepted the that national 
constitutional courts could act as “judicial authorities of last instance” concerning national 
constitutional questions.33 However, the ECJ it proceeded to indicate that in considering any matter 
concerning Union law, constitutional courts should “refer preliminary questions on the validity of 
secondary Union law and to apply its conclusions in the legal proceedings before them”.34 The ECJ 
reinstated its long-standing position that before national courts could rule on the validity of an EU 
act, “the Court of Justice should be given the opportunity to review the legality of the Union 
 
28 Ibid, [229]. 
29 Ibid, [249]. 
30 Payandeh, Constitutional Review of EU Law After Honeywell: Contextualizing the Relationship between the German 
Constitutional Court and the EU Court of Justice, 9-38, 17. 
31 Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lu¨ beck-Ost, ECLI:EU:C:1987:452, [15]. 
32 Case C-27/95, Woodspring v Bakers of Nailsea [1997] ECR I-1847, [20]; Case C-461/03 Gaston Schul Douane-expediteur, 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:742, [21]; Case C-344/04 IATA and ELFAA, ECLI:EU:C:2006:10, [27]; Case C-119/05 Lucchini, 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:434, [53]; Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli, ECLI:EU:C:2010:363, [54] 
33 Asteris Pliakos and Georgios Anagnostaras, "Blind Date between Familiar Strangers: The German Constitutional Court 
Goes Luxembourg!" German Law Journal 15, no. 2 (2014), 369-382, 377. 
34 Ibid. 
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measure concerned in relation to the requirements of primary Union law”35 and that national 
procedures “may not impair its exclusive privileges to rule on the invalidity of the acts of the Union 
institutions”.36 The ECJ was careful not to disregard the ability of national constitutional courts to 
exercise constitutional review of ultra vires acts, but the Court reinstates the obligation of national 
courts to refer any matters of EU law to the ECJ, establishing in this way its constitutional authority 
to review and decide on all matters concerning the acts of EU institutions before national courts do. 
As a result, the declaration of any act as ultra vires should, according to the ECJ, first obtain the 
approval of the European Court by way of a preliminary ruling.  
Following the ECJ’s Melki and Abdeli37ruling, the FCC in Honeywell38 gestured toward easing the 
tension with the ECJ. In Honeywell, the FCC reiterated its competence to exercise ultra vires review 
over acts of union institutions. It expressed its longstanding position that as long as the Union 
operates on the principle of conferral, with Member States as masters of the Treaties, the FCC’s 
capacity to police the boundaries of that agreement cannot be completely ceded as it is interlinked 
with questions of national constitutional significance. However, in an attempt to ease the tension 
with the ECJ, the FCC also acknowledged that pursuing any “complaints of an ultra vires act on the 
part of European bodies and institutions is to be coordinated with the task which the Treaties confer 
on the Court of Justice, namely to interpret and apply the Treaties, and in doing so to safeguard the 
unity and coherence of Union law”.39 Moreover, the FCC noted that any ultra vires review “must 
comply with the ruling of the Court of Justice in principle as a binding interpretation of Union law” 
such that before an ultra vires review of an EU act, the Court of Justice “is to be afforded the 
opportunity to interpret the Treaties, as well as to rule on the validity and interpretation of the legal 
acts in question, in the context of preliminary ruling proceedings”.40 The FCC acknowledged the fact 
that the primacy of EU law and its uniform application would be severely undermined should 
national courts be permitted to strike down Union acts. In addition, a restrictive approach to ultra 
vires review was established by developing a set of meta-standards without which the Court cannot 
proceed to review an EU legal act. Specifically, the Court stated that for an act to be considered as 
ultra vires and therefore invalid at the national level, it must “manifest that acts of the European 
bodies and institutions have taken place outside the transferred competences [by transgressing] the 




37 Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli, ECLI:EU:C:2010:363. 
38 BVerfg, Order of the Second Senate of 06 July 2010 – 2 BvR 2661/06 -, paras (1-116). 
39 Ibid, [56].  
40 Ibid, [60].  
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detriment of the Member States.41 Making the operation of ultra vires review contingent on the 
existence of restrictive conditions makes it almost impossible to assert the invalidity of EU law on 
the basis of a violation of the principle of conferral. Unsurprisingly, the FCC concluded that upon 
application of the above test, the ECJ’s judgment in Mangold42 did not constitute an ultra vires act.  
The position, as developed in Honeywell, is that constitutional review of EU acts may occur at 
national courts but, due to the ECJ’s jurisdiction to interpret EU law, no action of the Union can be 
declared ultra vires without the ECJ exercising its powers to interpret EU law before any national 
court proceeds to strike that action down. This position was practically affirmed in Gauweiler, when 
the FCC referred a matter to the ECJ for the first time. As indicated in Chapter 3, despite the FCC 
forwarding its own interpretation as to how the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions could be 
interpreted and readjusted so as not to be considered as acts ultra vires, the ECJ refused to follow 
the FCC’s directions and forwarding its own interpretation of the case. While the FCC was careful not 
to accept an inferior position, it did follow the ECJ’s ruling when deciding Honeywell.43  
1.3. Who is the final arbiter of constitutionality? An uneasy co-existence 
In a remarkable turn of events, the FCC for the first time ruled an ECJ judgment ultra vires. The 
case stems from an action against the ECB’s Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), a scheme 
positioned within the Expanded Asset Purchase Programme (EAPP) aimed at increasing money 
supply and support consumption in the Eurozone. Under the PSPP, Eurozone central banks may 
obtain “marketable debt securities issued by central governments of euro area Member States”,44 
sparking constitutional complaints against German institutions (the Bundestag and Bundesbank) for 
their omission to bring an action against the PSPP. The FCC referred the matter to the ECJ, which in 
turn delivered its judgment in the case of Weiss where it affirmed the legality of the ECB’s Public 
Sector Purchase Programme. However, the FCC found the ECJ’s judgment to be ultra vires on the 
ground that the judgment “fails to give consideration to the importance and scope of the principle of 
proportionality (Article 5(1) second sentence and Article 5(4) TEU), which also applies to the division 
of competences, and is no longer untenable from a methodological perspective given that it 
completely disregards the actual [economic policy] effects of the PSPP”.45 Essentially, the FCC held 
the degree of judicial review conducted by the ECJ subpar,46 as it failed to conduct “a 
 
41 Ibid, [61]. 
42 Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm, ECLI:EU:C:2005:709. 
43 BVerfg, Order of the Second Senate of 06 July 2010 – 2 BvR 2661/06 -, paras (1-116). 
44 BVerfg, Judgment of the Second Senate of 05 May 2020 – 2 BvR 859/15 -, paras (1-237), [10]. 
45 Ibid, [119]. 
46 Dimitrios Kyriazis, “The PSPP judgment of the German Constitutional Court: An abrupt pause to an intricate judicial 
tango”, European Law Blog, May 6th 2020, Accessed May 20th 2020, https://europeanlawblog.eu/2020/05/06/the-pspp-
judgment-of-the-german-constitutional-court-an-abrupt-pause-to-an-intricate-judicial-tango/  
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comprehensible review as to whether the ESCB and the ECB observe the limits of their monetary 
policy mandate”.47 In what will be one of the most discussed passages in European constitutional 
law in the coming years, the FCC concluded: 
“The interpretation of the ECB’s monetary policy mandate, as undertaken by the CJEU, 
encroaches upon the competences of the Member States for economic and fiscal policy 
matters…The ESCB is not authorised to pursue its own economic policy agenda. To the extent 
that the Weiss Judgment of the CJEU essentially affords the ECB the competence to pursue its 
own economic policy agenda by means of an asset purchase programme, and refrains from 
subjecting the ECB’s actions to an effective review as to conformity with the order of 
competences on the basis of the principle of proportionality, including a balancing of the 
economic and fiscal policy effects of the PSPP against its monetary policy objective, the 
Judgment of the CJEU exceeds the judicial mandate deriving from Art. 19(1) second sentence 
TEU). The CJEU thus acted ultra vires, which is why, in that respect, its Judgment has no 
binding force in Germany.”48 
The FCC’s latest judgment shows that the German Court is not a dog that barks but not bites. 
With this judgment it reiterates, in a powerful way, its long-term position that “if the Member States 
were to completely refrain from conducting any kind of ultra vires review, they would grant EU 
organs exclusive authority over the Treaties even in cases where the EU adopts a legal interpretation 
that would essentially amount to a treaty amendment or an expansion of its competences.”49 The 
current position, following this last exchange between the two courts, can be summarized as 
follows. The ECJ continues to assert its jurisdiction to interpret EU law and, therefore, have a first say 
in any action contesting an EU act as ultra vires. However, national constitutional courts continue to 
assert their own jurisdiction to strike down an act of the EU as ultra vires if that act exceeds the 
division of competences. As indicated by the PSPP case, in exceptional instances national 
constitutional courts may rule an ECJ decision and, by extension an act of the EU, ultra vires and 
invalidate that act within the jurisdiction of the Member State in question.  
Of course, the dialogue between the ECJ and FCC does not define the relationship between the 
ECJ and all national courts. However, the position described above is a good indication of a broader 
attitude toward constitutional review in the EU between the Union’s highest court and all other 
national constitutional courts. Indicatively, the ultra vires jurisprudence initiated by the FCC in its 
 
47 BVerfg, Judgment of the Second Senate of 05 May 2020 – 2 BvR 859/15 -, paras (1-237), [123]. 
48 Ibid, [163]. 
49 Ibid, [111].  
 151 
Maastricht judgment influenced constitutional courts in Spain,50 Poland,51 and the Czech Republic52, 
all of which expressed their intentions to act as an “ultima ratio against the violation by the Union 
institutions of the principle of conferral”.53 Despite these declarations, few constitutional courts 
attempted to strike down an act of the Union as ultra vires and challenge the increasing 
competences of the Union. A notable example was the Czech Constitutional Court’s ruling in the 
Slovak Pensions case that an ECJ decision was ultra vires.54 The case concerned a pension 
supplement provided by Slovakia for those who have contributed pension payments in 
Czechoslovakia – which was dissolved into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993. In a series of 
judgments and legislative revisions, the Czech Supreme Administrative Court put forward a question 
of Union law to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. In an attempt to salvage its own jurisdiction on the 
matter, the Czech Constitutional Court refused to follow the ECJ’s judgment55 and ruled it ultra vires. 
In its reasoning, the Czech Constitutional Court stated that EU law did not apply to a pension scheme 
concerning a dissolved state. In addition to legal reservations on the correctness of this judgment, it 
does not concern a “structural reallocation of competences between the Union and the Member 
States”.56 While this observation may be important when considering the breadth of ultra vires 
review, it also distinguishes the Slovak Pensions case from the discussion in this chapter. 
In conclusion, ultra vires review in the European Union remains divided between the CJEU and 
national constitutional courts. The CJEU continues to assert that: only the Court of Justice can 
interpret EU law and decided whether an act of an EU institution as contrary to EU law;57 preliminary 
rulings are binding on Member States;58 and the obligation of Member States to ensure that EU law 
takes full effect.59 However, national constitutional courts are not showing any willingness to cede 
their jurisdiction to review acts of the EU that could potentially increase the competences of the 
Union contrary to the principle of conferral. With both the CJEU and national constitutional courts 
claiming jurisdiction to conduct ultra vires review, constitutional guardianship in the EU continues to 
 
50 Camilo B. Schutte, "Spain Tribunal Constitucional on the European Constitution. Declaration of 13 December 2004”, 
European Constitutional Law Review 1, no. 2 (2005), 281-292. Ricardo Alonso García, "The Spanish Constitution and the 
European Constitution: The Script for a Virtual Collision and Other Observations on the Principle of Primacy”, German Law 
Journal 6, no. 6 (2005), 1001-1024. 
51 Krystyna Kowalik-Bańczyk, "Should we Polish it Up? the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Idea of Supremacy of EU 
Law”, German Law Journal 6, no. 10 (2005), 1355-1366. 
52 Petr Bříza, "The Czech Republic: The Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty Decision of 26 November 2008”, European 
Constitutional Law Review 5, no. 1 (2009), 143-164. 
53 Georgios Anagnostaras, "Activation of the Ultra Vires Review: The Slovak Pensions Judgment of the Czech Constitutional 
Court”, German Law Journal 14, no. 7 (2013), 959-973, 960. 
54 Czech CC, Judgment of 31 Jan, Pl. .S 5/12, Slovak Pensions XVII. The English translation is available at the Czech 
Constitutional Court’s website, www.usoud.cz/view/6342  
55 Case C-399/09, Landtová Marie Landtová v Česká správa socialního zabezpečení, ECLI:EU:C:2011:415. 
56 Ibid, 967. 
57 Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lu¨ beck-Ost, ECLI:EU:C:1987:452, [15], [17]. 
58 Case C-446/98, Fazenda Pública v Câmara Municipal do Porto, ECLI:EU:C:2000:691. [49]. 
59 Case C-212/04, Konstantinos Adeneler and Others v Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (ELOG), ECLI:EU:C:2006:443, [122]. 
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operate at both national and supranational level. While the parallel claims to jurisdiction authority 
may cause conflict between the courts, as in the PSPP judgment, the fact remains that the CJEU 
reserves jurisdiction to act as a constitutional court. How, then, did the CJEU respond to institutional 
development during the Eurozone crisis and how did it exercise its function as guardian of the 
constitutional arrangement between the EU and its Member States?  
2: The case of Mallis and Malli. Constitutionalising the scrutiny lacuna 
As the constitutional implications of the Eurozone crisis touch the core of Europe’s constitutional 
settlement, the exercise of constitutional review becomes of outmost relevance. With the CJEU 
continuing to assert its jurisdiction to rule on whether an act of the Union is ultra vires, the aim of 
this section is to consider the extent to which the Court exercised its function as a constitutional 
court. Mallis and Malli v Commission and ECB60 was the first set of cases to challenge the 
institutional channels through which the bail-in was achieved. The applicants, Cypriot nationals and 
depositors in “Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co. Ltd” (Laiki), brought an action for annulment of the 
Eurogroup statement issued on the 25th of March 2013 outlining the restructuring of the financial 
sector through a bail-in resolution. The case required the Court to consider the involvement of the 
European Commission, European Central Bank and Eurogroup in deciding a bail-in resolution for the 
Cypriot banking sector and whether the involvement of EU institutions constitutes an expansion of 
competences by the Union. 
Before examining the claims put forward in Mallis, it will be useful to explain two key 
characteristics of the contested statement: the policy measures it outlined and, the legal relations it 
established. As indicated in Chapter 4, the Eurogroup statement outlined a set of policy measures 
aiming at restructuring Cyprus’ financial sector. According to the Eurogroup’s statement, Laiki would 
be “resolved immediately with full contribution of equity shareholders, bond holders and uninsured 
depositors – based on a decision by the Central Bank of Cyprus, using the newly adopted Bank 
Resolution Framework”.61 The statement goes on to outline the methods through which Laiki’s 
resolution would be achieved. It would be split into a ‘good’ branch and a ‘bad’ branch, and all Laiki’s 
assets, healthy operations and the Emergency Liquidity Assistance loan (ELA) would be folded onto 
the Bank of Cyprus. Recapitalisation of the Bank of Cyprus would then be achieved by a 
“deposit/equity conversion of uninsured deposits with full contribution of equity shareholders and 
bond holders”.62 Effectively, this meant that all uninsured deposits (over one hundred thousand 
 
60 Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P, Konstantinos Mallis and Others v. Commission and 
European Central Bank, order of the General Court (Grand Chamber) of 16 October 2014, ECLI:EU:T:2014:909. 
61 Eurogroup Statement on Cyprus, March 25th 2013. Annex, point 1.  
62 Eurogroup Statement on Cyprus, March 25th 2013. Annex, point 5. 
 153 
euros) were subjected to a haircut, calculated later at 47.5%. Laiki’s bad branch was comprised of all 
“equity shareholders, bondholders and uninsured depositors”63 and was led to liquidation, meaning 
that all of the above-mentioned parties, whether investors or depositors, lost their property.  
Against this background, Cypriot depositors affected by the bail-in challenged the legality of the 
Eurogroup’s statement in actions brought directly to the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
According to Article 263 TFEU, under which the claim is brought, four classes of acts come under the 
review of the court: legislative acts; acts of the Council, the Commission, and the European Central 
Bank; acts of the European Parliament and the European Council intended to produce legal effects 
vis-a-vis third parties; and acts of bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal 
effects vis-a-vis third parties.64 Since the Eurogroup has no authority to issue legislative acts, it is not 
explicitly mentioned as one of the institutions whose acts can be the action of annulment and is not 
formally a body, office, or agency of the Union whose acts can produce legal effects vis-a-vis third 
parties. In order to overcome the barriers erected by the lack of formal legal connection between 
policy measures outlined by the Eurogroup and the formal transposition of these measures into law, 
the applicants in Mallis contested the Eurogroup statement, but directed the case against the 
Commission and ECB. The applicants put forward two main arguments under four heads of claim.65 
The first argument was that the measures outlined in the Eurogroup statement constituted a 
decision of either the European Commission or the European Central Bank or both that was 
communicated through the Eurogroup statement. The purpose of this argument was to impute the 
decision to two Union bodies with the capacity to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties and 
whose acts were reviewable by the CJEU. The applicants’ second argument attempted to expand the 
reading of Article 263 (2) s to include the Eurogroup statement within the definition of those ‘acts of 
bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.  
At the centre of the claims in Mallis is the proposition that since the EU exercised decision-
making authority in the area of fiscal policy, the Eurogroup statement constituted an act ultra vires 
 
63 Eurogroup Statement on Cyprus, March 25th 2013. Annex, point 1.  
64 Article 271 TFEU also allows acts of the Board of Governors and the Board of Directors of the European Investment Bank 
to be reviewed under certain circumstances. See also: Trevor C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law, Eighth 
edition. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 364. 
65 First, “annul the contested statement, ‘which took its final form through [Decree No 104] of the Governor of [CBC] as the 
representative and/or agent of the European System of Central Banks … whereby the “sale of certain operations” of [Laïki] 
was decided and which in essence constitutes a joint decision of not only the [ECB] but also of the … Commission’; Second, 
in the alternative, declare that the contested statement in essence constitutes ‘a joint decision of the [ECB] and/or of the … 
Commission’ irrespective of the shape or form in which it was dressed; Third, in the further alternative, annul the 
contested statement, ‘irrespective of the shape or form in which it was dressed’; Fourth, in the yet further alternative 
‘annul the joint decision of the [ECB] and/or the … Commission … adopted through Eurogroup, irrespective of the shape or 
form in which it was dressed’. 
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and was therefore an action capable of being annulled by the CJEU.66 The court was asked to 
consider whether, under Article 263 TFEU, the Eurogroup statement outlining policy measures 
including a depositor’s bail-in could come under judicial review on the grounds of lack of 
competence, misuse of powers, procedural infringements of an essential procedure or an 
infringement of the Treaties or any rule of law. In essence, the case called upon the Court to 
recognize the use of political power and economic pressure by Union institutions as creating legal 
effects for the purposes of Article 263 and to reinstate the constitutional division of competences 
between Union and MS. Acting as the ultimate constitutional authority, the CJEU had the 
opportunity to navigate the unmapped waters of decision making during the Eurozone crisis by 
examining the fundamental proposition presented by the case of Mallis and Malli. In this section of 
the chapter, I will consider how the CJEU, including the General Court, Advocate General and Court 
of Justice, discharged its constitutional authority to review acts ultra vires by analysing the Court’s 
response to the issues raised in Mallis.  
2.1. Ruling the case as inadmissible: The legal validation of a scrutiny lacuna 
As indicated above, for an act to be reviewable under Article 263, it should be authored by a 
Union institution or body capable of creating legal effects; only then would the Court have 
jurisdiction ratione materiae (regarding the subject matter). As the claims were brought against the 
Commission and ECB, the two responding parties refused authorship of the measures. In technical 
terms this translates to an objection on the basis of admissibility due to the wrongful identification 
of the defendants, impelling the court to turn its attention to that question before examining the 
case’s merits.67 In dealing with the question of admissibility, the Court considered the first argument 
put forward by the applicants: that the Eurogroup statement constituted a decision of either the 
European Commission or European Central Bank or both, communicated through the Eurogroup 
statement. In its assessment, the Court reviewed the Eurogroup’s status and its relationship with the 
ECB and Commission as described by the Treaties and stated the following. Found under Article 137 
TFEU, the Eurogroup was set up as an informal forum for the Ministers of the Eurozone countries to 
facilitate discussion at a ministerial level. Despite its institutional structure, the Treaties do not vest 
the Eurogroup with any decision-making powers. Consequently, the Court notes, the Eurogroup 
 
66 Shaelou and Karatzia, Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Cyprus Bail-in Litigation: A Commentary on Mallis and Ledra, 
249-268, 252. 
67 For the sake of clarity, it should be stated that this procedural issue (the identification of the defendant) is decided under 
the Rules of Procedure, not under Article 263(1). Article 114(1) of the Rules of Procedure allows the court to rule on the 
question of admissibility and on the matter under Article 114(4) prior to its final judgment. Even though the court, through 
the information contained in the application may impute the contested statement to a body responsible for its issuing, it is 
ultimately up to the claimant to endorse that decision. Should the applicant persist in the designation of the author, the 
court may rule the application inadmissible due to the wrongful identification of a defendant.  
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cannot reach any legally binding decisions. Article 1 of the Protocol on the Eurogroup clearly states 
that both the Commission and the ECB can sit in the meetings, outlining in this way the active role 
both institutions play in Eurogroup meetings. This, though, does not indicate any that the 
Commission or the ECB have delegated any powers. In addition, neither institution has any power of 
review capable of influencing the conclusions of the meetings in any way. Hence, the court 
concluded, the Eurogroup is not controlled by the Commission or the ECB nor does it act as their 
agent, reiterating in this way what is in the Treaties: that the Eurogroup is not an official decision-
making body of the Union, but an independent forum for discussion at a ministerial level. For these 
reasons the court refused to either attribute or impute the statement to the Commission or the ECB.  
Pursuing an additional route, the applicants sought to establish a link between the contested 
statement, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the Commission and the ECB. However, this 
line of argument required the Court to impute the Eurogroup statement to the ESM and, then to 
accept that the ESM is controlled by the Commission and ECB. Following the judgment of the ECJ in 
Pringle,68 which positioned the ESM outside the scope of EU law, it was impossible for the General 
Court to accept such an argument. As Chapter 3 indicated, one of the issues considered by the ECJ in 
Pringle was “whether Member States can allocate tasks to EU institutions outside the EU 
framework”.69 According to Pringle, Article 136(3) TFEU confirms that Member States have the 
power to establish a stability Mechanism without conferring “any new competence on the Union”,70 
despite the operation of Union institutions within the ESM’s structure. Unsurprisingly, the same 
rationale was followed in Mallis, as the Court found that the “duties conferred on the Commission 
and ECB within the ESM Treaty do not entail any power to make decisions of their own”, while any 
“activities pursued by those two institutions within the ESM Treaty solely commit the ESM”.71 As 
ESM loans commit only the ESM and debtor countries to the agreement between them, the Court 
refused to recognise any legal connection between ESM loan agreements and EU institutions. 
Consequently, no legal liability for measures adopted as a consequence of ESM conditionality can be 
extended to EU institutions. As a result, decisions concerning ESM loan conditionality adopted by the 
Troika during the Eurogroup could not be attributed to a body whose acts were reviewable, as the 
ESM is positioned outside the scope of EU law.  
 
68 Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756. 
69 Alicia Hinarejos, "The Role of Courts in the Wake of the Eurozone Crisis”, in Beyond the Crisis: The Governance of 
Europe's Economic, Political, and Legal Transformation, eds. Mark Dawson, Henrik Enderlein and Christian Joerges (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 112-136, 114. 
70 Pringle, at [73]. 
71 Mallis, [48].  
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It should be noted that the case fell at this point on the basis of mistaken designation of the 
defendant.72 However, the Court did consider the second argument in Mallis, “for the sake of 
completeness”.73 The applicants tried to expand the reading of Article 263 TFEU to include the 
Eurogroup within its definition and, by extension, within the bodies, offices or agencies of the Union 
intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. The Court, reiterating its position, noted that 
on examination of the Treaty provisions it is clear that as an informal body created solely as a forum 
for discussion, the Eurogroup has no legal personality and has not been vested with legislative 
powers by the Treaties. As a result, the Eurogroup cannot be regarded as an office, body or agency 
of the Union whose actions produce legal effects within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU.74 However, 
the Court continued examining whether the Eurogroup statement produced legal effects of such a 
kind as to affect the interests of third parties by bringing about a distinct change in their legal 
position.75  
In examining this issue, the Court considered the substance of the contested statement by 
examining its content and wording,76 concluding that the bail-in was neither part of the 
macroeconomic adjustment programme,77 nor a condition on which financial assistance by the ESM 
would be granted.78 Moreover, the Court noted that it is not within the powers of the Eurogroup to 
accept or reject assistance by the ESM.79 As a result, the Eurogroup statement was deemed to be of 
a purely informative nature; simply “informing the general public of the existence of certain policy 
agreements and expressing its opinion on the likelihood of the grant of the financial assistance 
facility by the ESM”80 and falling short of a legally binding measure thus escaping the ambit of 
judicial review.81 
Following the General Court’s order, the applicants brought an appeal before the ECJ82 
contesting the “interpretation or application of EU law by the General Court”.83 Despite the 
applicants’ having submitted three pleas, the ECJ considered all points of appeal together as they 
contribute toward the same claim, specifically, that “the General Court committed errors of law and 
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failed to fulfil its obligation to state reasons in holding that the statement at issue did not display, in 
their regard, the characteristics of an act whose annulment may be sought on the basis of Article 
263 TFEU.”84 Unfortunately, the ECJ did not go into any more depth than the General Court, 
restricting the ambit of the Court’s consideration to the examination of Treaty provisions. Due to its 
formalistic approach, a path set by the Advocate General’s opinion,85 the ECJ concluded that the 
General Court did not err in law, either in its decision not to impute the statement to one of the two 
responding institutions or in its decision not to include the Eurogroup within those bodies, offices or 
agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. Despite the 
constitutional significance of this case, the ECJ reiterated the General Court’s findings and restricted 
its own examination to a review of formal Treaty provisions.  
A more detailed discussion on some of the issues raised in the appeal may be found in the 
Advocate General’s Opinion.86 While this analysis was also formalistic in its examination of whether 
the Eurogroup statement could be imputed either to the Commission or to the ECB, 87 the Advocate 
General considered in slightly more detail the second question of whether the Eurogroup can be 
reviewed under Article 263. Interestingly, Advocate General Wathelet used the statement’s wording 
to position it within the broader context in which it was decided. For example, words such as 
“welcomed” and “took note” were taken to indicate the recording, on the part of the Eurogroup, of 
a political commitment by the government of Cyprus.88 In other words, these measures were taken 
to be unilateral declarations of intent in anticipation of a loan facility by the ESM, which the 
Eurogroup “expected” would be approved following these commitments.89 Despite accepting that 
the “sequence of events shows that the Eurogroup clearly carries considerable political weight and 
that the Member States feel bound by the agreements concluded within that forum”, the Advocate 
General insisted on the informative nature of the statement.90  
2.2. Legally validating the Eurogroup’s development and the constitutionalisation of a scrutiny lacuna 
The judgment in Mallis constitutionalised the scrutiny lacuna created by institutional 
development in the Eurozone crisis. As indicated in Chapters 3 and 4, intensified coordination 
between Union institutions and Member States on matters of economic and fiscal policy led to the 
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development of new institutional channels of economic decision-making. These novel channels of 
informal coordination let institutions such as the Eurogroup operate in a scrutiny lacuna – a space 
that has no formal procedures ensuring accountability or transparency and does not create any 
legally recognizable relationships, meaning that its actions are not recognized as actions capable of 
being the subject of annulment. Against this background, the Court of Justice was asked to consider 
whether institutional development amounts to the expansion of competences and, by extension, to 
acts ultra vires by EU institutions. By interpreting the contested Eurogroup statement as a unilateral 
declaration of intent by national governments in order to obtain financial assistance, the Court 
neither recognised the Eurogroup as the author of appropriate crisis response measures or as a 
decision-making body with the capacity to issue binding measures. This insulated space, a scrutiny 
lacuna, is given legal validation through the Court’s unwillingness to interfere; it is constitutionalised.  
For private litigants, actions that are de-facto authored by EU institutions cannot be challenged 
in EU courts but can still be challenged in national courts – a matter that will be discussed in more 
depth in the next chapter. At this point in our discussion, it is more important to examine the effects 
of Mallis from the perspective of EU public law to assess the case’s wider significance. Given the 
continuing claim of constitutional review by the ECJ, as outlined in the first section of this chapter, 
the CJEU acts as a constitutional court with authority to rule on whether an act of the Union is ultra 
vires. According to the CJEU’s position, its authority to interpret European law combined with the 
binding effect of preliminary rulings position the Court at a higher ground since no national court 
could strike down an act of the Union as ultra vires before the CJEU first accepting such an 
interpretation. The PSPP judgment may have shaken the waters of constitutional review in the EU 
but the CJEU continues to position itself as the sole interpreter of EU law and, therefore, as the 
relevant authority to determine, at last instance, questions of EU law and acts of the Union. By 
rejecting the case as inadmissible, the Court fails to bring the Eurogroup within its jurisdiction, 
indicating a self-imposed limit on the exercise of constitutional review. Effectively, the CJEU reduced 
the scope of judicial review by limiting the reach of its own jurisdiction, much like it did with Pringle. 
In that case, the Court accepted the positioning of a financial institution outside the remit of EU law 
despite the participation of EU institutions and Member States within the ESM. In Mallis, the Court 
restricted the ambit of judicial review by refusing to acknowledge the de-facto binding effects of 
Eurogroup decisions.  
As a result, institutional development during the Eurozone crisis remains hidden behind the 
formal description of Union institutions and the active involvement of the Eurogroup in deciding 
crisis-response measure remains legally unaccounted for. Most importantly, though, ultra vires 
review remains inert during a crucial period. The inadmissibility of claims indicates the light touch of 
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review as the CJEU contained its analysis and consideration of the issue to the formal prescriptions 
of the Treaties. By not engaging with the substance of the issue, albeit for the sake of 
completeness,91 the Court failed to exercise the very jurisdiction it reserved for itself. The wider 
significance of Mallis, from the perspective of European public law, is the gradual diminution of ultra 
vires review by CJEU.  
Interestingly, Mallis reveals another dimension to the relationship between neoliberalism and 
European constitutional law. Recalling from earlier discussions in Chapters 1 and 2, the relationship 
between neoliberalism and constitutional law was mostly identified through the use of 
constitutional instruments for constructing a legal framework within which neoliberal markets could 
develop. Critical theorists, such as Stephen Gill, highlight the role of constitutional law in the 
construction of institutional frameworks that separate and insulate of economic decision-making 
from political interference, while others, such as Wendy Brown, complement our understanding of 
the relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law by highlighting the role of judicial 
reason as complementary to neoliberal practices. Mallis is a clear example of how the exercise of 
judicial review complements neoliberal practices aimed at separating and insulating economic 
decision-making from political interference. The scrutiny lacuna may have been created through the 
Eurogroup’s development, but it was constitutionalised through the exercise of judicial review. By 
deciding not to intervene in the Eurogroup’s actions, the Court essentially validates the practices of 
all institutions involved (the European Commission, European Council, European Central Bank and 
the Eurogroup) and the Eurogroup’s subsequent development into a decision-making body during 
the crisis. In the case of the Eurozone crisis, the constitutionalisation of separation and insulation of 
economic decision-making from political interference does not occur through the structuring of 
institutions or market conditions through positive legal means but instead through the legal 
validation of an insulated space for decision-making as this was constructed by institutional 
practices.  
3: Assessing the wider implications of Mallis and Malli. How the Court’s approach 
reduces the scope of constitutional review.  
In the previous section, I argued that ruling the case inadmissible constitutionalised a scrutiny 
lacuna. As a consequence of the Court’s approach in Mallis, the previous section also argued that 
ultra vires review is severely undermined by the Court’s approach. However, this argument could be 
 
91 Procedurally, this is an important point as no appeal can be brought against issues considered for the sake of 
completeness. Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet delivered on 21 April 2016 in Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P, 
Konstantinos Mallis and Others v. Commission and European Central Bank. 
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rebutted by defending the Court’s formalist approach as the only viable legal alternative. In other 
words, one could argue that the CJEU did not limit the reach or effectiveness of ultra vires review 
because the result in Mallis was the only result it could have reached. In this section, I consider the 
limits of the Court’s jurisdiction when exercising constitutional review and assess whether an 
alternative judgment was within the Court’s interpretive and jurisdictional limits.  
3.1. Imputing the decision to an institution of the Union capable of reaching binding decisions. 
By insisting on imputing the statement to the responding parties, the applicants in Mallis argued 
that the Eurogroup was a configuration of either the Commission or the ECB or both. Imputing the 
decision to a Union institution is not foreign to the ECJ’s jurisprudence. Any entity created by 
European Union law to which power is delegated will be regarded as a body, office or agency of the 
Union. Consequently, any act arising from the entity to which power is delegated by a Union 
institution and creates legal effects can be reviewed by the Court.92 However, the issue in Mallis 
differs in an important respect. Despite the ECB and Commission operating within the Eurogroup, 
neither institution has delegated power to the Eurogroup. However, as Chapters 3 and 4 indicated, 
the forum increasingly resembles the organisational structure of an EU institution, with a president, 
established working procedures and a Working Group that provides technical assistance to the 
Eurogroup. As a result, the Eurogroup is transformed into an independent entity – an institution in 
its own right. Therefore, the issue of imputing such a decision to a different body of the European 
Union is a rather difficult task. It would require the Court to explain why these measures can be 
described as a decision of either the ECB or the Commission alone, irrespective of the operation of 
additional actors within the Eurogroup. This means not only indicating the involvement of the ECB 
and the Commission in the decision-making process, but also justifying why such an involvement is 
adequate to explain the final result of a complex and multi-layered negotiation among Cypriot 
authorities, members of the Eurozone, the IMF, the ECB and the Commission. The leap from 
establishing the involvement of an institution to imputing the decision to it is perhaps too great for a 
court to take.  
Another possible avenue for the applicants would be to draw a link between conditionality 
measures and Council decisions. However, this was also foreclosed by the CJEU. As indicated in 
Chapter 3, the Court “declined jurisdiction to review the legality of national measures taken 
pursuant to MoUs attached to assistance granted by the EFSF, EFSM, or otherwise, claiming the lack 
of a link to EU law.”93 In the case of ADEDY, for example, the Court did not find any direct concern 
 
92 Case 5/85, AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities. 
93 Ibid, 121. See, for example: Case T-541/10, Anotati Dioikisi Enoseon Dimosion Ypallilon (ADEDY) and Others v. Council, 
ECLI:EU:T:2012:626. 
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between excessive deficit Decisions addressed to Greece and the applicants, given the wide 
spectrum of discretion afforded to the Hellenic Republic by Council Decisions on how to reach 
macroeconomic objectives.94 Consequently, the Court concluded that Council decisions transposing 
conditionality into EU law could not be reviewed under Article 263 TFEU and directed applicants to 
national courts. 
A similar approach was adopted by Advocate General Wathelet when discussing Mallis. As the 
Advocate General pointed out, it is due to the operation of national measures that the applicants’ 
legal position is altered, not through the operation of EU law. Once again, the Court refuses to 
acknowledge the link between acts of the Union such as Council Decisions, and national measures. 
Despite this being a possible ground on which an alternative direction could have been adopted by 
the Court, it is not a viable alternative for the applicants in Mallis, because the case was brought 
against the Commission and ECB while the contested statement was issued by the Eurogroup. 
Nowhere in the application is the Council decision contested, leaving no room for considering an 
alternative direction down this path.  
3.2. Is the mistaken designation of the defendant conclusive? 
It should be reiterated that the mistaken designation of the defendant is precisely the point at 
which the case was declined. Because the Court could not impute the statement to one of the two 
defendants or any other body of the Union, the case was deemed inadmissible. However, as the 
Court admitted, the mistaken designation of a defendant does not necessarily “render the 
application as inadmissible if the application contains information which makes it possible to identify 
unambiguously the party against whom it is made, such as the designation of the contested measure 
and the body responsible for it.”95 Despite the fact that the applicants have brought an action 
against the Commission and ECB and not the Eurogroup, the application contained ample 
information for the Court to identify the Eurogroup as the party against whom the claim is brought. 
For the General Court, the fact that the contested statement was a Eurogroup statement was 
deemed enough to examine whether the statement created legal effects. It concluded, therefore, 
that it was within the Court’s powers to consider whether the claim could be directed against the 
Eurogroup - a question that was indeed considered by the General Court, if only for the sake of 
completeness.  
 
94 Case T-541/10, Anotati Dioikisi Enoseon Dimosion Ypallilon (ADEDY) and Others v. Council, ECLI:EU:T:2012:626, [70], [71], 
[84]. 
95 Mallis, [36].  
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The Advocate General, however, expressed a different opinion. Without stating that the General 
court erred in law, the Advocate General argued that Mallis “does not contain a ‘mistake’ of the kind 
referred to in the order in Commission v EIB (85/86, EU:C:1986:292) and in the judgment in Spain 
and Finland v Parliament and Council (C-184/02 and C-223/02, EU:C:2004:497), [since] Mallis and 
Others adhered to their decision to direct their actions against the Commission and the ECB and not 
against the Euro Group.”96 Instead of relying on these cases, the General Court could have relied on 
a different set of cases97 to reach a different conclusion and, therefore, not foreclosing the 
possibility of examining the second question raised by the case (whether the Eurogroup can be 
considered as a body, office, or agency of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-a-vis third 
parties). However, as the General Court did not err in law, the Advocate General’s comments only 
indicate another interpretive possibility. It was therefore possible for the General Court or the ECJ to 
continue with the examination of the case despite the mistaken designation of the defendant.  
3.3. Is the Eurogroup a ‘body, office or agency of the Union’? 
In examining whether the claim could be directed against the Eurogroup, the first question to 
consider is whether the Eurogroup can be regarded as a body, office or agency of the Union within 
the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 263. From the outset, the issue of the Eurogroup’s lack 
of legal personality creates a significant hurdle. The Treaty of Lisbon made Article 263 applicable to 
certain bodies, offices or agencies of the Union without legal personality (for example European 
Council or the Committee of the Regions).98 However, the Eurogroup has no legal personality and is 
not one of those institutions expressly included within the Article – a fact that, as the judgment in 
Mallis indicated, could be considered conclusive, therefore leaving the Eurogroup outside the ambit 
of judicial review.99 
Nevertheless, the Court’s approach to Article 263 indicated that it would exercise review of a 
measure adopted by an EU institution irrespective of its form as long as it produced legal effects. In 
the case of Les Verts,100 for example, a private party brought an action against the European 
Parliament. In that case, the green-ecologist party of France (Les Vert – The Greens), challenged 
direct political party funding by the Parliament in a case directed against the Parliament. However, 
the then Article 173 EEC (replaced by Article 230 EC and currently Article 263 TFEU) restricted the 
 
96 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet delivered on 21 April 2016 in Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P, 
Konstantinos Mallis and Others v. Commission and European Central Bank, [114]. 
97 Ibid, [115]; Joined cases C-181/91 and C-248/91, European Parliament v Council of the European Communities and 
Commission of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:C:1993:271. 
98 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet delivered on 21 April 2016 in Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P, 
Konstantinos Mallis and Others v. Commission and European Central Bank, [64]. 
99 Ibid, [67]. 
100 Case 294/83, Parti écologiste "Les Verts" v European Parliament, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166. 
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Court’s jurisdiction to hearing cases brought only against the Commission and the Council. The 
applicants claimed that the narrow scope of the Article amounted to a ‘denial of justice,’ as the acts 
of a Union institution could not be reviewed. The Court adopted a radical interpretation of the 
Treaty, expanding the ambit of judicial review to include acts of the European Parliament within the 
meaning of Article 173 EEC.101 The Court’s reasoning indicates that irrespective of any formal 
restrictions, “neither [the Community’s] Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the 
question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional 
charter, the Treaty…[that] established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed 
to permit the Court of Justice to review the legality of measures adopted by the institutions.” 102 
Similarly, the Court in ERTA103 indicated that even if an act does not fall within any of these 
categories it can be reviewed if it produces legal effect.  
The importance of ERTA should not be underestimated. Despite the fact that Article 173 EEC 
(now Article 263 TFEU) implied that an action for annulment was limited to those acts described 
under Article 189 EEC (now Article 288 TFEU) the Court extended its jurisdiction to cover all those 
“measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have 
legal effects”.104 By widening the ambit of Article 173 EEC, the Court ensured that no action 
springing from a Union institution could develop outside the Court’s control, irrespective of any 
difficulties in categorising such action.105 Subsequently and in the case of Sogelma106 the Court 
upheld this position by insisting that “any act of a Community body intended to produce legal effects 
vis-à-vis third parties must be open to judicial review”.107 From these cases, it is clear that the Court 
strove to ensured that the principle of judicial review was not undermined by a limited reading of 
the Treaties.  
It is surprising, then, that the General Court did not consider whether the claim could be 
directed against the Eurogroup other than for the sake of completeness.108 Even under the more 
restrictive Article 173 EEC, the Court’s approach in Les Verts indicated the possibility of expanding 
the scope of a Treaty provision to uphold the effective exercise of judicial review. In a case that with 
 
101 Laurent Pech, "The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union”, The Jean Monnet Working Paper 
Series, no. 04 (2009). http://ssrn.com/abstract=1463242, 13.  
102 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, [281]. 
103 Case 22-70, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:C:1971:32. 
104 Case 22-70, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:C:1971:32. See 
also, Anthony Arnull, "Judicial Review in the European Union”, in The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law, eds. 
Damian Chalmers and Anthony Arnull (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 376-402. 385-386.  
105 Ibid, 386.  
106 Case T-411/06, Sogelma v European Agency for Reconstruction (AER), ECLI:EU:T:2008:419. 
107 Ibid, [37].  
108 Doing so means that parts of the order considered for the sake of completeness cannot form the subject matter of an 
appeal.  
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a tremendous resemblance to Mallis, as neither the Parliament (in Les Verts) nor the Eurogroup (in 
Mallis) are stated in the Treaty as institutions whose acts can be reviewed, the Court could have 
drawn on its jurisprudence to uphold the effective exercise of judicial review. Had the Court adopted 
a purposive, instead of a strictly textual and formal, reading of the Article it could have examined 
whether the acts of the Eurogroup produce legal effects. Such an approach would not be 
incompatible with the intentions of the legislators either. The Court’s developing jurisprudence, as 
outlined above, was adopted and reflected in the “successive amendments to the first paragraph of 
the Article 230 EC”109 and its subsequent development and expansion into what is now Article 263 
TFEU. It is clear therefore that not only the CJEU but also the legislators intended to enhance judicial 
review and protection of the individual by including within the scope of judicial review all acts of the 
Union that produce legal effects, irrespective of their source.  
3.4. Did the Eurogroup statement produce legal effects?  
Since the acts emanating from the Eurogroup can, arguably, be reviewed so long as they 
produce legal effects, the next question to be considered is whether there is any legally binding 
force supporting the forum’s statements. Three easily identifiable categories of legally binding acts 
that can be adopted by Union institutions and are capable of review are regulations, directives and 
decisions.110 Following ERTA, a set of cases developed around what came to be known as ‘acts sui 
generis’. An act sui generis produces legal effects if it “alters the legal position of some person”, or to 
put it differently, if it produces a “change in somebody’s rights and obligations”,111 and when it alters 
the relationship between Union institutions (the internal management of the Communities) 112 or 
between the EU and Member States.113 Noordwijks Cement Accord114 offers an indicative example of 
how the Court refused to allow an act of the Commission to escape judicial review even if this act 
was not within an already defined reviewable act. In this case, a letter sent to cement companies 
informing them that they no longer enjoyed immunity from fines for breach of EC competition law 
was deemed by the Court as an act sui generis capable of being reviewed because it altered the 
position of the companies. The letter produced legal effects and thus was capable of being reviewed. 
Another indicative example is Lassalle v European Parliament.115 A notice of vacancy for a post in the 
European Parliament requiring the applicant to have perfect knowledge of Italian was deemed a 
 
109 Alan Dashwood et al, Wyatt and Dashwood's European Union Law, 6th ed. (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011), 158. 
110 Article 288 TFEU [249/189 EC].  
111 Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law, 351. 
112 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European UnionPearson Education, 2002), 114.  
113 Case 22-70, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:C:1971:32. 
114 Joined cases 8 to 11-66, Société anonyme Cimenteries C.B.R. Cementsbedrijven N.V. and others v Commission of the 
European Economic Community, ECLI:EU:C:1967:7. 
115 Case 15-63, Claude Lassalle v European Parliament, ECLI:EU:C:1964:9. 
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reviewable act as it “limit the choice which the administration will have eventually to make [which] 
has an adverse effect on servants who, like the applicant, do not fulfil one of the required 
conditions”.116 This reading indicates that an act can produce legal effects even if the action will be 
taken in the future, provided that the act under review is definite and unequivocal.117 In both of 
these cases, we observe the Court recognising the binding effect of an act despite the form in which 
it was dressed. The test, therefore, for acts sui generis intended to have legal effect is substantive, 
not formal.118 
The crucial question, therefore, is whether the Eurogroup’s statement can be considered as an 
act sui generis intended to produce legal effects. It must be reiterated that both the General Court 
and the Advocate General considered this question, albeit just for the sake of completeness. Despite 
examining the content of the statement, the General Court and Advocate General only conducted an 
‘internal’ examination of the statement, only considering its wording. By focusing on words such as 
“welcomed” or “took note”, the Court read the statement as a "purely informative"119 statement 
notifying the general public of policy decisions presented by the government of Cyprus to the 
Eurogroup. However, the Court omitted to comment on other parts of the statement that indicate 
the statement’s directive nature. The instructive nature of Eurogroup statements is revealed in the 
opening sentence that states that “the Eurogroup has reached an agreement with the Cypriot 
authorities on the key elements necessary for a future macroeconomic adjustment programme. This 
agreement is supported by all euro area Member States as well as the three institutions”. Here we 
see the Eurogroup presented as a body with decision-making capacities. Language like “urges the 
immediate implementation of the agreement between Cyprus and Greece on the Greek branches of 
the Cypriot banks” and “requests the Cypriot authorities and the Commission, in liaison with the 
ECB, and the IMF to finalise the MoU” are further indications of the statements’ directive nature. To 
determine whether the statement produces legal effects, both the content and the context in which 
it was decided must be reviewed.  
The first factor to be considered in addressing the question of legal effects within the context of 
the statement are the several points of contact between the Commission, ECB, ESM and Eurogroup 
as they are found in the ESM Treaty and Regulation No 472/2013.120 The ESM Treaty indicates 
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several points of contact between the Mechanism and EU institutions. A detailed assessment of 
Cyprus’ financial needs and the risk it posed to the Euro area as a whole was conducted by the 
Commission in liaison with the ECB, as presented in Chapter 4.121 Moreover, the ESM Board of 
Governors is comprised by the same Ministers of Finance who comprise the Eurogroup and, in some 
instances, the ECOFIN Council.122 As Repasi indicates, the identical composition of these institutions 
means that Eurogroup statements foreshadow “subsequent decisions adopted by the ESM”.123 
Furthermore, Regulation 472/2013 specifies that upon receipt of request for financial assistance, the 
Eurogroup Working Group’s president is informed and a discussion is held within the working group 
to examine the possibilities available through Union or euro-area financial instruments.124 
Subsequently, the Commission, ECB and where possible the IMF conduct a debt sustainability and 
financing needs assessment. When assistance is granted by the ESM or the EFSF, the Commission’s 
assessment is submitted to the Eurogroup.125 Importantly, the Member State, in agreement with the 
Commission ECB and IMF, is required to prepare and submit a macroeconomic adjustment 
programme for the Council to approve.126 Although the Eurogroup is not explicitly mentioned, final 
negotiations between Member States and the Commission regarding a macroeconomic adjustment 
programme occur within the Eurogroup.  
By considering these points of contact as part of the context within which the bail-in resolution 
was reached, it becomes clear that the involvement of Union institutions is less nuanced than the 
Court presented it as.127 As indicated in Chapters 3 and 4, the financial assessment carried out by the 
Commission and ECB, in combination with the Eurogroup Working Group technical support, shaped 
perceptions within the Eurogroup about the sustainability of any loan agreement to Cyprus and 
about the appropriate means of recapitalising the country’s failing banking sector. Chapter 4 in 
particular indicated how the Eurogroup became a body for deliberation and decision-making during 
the crisis to the extent that measures such as the bail-in resolution, can be attributed to the 
Eurogroup as a body in its own right. The context of the Eurogroup statement, therefore, indicates 
not only a high degree of coordination between Union institutions within the Eurogroup, but the 
binding effect of Eurogroup statements. 
 
121 Article 13, ESM Treaty. See adjustment programme for the results of this assessment.  
122 When ECOFIN Council adopts decisions under Article 139(4) TFEU or Article 136 TFEU or secondary law adopted in 
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Euro can vote. Rene Repasi, "Judicial Protection Against Austerity Measures in the Euro Area: Ledra and Mallis”, Common 
Market Law Review 54 (2017), 1123-1156, 1145. 
123 Ibid, 1145. 
124 Regulation 472/2013, Article 5.  
125 Regulation 472/2013, Article 6. 
126 Regulation 472/2013, Article 7. 
127 Karatzia, Cypriot Depositors before the Court of Justice of the European Union: Knocking on the Wrong Door?, 175-184, 
179.  
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The second factor to be considered in addressing the question of legal effects within the context 
of the statement is the chronology of the negotiation procedure. The first Eurogroup meeting was 
held on Saturday March 16.th The results of that meeting, summarised in the Eurogroup Statement 
on Cyprus dated March 16th,128 formed the basis for a bill (“Fee Upon Deposits in Credit Institutions 
Law of 2013”) outlining a horizontal bail-in applicable to the whole banking sector of Cyprus. 
However, the House of Representatives rejected this bill on March 19th. Two days later, on March 
21st the Governing Council of the ECB announced its decision to cut the ELA funding it provided to 
the Central Bank of Cyprus unless an EU/IMF programme was in place. On the same day, in light of 
the ECB’s mandate and in the absence of a working alternative, the House of Representatives 
approved the new restructuring framework as outlined in the “Resolution of Credit and Other 
Institutions Law of 2013”. By vesting the CBC with authority to decide on the liquidation terms of any 
credit institution, the bill transferred power to the executive branch of the government to negotiate 
an agreement with the Eurogroup in the upcoming meeting of March 25th that would inevitably 
include a bail-in resolution. Chapter 4, in particular, indicated the inevitability of a bail-in resolution 
as members of the House accepted that with the passing of the bill, a bail-in resolution would be 
agreed in the subsequent Eurogroup meeting. The handing down of a bail-in resolution by the 
Eurogroup is further supported by the wording of the statement. Indicatively, the statement 
indicates that “the Eurogroup has reached an agreement with the Cypriot authorities on the key 
elements necessary for a future macroeconomic adjustment programme. This agreement is 
supported by all euro area Member States as well as the three institutions.” As the statement 
continues to outline detailed policy measures that became binding law with the passing of Decrees 
by the Central Bank of Cyprus, the legally binding nature of Eurogroup statements is further 
highlighted. 
Could this, then, be the point where the court could exercise constitutional guardianship? It is 
clear that the question of legal relations cannot be settled so easily. Drawing on existing case-law as 
well as the context and content of the Eurogroup statement, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union had sufficient legal instruments and scope for argumentation to recognise the legal relations 
produced by Eurogroup statements during the crisis. Nominal cases such as Les Verts and ERTA and 
the development of Article 173 EC, 230 EC and 263 TFEU indicate the clear intention that no 
measure of a Union institution should go unreviewed if this produced legal effects. While it is true 
that the Eurogroup statement may not fit perfectly with the existing definition of an act sui generis 
as outlined above, it is impossible to find a ‘perfect fit’ for Eurogroup statements under existing case 
law. Hence, what is presented here is not a so much a clear category under which this statement 
 
128 Eurogroup Statement on Cyprus, March 16th 2013. 
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could come, but rather the existence of existing categories, including acts sui generis, flexible 
enough to include a non-categorizable act such as the Eurogroup statement and that could have 
been useful tools for legal argumentation for the effective exercise of judicial review.  
Looking at both the content and context of the statement indicates that the forum “clearly 
carries considerable political weight and that the Member States feel bound by the agreements 
concluded within that forum.”129 I would go a step further and argue that what we observe in 
Eurogroup statements is a clear intention to create legal relations between the Union (Eurogroup) 
and the Member State receiving financial assistance. As indicated in Chapters 3 and 4, as a legal 
instrument, conditionality locks in the commitments and policies outlined by Eurogroup statements 
while national measures are then employed to transpose these commitments into binding legal 
provisions. The case of Cyprus clearly indicates both how Eurogroup statements express the results 
of intergovernmental coordination between Eurozone members and European institutions and the 
binding effect of this result. The multiple points of contact between Eurogroup statements and 
European institutions indicate the participation of Union institutions in the Eurogroup statement, 
and the wider context of its implementation, indicated by the chronology of events, attests to the 
binding effect of the statement. As Eurogroup statements are later coupled with debt conditionality, 
the intention to create legal relations between policy decisions in Eurogroup statements and the 
member to which is addressed is evident. The ECJ could recognise Eurogroup statements as an act 
sui generis intended to produce legal effects if the statement was positioned within the context of 
crisis decision-making.  
The question of legal effects is, therefore, the key issue in this case and it is both surprising and 
unfortunate that the Court dismissed the case before reaching this point. Recognising the legal 
effects produced by the statement would overcome procedural difficulties concerning the mistaken 
designation of the defendant as well. According to Repasi, to “reinterpret the action from one 
directed against the Commission and the ECB aiming at annulling a Eurogroup statement as one 
directed against the Eurogroup aiming at annulling corresponding paragraphs in the Eurogroup 
statement, the MoU concluded between Cyprus and the ESM, Council Decision 2013/236 and 
Council Implementing Decision 2013/436, would certainly transgress the limits of the ‘mistaken 
designation’, as it would amount to an entire new action”.130 However, recognising the Eurogroup 
statement as producing legal effects in its own right would not amount to an entire new action, 
overcoming the procedural difficulties outlined above.  
 
129 Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet delivered on 21 April 2016 in Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P, 
Konstantinos Mallis and Others v. Commission and European Central Bank, [132]. Emphasis added.  
130 Repasi, Judicial Protection Against Austerity Measures in the Euro Area: Ledra and Mallis, 1123-1156, 1146. 
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Considering what Mallis could have been shows how the Court could have included the 
Eurogroup within its ambit of review. The existence of a legally possible and justifiable interpretation 
of EU law that would lead to the case being admissible further supports the argument that by 
striking the case as inadmissible, the ECJ not only constitutionalised a scrutiny lacuna but also 
limited the reach and effectiveness of ultra vires review at a time that it was most relevant. Through 
this act of self-limitation or self-negation, the ECJ undermines a constitutional function it explicitly 
reserved for itself with important implications for the broader field of European public law. As 
Michelle Everson very accurately pointed out, “each Euro-securing decision contains its own future 
hazards, undermining legality and the rule of European law, and also colluding in the foreclosure of 
constitutionality within Europe”.131 Despite the constitutional significance of Mallis, the Court’s 
approach constitutionalised a scrutiny lacuna within European constitutionalism and diminished the 
reach and scope of ultra vires review in the EU.  
Conclusion 
In the introduction to this chapter, I pointed out that Mallis could have been a case of nominal 
significance, as the ECJ had a first-class opportunity to review the development of institutions during 
the crisis and assess the Union’s expansion of competences. More importantly, the Court had the 
opportunity to exercise its function as a constitutional authority in the European Union. The 
constitutional significance of Mallis is not restricted to the strict boundaries of a claim brought by 
Cypriot depositors affected by the bail-in or the slightly broader boundaries of the constitutional 
implication of the Eurozone crisis. The constitutional importance of Mallis is significantly broader 
and reaches the very core of constitutional review.  
By approaching the case through the perspective of EU public law, the chapter focused on how 
the Court discharged its jurisdiction to exercise ultra vires review. Through a close reading of Mallis, 
the chapter indicated how the ECJ foreclosed any direct action for annulment of a Eurogroup 
statement, despite the active involvement of the forum in decision and policy making during the 
crisis. Letting ultra vires review remain inert during a period that is so relevant gives legal validation 
to the insulated space of de-facto decision-making created by the Eurogroup’s development. At the 
same time, we can see the legal validation of an ongoing alteration of Europe’s constitutional 
settlement and constitutional identity by the very institution entrusted with safeguarding Europe’s 
identity. The Court’s approach reveals the gradual withering of constitutional review in the European 
Union, given that its highest Court has refused to review the Union’s expansion of competences.  
 
131 Michelle Everson, "An Exercise in Legal Honesty: Rewriting the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht”, 
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Through Mallis, therefore, the chapter unveils a further dimension to the relationship between 
neoliberalism and constitutional law. By constitutionalising a scrutiny lacuna, judicial review 
operates to give legal validation to insulation. What we observe is a different operation of 
constitutional law from that identified in the thesis’ first chapter. The constitutionalisation of a 
scrutiny lacuna is not achieved through constitutional instruments like constitutional documents or 
provisions, but though the operation of constitutional review. It is the court’s acceptance of an 
institutional development that gives legal effect to a constitutional change, not the active 
restructuring of the state through constitutional instruments.  
However, a complete assessment of constitutional review during the crisis cannot be completed 
until the national dimension is also examined. In fact, a recurring point found in the Court’s 
commentary, both in Mallis and other relevant cases, is that the effectiveness of judicial review is 
sustained through national courts. In the next chapter of the thesis, therefore, I will consider 
whether national constitutional courts exercise ultra vires review effectively enough to remedy the 
scrutiny lacuna created by the ECJ.
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Chapter 6 – Constitutionalising the scrutiny lacuna at the national 
level: The case of Christodoulou 
This chapter considers the extent to which the Supreme Court of Cyprus exercised ultra vires 
review in light of institutional development during the crisis and whether its approach further 
constitutionalises the scrutiny lacuna. By conducting a close reading of cases brought before the 
Supreme Court of Cyprus by depositors affected by the bail-in, the chapter indicates how the Court 
foreclosed the possibility of constitutional review at the national level by ruling the case of 
Christodoulou1 as inadmissible despite the considerable scope for constitutional review afforded to 
it. Drawing on the legal analysis conducted throughout the chapter, I argue that the Court’s 
approach is an act of self-limitation and provides further legal validation to the scrutiny lacuna. As a 
result, the scope and effectiveness of constitutional review both in Cyprus and in the EU is further 
reduced.  
The chapter continues from the discussion initiated in Chapter 5. In that chapter, I indicated that 
due to the constitutional settlement between the EU and its Member States, any alteration in the 
division of competences subverts not only the European constitution but also the constitutions of 
Member States. This inevitable mirroring of constitutional change is why national courts insist on 
their inherent jurisdiction to exercise ultra vires review despite the ECJ’s jurisdiction to interpret EU 
law. As Chapter 5 indicated, national courts are obliged to forward any questions concerning the 
interpretation of EU law by way of preliminary ruling to the ECJ. As a result, the ECJ must review any 
act ultra vires of the Union prior to a national court striking it down as incompatible with the 
national constitution. While the positive obligation of national constitutional courts to refer matters 
to the ECJ may give a procedural advantage to the ECJ, the role of national courts should not be 
understated, as the recent PSPP judgment indicated. In this chapter I consider how the expansion of 
EU competences and consequent alteration in the constitutional identity of Cyprus was reviewed by 
the Supreme Court of Cyprus. The chapter also considers whether national courts, in this case the 
Supreme Court of Cyprus, contribute to the constitutionalisation of a scrutiny lacuna. 
The discussion presented in this chapter is positioned within a broader set of literature 
concerning the exercise of judicial review in countries receiving financial assistance. Crisis response 
measures in Greece and Portugal, for example, challenged constitutionally protected rights and 
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principles.2 Existing literature discusses these examples and indicates the variability of constitutional 
review.3 Drawing on the Greek example, Kombos indicates how cases challenging budget cuts and 
salary or pension reductions of the public sector,4 retrospective taxation,5 and alterations in 
employment conditions and terms,6 were found to not constitute any violation to constitutional 
provisions, principles or rights according to Greek Courts. While some lower courts and, 7 later some 
higher courts,8 did exercise a tougher stance especially with regards to workers’ rights, the overall 
approach identified by Kombos is one of light review based on the “existence of a higher social 
interest that justified the interference with constitutional rights”.9 Portuguese Courts, in contrast, 
gradually developed a “higher standard of review” despite an initial “willingness to review austerity 
measures by taking into account the seriousness of the situation”.10 As Fasone indicates,11 the 
Portuguese Supreme Court initially found crisis response measures constitutional,12 but gradually 
developed a firmer stance toward austerity measures and set limitations to political actions and 
struck down some measures as unconstitutional.13 Existing literature on the response of national 
courts to crisis response measures indicates a varying stance, ranging from the judicial validation of 
austerity measures to a firmer stance against the violation of constitutionally recognised rights. 
However, the above examples focus mainly on the impact of crisis response measures on 
fundamental or social rights. Similar to the division of cases before the CJEU between those cases 
challenging social or fundamental rights and those chases challenging the ways through which crisis 
response measures were decided, as outlined in Chapter 3, the above examples fall within the first 
of the two categories.  
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The example of Cyprus, in addition to being understudied, highlights a different aspect of the 
crisis. While discussions outlined above focus on the implementation of austerity measures and their 
impact on existing constitutional provisions or rights, case law before the Supreme Court of Cyprus 
considers the effects of institutional development at the supranational level on national 
constitutions of debtor, as opposed to creditor, countries. As such, the Cyprus example concerns 
ultra vires review, similar to the Gauwelier and Pringle jurisprudence whereby acts of the Union 
were challenged before national courts as unconstitutional. Despite similarities between Gauwelier 
Pringle and Christodoulou,14 the case before the Supreme Court of Cyprus focuses on the expansion 
of competences through the Eurogroup’s development as opposed to the ECB’s Outright Monetary 
Transaction program and the creation of the European Stability Mechanism respectively. For the 
purposes of this chapter it is sufficient to remind the reader of two key factors concerning economic 
decision-making during the crisis in Cyprus. Firstly, the bail-in was achieved through a number of 
Decrees issued by the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) under a new banking resolution framework. 
Secondly, despite these measures being passed through the national procedures and with the 
authority of national institutions, the Eurogroup was instrumental in deciding and shaping bail-in 
conditions. EU institutions, such as the ECB, Commission and the Eurogroup actively intervened in 
the decision-making process, raising fundamental concerns about the EU’s ability to exercise 
decision-making powers in areas reserved by Member States. Cases brought before the Supreme 
Court of Cyprus by depositors affected by the bail-in raise the question of an alteration in the 
constitutional settlement between the EU and Cyprus. Therefore, the cases before the Supreme 
Court of Cyprus may give rise to ultra vires review similar to cases decided by other constitutional 
courts in the European Union while differing significantly as the issues put forward concern an 
aspect of the Eurozone crisis that has gone un-addressed in other jurisdictions.  
In order to consider the exercise of constitutional review by the Supreme Court of Cyprus to the 
issues raised by depositors, the chapter proceeds in three sections. Section 1 lays out the historical 
development of the Cypriot constitution and the strong constitutional tradition developed since 
independence. The section highlights a conflicting approach between the strong constitutional 
tradition of Cyprus developed in the earlier years of the Republic and the absence of a reservation 
formula similar to the German Federal Constitutional Court aimed at ensuring the constitutional 
settlement between Cyprus and the EU. Section 2 continues to examine how the Supreme Court of 
Cyprus responded to the issues raised by depositors and the extent to the Court exercised ultra vires 
review. Through a close reading of the majority judgment in Christodoulou, the section indicates 
 
14 Myrto Christodoulou v. Central Bank of Cyprus (and other consolidated cases), Case No. 551/2013, Supreme Court 
Judgment of 07/06/2013. 
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how the Supreme Court engaged in an act of self-limitation by ruling the case inadmissible. Section 3 
takes a closed look at the minority opinion in order to highlight the existence of a legally feasible 
alternative approach to the majority judgment.  
Ultimately, the chapter indicates how the Supreme Court’s judgment provides legal validation to 
the scrutiny lacuna established by the Eurogroup’s development. Ultra vires review in the European 
Union is, therefore, further restricted through the absence of constitutional review at the national 
level. As a result, the insulation of economic decision-making from interference is further 
strengthened by the unwillingness of national constitutional courts to disrupt supranational 
economic coordination and contribute, in this way, to the resolution of constitutional conflict 
between neoliberalism and other constitutional objectives.  
1. The tradition of constitutional review in Cyprus prior to the Eurozone crisis: The 
gradual withering of a strong constitutional tradition  
Constitutional review in Cyprus is highly influenced by the historical conditions in which the 
constitution evolved. Drawing upon a series of events, from the creation of the constitution in 1960, 
to the doctrine of necessity in 1964 and the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004, this section will 
outline the basic characteristics of the Cyprus constitution and identify the fundamental rationale 
behind constitutional review as it was exercised prior to the Eurozone crisis. The section highlights 
two contradictory characteristics of constitutional review in Cyprus. First, the development of a 
constitutional tradition characterised by strong constitutional review and oriented toward the 
protection of division of powers and limited government whereby courts may invalidate legislation 
or administrative action for non-conformity to the constitution.15 Secondly, the acceptance of EU 
supremacy without any constitutional reservation formula through which to ensure that the 
relationship between EU and Cyprus remains on the constitutional basis on which it was initially 
granted, unlike other constitutional courts that reserve their jurisdiction to act as ultima ratio in 
cases of constitutional alterations affecting their respective states.  
1.1. Constitutional review and the strong constitutional tradition of Cyprus 
Adopted after a long colonial history and inter-community conflict, the Constitution of Cyprus 
reflects the island’s turbulent past. Otherwise known as the Zurich Constitution, the legal framework 
giving birth to the newly formed Republic of Cyprus was signed in Nicosia on the 16th of August 
 
15 Paul Craig, "Democracy”, in The Cambridge Companion to Comparative Constitutional Law, eds. Roger Masterman and 
Robert Schütze (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 201-229, 203. 
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1960 after a series of agreements16 between Greece, Turkey, the UK and representatives of the 
people of Cyprus in Zurich and London on the 11th and 19th of February 1959 respectively. The 
constitution establishes a Presidential Republic with a strict separation of powers. As Polyviou points 
out, a principal feature of the Cyprus Constitution is that of “communalism”; the retaining and 
recognizing of politically separate communities despite their inclusion under a unified governmental 
machine. This feat required the creation and retainment of “convoluted arrangements aimed mainly 
at satisfying the need to protect the rights and secure the participation of the Turkish Cypriot 
minority in the functions of the State”.17 Indicatively, the 1960 Constitution provides for the Greek 
community to elect a President and the Turkish community to elect a Vice-President. The division of 
authority between the two communities runs along the entirety of governmental arrangements 
even though there is a unitary state that is neither a federation nor a confederation.18 At the same 
time, the Constitution is characterised by a strong distinction between different branches of 
government. The principles of separation of powers and limited government run deep in 
constitutional provisions, setting defined limits to the exercise of power by the executive,19 
legislative20 and judicial branches of government.21 Given the strict division of powers between the 
two communities and different branches of state institutions, commentators describe the Cypriot 
constitutional settlement as a “one of the most complex and rigid in the world”.22 In a much quoted 
passage, De Smith writes: “One who was totally ignorant of the realities of the politics might well 
 
16 There are two levels to the London and Zurich agreements: the international and the internal. Three treaties (the Treaty 
of Establishment, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee) define the Republic’s international identity, while the 
Constitution served as the legal framework for internal governmental arrangements. See Polyvios G. Polyviou, Cyprus on 
the Edge: A Study in Constitutional Survival (Nicosia: Polyvios G. Polyviou, 2013), 7-8.  
17 Kypros Chrysostomides, The Republic of Cyprus: A Study in International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2000), 26.  
18 In addition to the Presidency arrangements, legislative power is divided between 35 Greek and 15 Turkish members of 
the House of Representatives; the Supreme Constitutional Court would be comprised of one Greek, one Turk, and one 
neutral judge; the High Court would be comprised by two Greeks one Turk and one neutral President, while the public 
service was to be composed of Greek and Turks in a ration of 7:3. See Polyviou, Cyprus on the Edge: A Study in 
Constitutional Survival, 10-13; Chrysostomides, The Republic of Cyprus: A Study in International Law 27-30; Polyvios G. 
Polyviou, Cyprus in Search of a Constitution: Constitutional Negotiations and Proposals, 1960-1975Zeno, 1976). 
19 Executive power is exercised by the President, Vice-President the Council of Ministers and executive governmental 
institutions such as the Advocate General and the Cyprus Central Bank. The President of the Republic, elected directly 
through universal suffrage, holds office for five years and acts as the Head of State. It is the responsibility of the President 
to appoint and remove ministers. While executives such as the President of the Supreme Court, the Advocate General and 
Vice Advocate General or the Governor of the CBC are directly appointed by the President, they cannot be removed 
because their institutions are independent. These provisions go to support the principle of limited government and prevent 
the executive branch from concentrating power to one person or office. See Articles 47- 51 of the Constitution.  
20 The House of Representatives holds monopoly of legislative power in all matters with the exception of those reserved for 
the Greek and Turkish Cypriot Communal Chambers (Article 61); a provision that remains valid though practically it is futile 
as the two Chambers are inactive due to the continuing segregation between the two communities. The only limitation on 
the legislative powers of the House of Representatives is the ability of both President and Vice-President to veto any 
decision of the House in matters of defence, security and foreign affairs (Article 51. Due to the absence of the Turkish 
Cypriot community, the office of the Vice-President remains unoccupied). In all other matters, veto power is restricted to 
returning a decision to the House of Representatives for reconsideration (Article 54). 
21 The judiciary is an independent state institution and responsible for exercising judicial power under Article 152 of the 
Constitution. 
22 Chrysostomides, The Republic of Cyprus: A Study in International Law, 26.  
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inquire whether the principles underlying the Constitution of Cyprus and the detailed rules that it 
embodies, has been conceived by a constitutionalist and a mathematician in a nightmarish 
dialogue”.23 The complex system of representation within state institutions did not hold-up for long.  
The retention of conflict-ridden identities led to “political and constitutional communal 
segregation”24 that procedural means could not bridge. Three years after its birth, the Republic of 
Cyprus experienced its first constitutional crisis. Instead of facilitating communalism, constitutional 
arrangements polarised the population, and their implementation was a constant source of 
conflict.25 After a series of disagreements springing from the implementation of constitutional 
arrangements such as the 7:3 ratio for the public service, the creation of an national army and the 
running of municipalities, the state came to a “virtual halt”.26 As a response, then President of the 
Republic, Archbishop Makarios, came up with a constitutional reform plan known as the thirteen 
points. An inevitable political disagreement erupted, with the Turkish Vice President, Dr. Kutchuk, 
resisting any changes. The political unrest sparked the first intercommunal conflict post-
independence, as the two communities clashed violently, and the first military intervention of a 
guarantor power, as Turkey bombed Greek Cypriot villages. A steady withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots 
from all governmental functions proceeded, leaving Greek Cypriots solely responsible for exercising 
governmental functions.  
Following the 1963 events, the Republic was at a crossroads. The State machinery came to an 
abrupt end after the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots from their governmental posts. The 
administration of justice became virtually impossible after the President of both the Supreme 
Constitutional Court and the High Court resigned, and Turkish Cypriot District Court judges refused 
to attend to their duties. As a result, the country’s two highest courts ceased functioning in August 
1963 and June 1964 respectively. Faced with the country’s imminent collapse, the President of the 
Republic consulted the Attorney-General, Criton Tornaritis, on whether the government could 
continue functioning. His response was decisive: “the life of the State and its Government could not 
be wrecked...no organs could abstain therefrom”.27 As a result, a new law, the Administration of 
Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law of 1964 (Law 33/64), was introduced by the Greek Cypriot 
members of the House of Representatives aiming at ending judicial inertia by creating a new 
Supreme Court. Importantly, Articles 146 and 152 establishing the two highest Courts had not been 
repealed by the Law. Instead, in order to allow the continuance of their jurisdiction, the House of 
 
23 Stanley A. de Smith, The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions (Stevens, 1964), 285.  
24 Glafcos Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition, Vol. 1 (Nicosia: Alitheia Publishing, 1989), 114.  
25 Polyviou, Cyprus on the Edge: A Study in Constitutional Survival 21-22.  
26 Ibid, 22.  
27 Ibid, 26.  
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Representatives established a new Court bearing their competences. By allowing the newly formed 
Supreme Court to hear questions of unconstitutionality28 instead of having to refer such matters to 
the Supreme Constitutional Court, the administration of justice was reignited and expedited for the 
benefit of both communities – at least according to Greek-Cypriots.29 Clearly, the unilateral decision 
to establish a new Supreme Court contravened the Constitution, and it was challenged in the case of 
Attorney General of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim.30 
Before the newly formed Supreme Court lay a difficult yet crucial question: could a law by the 
House of Representatives “be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, any of the provisions of the 
Constitution”?31 To this, and despite the rather obvious contradiction of the law to the letter of the 
Constitution, the Court uphold the validity and legality of Law 33/64. The judgment in Ibrahim rests 
on the public law doctrine of necessity.32 As the Court indicated in its judgment, “the doctrine of 
necessity in public law is in reality the acceptance of necessity as a source of authority for acting in a 
manner not regulated by law but required, in prevailing circumstances, by supreme public interest, 
for the salvation of the State and its people. In such cases ‘salus populi’ becomes ‘suprema lex’.”33 To 
this day, the Constitution of Cyprus rests upon the doctrine of necessity. Despite these historical 
developments, the constitution was never amended and continues to provide for offices such as the 
Vice-President that remain vacant after the events of 1963 and 1964. Thus after 1964 there is a 
discrepancy between constitutional provisions and their material application.34  
Unsurprisingly, the development of the Cypriot constitution through the doctrine of necessity 
has influenced judicial perceptions and rationale.35 In considering the constitutionality of 
 
28 Article 144 of the Constitution allows any party in the proceedings to raise the question of unconstitutionality.  
29 [1964] C.L.R 195 at 206. 
30 [1964] C.L.R 195. All references to, and quotations from, the case are direct and have not been translated as the original 
judgment was written in English. Interestingly, since English was the official language of the courts and the whole civil 
service, during the decolonisation period it took several years to make the transition into Greek and Turkish (the three 
official languages of the Republic of Cyprus are Greek, Turkish and English). It was not until 1989 that the Greek language 
(in the absence of Turkish Cypriots, Turkish was not employed in Court proceedings) became the official language for the 
legal system.  
31 [1964] C.L.R 195 at 218. 
32 Ibid, 28.  
33 [1964] C.L.R 195 at 231. 
34 Constantinos Kombos and Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou, "The Cypriot Constitution Under the Impact of EU Law: An 
Asymmetrical Formation”, in National Constitutions in European and Global Governance: Democracy, Rights, the Rule of 
Law, eds. Anneli Albi and Samo Bardutzky (The Hague: Asser Press, 2019), 1373-1432, 1374. 
35 Ibid, 1378. 
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legislation36 but also executive and administrative acts,37 the Supreme Court of Cyprus38 reviews 
cases of “conflict or contest of power or competence between state organs and questions of 
interpretation of the Constitution in cases of ambiguity”.39 As Kombos and Laulhé-Shaelou observe, 
the combination of strong constitutional principles such as separation of powers and limited 
government with the doctrine of necessity, gave rise to a constitutional tradition that gives primacy 
to “ensuring full effective judicial protection, the rule of law, separation of powers and the principle 
of legality.”40 Therefore, when exercising constitutional review, the Supreme Court maintains an 
approach that aims to sustain the division of powers and by extension the principle of limited 
government.  
1.2. EU accession and the absence of a reservation formula 
The tradition of strong constitutional review can be contrasted with the Court’s position vis-a-vis 
the supremacy of EU law. Following EU accession, amid suggestions to proceed with a significant 
constitutional amendment that would bring an end to the discrepancy between constitutional 
provisions and their material application following 1964, only Article 1 of the Constitution was 
amended to recognise the supremacy of EU law,41 stating that:  
“No provision of this Constitution shall be considered as invalidating laws enacted, acts done or 
measures adopted by the Republic necessitated by its obligations as a Member State of the European 
Union or shall prevent Regulations, Directives or other acts or binding measures of a legislative 
character adopted by the European Union or by the European Communities or by their institutions or 
by their competent bodies under the provisions of the treaties founding the European Communities 
or the European Union, from having legal effect in the Republic.”42 
 
36 Bills (Article 57) and the State Budget (Article 51, 138, 139) can be referred to the Supreme Court, by the President, prior 
to their passing into law. Existing legislation can be challenged through judicial proceedings. 
37 Articles 137-147. In exercising constitutional review, the SC should always act with reference to the principle of 
constitutional supremacy pursuant to Article 179. Article 179.2 states that “No law or decision of the House of 
Representatives or of any of the Communal Chambers and no act or decision of any organ, authority or person in the 
Republic exercising executive power or any administrative function shall in any way be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, 
any of the provisions of this Constitution.” See also, The Police v Andreas Georghiades (1983) 2 CLR 33. 
38 The Supreme Court (SC) of Cyprus is comprised of thirteen judges of whom one serves as the president. The Court has 
jurisdiction to act as an Appellate Court, hearing appeals from lower courts in civil and criminal cases and a Constitutional 
Court examining the compatibility of legal provisions with the constitution and also examining any conflict of power or 
interest between State authorities. In addition, the SC has exclusive jurisdiction to hear Elections Petitions, to issue 
Prerogative Writs (Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Certiorari, Quo Warranto and Prohibition), and in hearing admiralty cases. 
See also, Supreme Court of Cyprus, www.supremecourt.gov.cy, Accessed August 13th 2018. 
39 Pavlos Neophytou Kourtellos, "Constitutional Law”, in Introduction to Cyprus Law (Neocleous & Co. LLC), ed. Dennis 
Campbell (New York: Yorkhill Law Publishing, 2000), 15-44, 26. 
40 Kombos and Shaelou, The Cypriot Constitution Under the Impact of EU Law: An Asymmetrical Formation, 1373-1432, 
1378. 
41 Article 1A, Constitution of Cyprus, as amended by Law No. 127(I)/2006, Official Gazette No. 4090, 28.7.2006, Annex I(I), 
p. 1372. 
42 As translated in Ibid, 1381. 
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The fact that Article 1A “gave a more extensive scope and effect to the principle of primacy of EU 
law than what the jurisprudence of the ECJ required”,43 at least before the introduction of the Treaty 
of Lisbon,44 indicates that legislators wilfully accepted the principle of supremacy. As Kombos and 
Laulhé-Shaelou explain, unlike most of EU Member States, the “issue of the transfer or delegation of 
powers to the EU has not been at the epicentre of the debate in Cyprus because the prevailing view 
sees participation in the EU as a matter of political determination that was expressed through 
accession to the Union”.45 While such voluntary limitation of powers may be accept as an expression 
of sovereign will, it becomes problematic when the Courts fail to develop a reservation formula 
ensuring that no alterations are made to the initial limitation of powers. As indicated throughout this 
thesis, accession of EU law is based on the transfer of competences from them national to the 
supranational. However, this transfer is neither unlimited nor unconditional. As Chapter 3 indicated, 
several constitutional courts have continuously asserted their jurisdiction to police the constitutional 
boundaries between the EU and their respective States. We saw how the German Federal 
Constitutional Court developed a test to be applied before the Court could pronounce an act of the 
EU as ultra vires. In the case of Cyprus, however, the Supreme Court failed to express a reservation 
formula of this kind, or at least its intention to exercise constitutional review of an act ultra vires by 
the EU that effectively transgresses the initial transferring of powers by Cyprus to the Union. 
A disparity can therefore be observed between, on the one hand, a strong constitutional 
tradition aiming at ensuring the constitutional identity of Cyprus and, on the other hand, the 
absence of a reservation formula oriented towards protecting the constitutional identity of Cyprus 
and its constitutional relationship with the European Union from EU acts ultra vires. The chapter 
continues to consider how cases brought before the Supreme Court of Cyprus by depositors affected 
by the bail-in give rise to an inherently constitutional question: the extent to which the Supreme 
Court can exercise constitutional review to protect the constitutional identity of Cyprus. Addressing 
this question would require the Court to consider the relationship between EU law and national 
provisions and the extent to which an alteration of the constitutional settlement through ultra vires 
acts falls under its review.  
2. The bail-in of Cypriot depositors and constitutional review  
In the aftermath of the Eurogroup agreement and subsequent bail-in measures, depositors filed 
applications for interim orders and brought actions for administrative recourse against the decisions 
 
43 Ibid, 1383. Emphasis in original.  
44 Declaration 17, TFEU. 
45 Ibid, 1387. 
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of governmental bodies such as the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC), the Governor of the CBC, and the 
Minister of Finance. In a total of fifty-two applications, actions were brought against Decrees issued 
as Regulatory Administrative Acts46 by the Central Bank of Cyprus, an independent public authority, 
giving effect to a depositor’s bail-in. Chapters 4 and 5 offered a detailed outline of how national 
measures gave effect to the liquidation of Cyprus Popular Bank (Laiki) and the restructuring and 
recapitalisation the Bank of Cyprus (BoC). For this chapter, it suffices to outline how contested 
Decrees influence the legal rights of depositors. Acting under its capacity as Resolution Authority, 
pursuant to the Resolution of Credit and Other Institutions Laws of 2013 to 2014,47 the Central Bank 
of Cyprus initiated the sale of operations held by the Bank of Cyprus and Cyprus Popular Bank (Laiki) 
respectively.48 The sale of operations held by the two banks in Greece was effected through Decrees 
9649 for Laiki and 9750 for the BoC, while Decree 10551 set out the conditions for the sale of BoC 
operations in the UK. Decree 10452 concerned the sale of certain operations of Laiki and essentially 
achieved the bail-in of Laiki depositors. As indicated in Chapters 4 and 5, Laiki’s operations were split 
into a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ bank. All assets, including loans, were attached to the good bank. All 
liabilities, including deposits, were included in the bad bank. Decree 104 initiated the sale of 
operations considered ‘good,’ while the bad bank was led into liquidation. As a result, deposits 
remained with the bad bank, later to be led into liquidation without any assets through which to 
fulfil its obligations to depositors, hence achieving the bail-in. In the case of the Bank of Cyprus, a 
depositors’ bail-in was achieved through Decree 103,53 which provided for the conversion of debt 
(debt of the bank to depositors, therefore debt here denotes deposits) into shares.  
 
46 Published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Cyprus, 3rd Annex, Part I, Regulatory Administrative Acts Issues No: 
4640, 26 March 2013; 4645, 29 March 2013; 4646, 1 April 2013.  
47 Later repealed and replaced by the Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms Law of 2016 (22(I)/2016). 
48 Regulatory Administrative Act No. 93, EE, Annex III (I), No. 4638, 749–52, 25 Mar. 2013; Regulatory Administrative Act 
No. 94, EE, Annex III (I), No. 4639, 741, 25 Mar. 2013; 
49 Regulatory Administrative Act No. 96, EE, Annex III (I), No. 4640, 745-48, 26 Mar. 2013; 
50 Regulatory Administrative Act No. 97, EE, Annex III (I), No. 4640, 749–52, 26 Mar. 2013.  
51 Regulatory Administrative Act No. 105, EE, Annex III (I), No. 4646, 789–96, 1 Apr. 2013. 
52 Regulatory Administrative Act No. 104, EE, Annex III(I), No. 4645, 781–88, 29 Mar.2013.  
53 Regulatory Administrative Act No. 103, EE, Annex III (I), No. 4645, 769–80, 29 Mar.2013. 
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As a public law case and more specifically as an administrative law case,54 Myrto Christodoulou v. 
Central Bank of Cyprus (and other consolidated cases) Case No 551/201355 was an attempt to bring 
the actions of public authorities under the Administrative Court’s scrutiny (the Administrative Court 
was at the time a branch of the Supreme Court).56 The main issue raised was the alteration of the 
applicant’s legal rights as a result of Central Bank of Cyprus Decrees, thus challenging the legality of 
an administrative act (Decrees) issued by a public authority (Central Bank of Cyprus). In raising this 
issue, the case also required the Court to consider the authorship of measures, hence the 
relationship between contested Decrees and the Eurogroup.  
Sitting as a full bench (four out of thirteen judges excluded themselves due to a conflict of 
interest) the Court heard the case in its capacity as an Administrative Review Authority.57 Before 
considering the merits of the case, the Court first had to address a preliminary objection about the 
admissibility of all claims filled by responding parties. The Court examined the totality of claims put 
forward by addressing two main questions: first, whether the applicants had locus standi under 
Article 146 of the Constitution to file a recourse and, second, whether the Decrees challenged fall 
within the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 146 of the Constitution. Consequently, the 
judgment in Christodoulou deals exclusively with the issue of admissibility. 
 
54 As in every Common Law system, Cypriot law is divided into civil and public law. Public law is defined as the “totality of 
legal provisions regulating the organisation of the State and those authorities exercising public power, the relationship 
between public authorities or between public authorities and private individuals”. Interstate relationships also fall within 
the broader category of public law, but are distinguished from national provisions through the term international public 
law. Constitutional, administrative, criminal and European Union law are branches of public law. Civil law regulates all 
relationships between individuals and relationships established between State and private individuals when the state is not 
acting as a public authority. Despite its striking similarities to the common law tradition of England and Wales, aspects of 
the Cypriot legal system are also influenced by the Greek and French traditions. One example is administrative law. 
Administrative law regulates the organisation, function and oversight of public administration. An administrative act is 
defined by The General Principles of Administrative Justice Law of 1999 (Law 158(I) of 1999), as the expression of will by a 
public institution. In other words, it is the unilateral decision of what it is to be done in a given situation. For an act to be 
considered administrative, it must arise from a body or institution capable of issuing executive or administrative decisions. 
Acts or omissions of a public authority falling under the above definition can be the subject-matter of administrative 
recourse pursuant to Article 146 of the Cyprus constitution. Some categories of actions are exempted. For example, when 
actions taken by executive power that are deemed to be ‘acts of government’ cannot be the subject matter of 
administrative recourse. The same stands for actions taken by executive power but are considered to fall within the ambit 
of civil, not public, law. See Nicos Charalambous, Handbook of Administrative Law in Cyprus [Εγχειρίδιο Κυπριακού 
Διοικητικού Δικαίου], Third ed. (Nicosia: Livadiotis, 2016), 1. 
55 Myrto Christodoulou v. Central Bank of Cyprus (and other consolidated cases), Case No. 551/2013, Supreme Court 
Judgment of 07/06/2013. 
56 Up until the establishment of an Administrative Court in 2015 (Law 131 (I)/2015, Law on the Establishment and 
Operation of an Administrative Court) the SC also had jurisdiction to hear cases of administrative recourse against any 
decision, act or omission of any person, organ or authority exercising executive or administrative authority. While 
jurisdiction to hear cases of administrative recourse at a first instance was transferred to the Administrative Court, the SC 
retains its jurisdiction as a Revisional Court and can hear appeals on cases decided by the AC. 
57 Law 33/1964 
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2.1. Article 146 of the Constitution and its application 
As the application was brought pursuant to Article 146 of the Constitution, it is vital to examine 
the definition and application of the article before examining the Court’s judgment. Article 146.1 
gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to:  
“adjudicate finally on a recourse made to it on a complaint that a decision, an act or omission of any 
organ, authority or person, exercising any executive or administrative authority is contrary to any of 
the provisions of this Constitution or of any law or is made in excess or in abuse of powers vested in 
such organ or authority or person”.  
Article 146.2 sets out the requirements under which applicants have locus standi to bring an action 
under this article:  
“a recourse may be made by a person whose any existing legitimate interest, which he has either as 
a person or by virtue of being a member of a Community, is adversely and directly affected by such 
decision or act or omission.”  
It follows that in considering a claim under Article 146, the Court needs to first establish jurisdiction 
to examine the contested act by deciding whether the act falls within the ambit of Article 146.1 and, 
then whether the applicant has locus standi under Article 146.2.  
To establish whether a decision, an act or omission of any organ, authority or person, exercising 
executive or administrative authority falls within the scope of Article 146, the Courts consider 
whether the contested act is indeed an administrative act. To qualify as an administrative act, it 
must derive from an administrative authority, organ or person and be considered a “unilateral 
authoritative pronouncement”.58 Such an act is one in which the “will of the administrative organ 
concerned has been made known in a given matter, [it is] an act which is aimed at producing a legal 
situation concerning the citizen affected and which entails its execution by administrative means”.59 
For an act to fall within this definition it must be unilateral, authoritative, relate to the domain of 
public law, create direct legal effects and not be an act of the legislature or the judiciary.60 However, 
not all actions of a public authority may be considered to be a matter of public law. There are two 
categories of actions that a public authority can take: acts of authority (public law) and acts of 
management (private law). In deciding whether an administrative act is considered within the ambit 
of private or public law, the Courts in Cyprus have followed an empirical test that, essentially, 
 
58 Christos Melides, "Administrative Law”, in Introduction to Cyprus Law (Neocleous & Co. LLC), ed. Dennis Campbell (New 
York: Yorkhill Law Publishing, 2000), 45-72, 49.  
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid. 
 183 
considers the purpose for which an act is taken.61 When the act is related to achieving a purpose of 
that authority, the act is within public law. Public purpose is that for which the general public has an 
interest in the performance of an act or part of it. In sum, for an act to be reviewed by the Supreme 
Court, acting as an Administrative Court, under Article 146 it must not only derive from a public 
authority, but its content must also be of public nature. 
To establish whether the applicants have locus standi, the Court considers the effect of that act 
on the applicant. The Court considers whether the act creates any legal relations vis-à-vis the party 
forwarding a claim. At this point, the nature of the act becomes of great importance. Cypriot law 
recognises two kinds of administrative acts: regulatory and individual. A Regulatory Administrative 
Act sets rules, by and large legal rules, that have general application and significance. According to 
Law 158 (I) of 1999, this means “an act which sets rules of legislative nature, general and 
impersonal, which could be applied to cases indefinitely, whether existing or which may exist in the 
future”.62 Therefore, the content of a Regulatory Administrative Act is not limited to one instance or 
set of circumstances, but is general and can be applied in a number of situations. Importantly, 
Regulatory Administrative Acts cannot be challenged through an appeal, but their legality can be 
checked when a decision based on such an act is challenged. In contrast, an Individual 
Administrative Act creates subjective conditions, meaning that the legal rules created concern a 
particular group of people. For an act to be considered as Individual, it must be directed at an 
identifiable group of people connected through a common characteristic, whether their identity, 
enjoyment of a right, occupation, participation in an activity or other characteristics. An Individual 
Administrative Act is believed to be comprised of a totality of individual cases, which is why 
Individual Administrative Acts can be directly challenged by the person or group of people to whom 
it is addressed.63 Therefore, for a party to have locus standi under Article 146, the administrative act 
in question must either be an Individual Administrative Act directed to them or the party needs to 
be affected by a legal provision adopted as a consequence of a Regulatory Administrative Act.  
2.2. Majority Judgment: Constitutionalising the scrutiny lacuna at the national level 
In deciding whether the applicants have locus standi, the Court turned its attention to examining 
the nature of the Decrees (whether they constituted Regulatory or Individual Administrative Acts) 
and whether they directly affected the legal rights of applicants. The court first determined the 
 
61 Antoniou and others. v. Republic of Cyprus, (1984) 3 C.L.R. 623; Machlouzarides v. Republic of Cyprus, (1985) 3 C.L.R. 
2342; Paphos Nautical Club v. Cyprus Port Authority (Ναυτικός Όμιλος Πάφου ν. Αρχής Λιμένων), (1992) 1, Supreme Court 
Judgment no. 882. 
62 Ibid, 53.  
63 Papaphilippou ν. Republic of Cyprus, (1992), Supreme Court Judgment no. 62; Kanika Hotels a.o v. Sewerage Board of 
Limassol-Amathus, (1996) 3, Supreme Court Judgment no. 169. 
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nature of the contested Decrees, deciding that the contested Decrees determined the conditions 
under which the two banking institutions (Laiki and BoC) were restructured and, subsequently, 
either put into liquidation (Laiki) or recapitalised (BoC). Based on this assessment, the Court 
interpreted the Decrees as Regulatory Administrative Acts regulating the conditions under which 
financial institutions are either restructured and recapitalised or put into liquidation. By extension, 
the Court ruled that the Decrees in question affect only the legal rights of the said institutions and 
do not have any effect on the legal rights of the applicants. 
The second conclusion the Court reached concerned the position of the applicants (depositors) 
vis-à-vis the contested Decrees. According to the majority assessment, the relationship established 
between a bank (the debtor) and depositors (the creditor) is strictly contractual. Deposits are 
considered property of the bank and, in return, the financial institution has a contractual obligation 
to return the deposited amount. In giving up their actual property (paper money) to the bank and 
receiving credit in return, depositors have only a contractual relationship with the bank, just as a 
bank owns credit when it grants a loan.64 As the applicants’ legal rights are considered to be of 
contractual nature, the Court argued that the operation of contested Decrees does not alter their 
legal rights. Rather, it is the inability of the banking institutions to fulfil their obligations toward 
depositors that has altered their legal rights. Based on these two conclusions, the Court concluded 
that the applicants have no locus standi and, as a result, no actionable claim under Article 146.  
In a rather surprising manoeuvre, the Court continued its commentary on the issue of locus 
standi to argue that depositors may have a course of action in civil proceedings, but not under public 
law. Since it is the inability of banks to perform their contractual obligation to depositors, they may 
only bring a claim against the financial institution itself, not the State. Consequently, all claims 
arising from the bail-in should be directed against the financial institutions that were not able to 
fulfil their contractual obligations and treated by civil courts in civil claims. The Court also noted that 
a civil action may also be brought against the Republic and the Central Bank of Cyprus if depositors 
can prove that the effect of administrative acts went against the ‘no creditor worst off’ principle.65  
 
64 The Court distinguishes between the position of a someone depositing into an account and into a bank vault. In the 
latter instance, the depositor does not give up possession of her property but entrusts it to the bank for safekeeping. She is 
therefore entitled to the deposited property, whether bank notes or other items.  
65 This principle, incorporated into the new resolution framework, states that no creditor should be “in a worse financial 
condition due to the implementation of resolution measures In comparison to the position they would be should the said 
institution would go into liquidation” (Article 3(2)(d), Law 17(I)/2013.) This principle aims to ensure that no creditors is left 
worse off as a consequence of resolution measures. Should the creditors be better off in case of a normal liquidation 
process then that process should proceed. Matters raised in this case, including the issue of priority, securities (including 
ELA), the sale of operations and the unequal treatment between depositors could be relevant in considering whether the 
contractual relationship established between the bank and its depositors and creditors was affected by the Decrees and 
whether actions of the State put the depositors in a disadvantageous position.  
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Two criticisms can be made that highlight both the limitations of the majority judgment and the 
way Christodoulou furthers the scrutiny lacuna identified in the previous chapter. Firstly, Decrees 97, 
103, 104 and 105 set the conditions under which the banking institutions are restructured and led 
into either liquidation or recapitalisation and therefore affect the ability of the two institutions to 
fulfil their contractual obligations against depositors. In the case of Laiki, for example, it was the 
moving of deposits to the ‘bad’ branch of the Bank that precluded the bank from fulfilling its 
obligations to depositors. Similarly, Decree 103 explicitly states that the Bank of Cyprus be 
recapitalised through the conversion of deposits to shares. Moreover, the flash sale of operations of 
the institutions in Greece and the UK, the decision not to include deposits in those operations in the 
recapitalization process, along with claims about differential treatment among depositors of the 
same institutions in different countries66 affected the ability of Laiki and the BoC to fulfil their 
obligations to Cypriot depositors. These factors cannot be overlooked. In fact, the Court accepted 
that it is due to the operation of Decrees 97, 103, 104 and 105 that the banks could not fulfil their 
contractual obligations to depositors. Yet the majority opinion did not recognise any connection 
between the decrees and the rights of applicants. This means that the public purpose served by the 
decrees is not recognised; a point of critique that the minority opinions also made. By failing to 
recognise how the decrees influence the rights of applicants, the Court effectively insulated the 
decision for a bail-in from any claims arising in public law.  
The second point of critique relates to the possibility of civil claims as indicated by the Court. 
Despite accepting the above factors as relevant, the Court positioned their effect within the ambit of 
civil claims against the Republic or Central Bank of Cyprus as possible evidence for indicating a 
breach of the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle. One doctrinal caveat of this argument is that before 
Christodoulou the common position was that no application for damages for any loss caused by an 
administrative action could be filed before the District Court unless that action was firstly held 
invalid by the Administrative Court.67 Consequently, if the court does not invalidate the acts, 
applicants may not have a civil course of action.68 However, this is not the main issue I want to raise 
here. The Court’s troubling reasoning states that if a public law claim is successful, the only remedy 
 
66 Ian Jack and Tom Cassels, "Cyprus: An Analysis of the Impact of the Resolution Methodology on Stakeholders’ Claims 
Including the Emergency Liquidity Assistance”, Capital Markets Law Journal 8, no. 4 (2013), 450-463. 
67 Stavros Pavlou, Landmark Supreme Court judgment of 07.06.2013 in Christodoulou v. Central Bank of Cyprus a.o. Case No 




68 A civil law claim also has some practical limitations for the applicants, including a prolonged period of time they face 
before receiving a conclusive answer to their claims and the inability to forward claims to the European Court of Human 
Rights because all domestic legal avenues have not been exhausted – something that would have happened had the 
substance of Christodoulou been examined. 
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available to the applicants is damages equal to the harm they suffered as a consequence of the 
administrative action. To calculate this harm, the Court would have to assess the ‘no creditor worse 
off principle’, essentially considering whether the depositors would have been better off had the 
Government not intervened. Civil actions, the Court continued, would engage with the exact same 
question. In other words, even if the public law avenue were foreclosed, the applicants might go 
down the civil law action route and end up in the same position, that is to prove that the Decrees 
put them in a worse position. Since the applicants have access to a course of action that eventually 
would lead the Courts to consider this question, the Supreme Court equated the outcome of the 
recourse action before it with the result of a future civil law claim.  
The issue here is that equating the result of a public law action with the result of a civil law 
question disregards, diminishes one could say, the role of public law in a time of crisis. Apart from 
the fact that the existence of a civil law claim is immaterial as to whether a public law claim should 
be accepted or rejected, the Court completely disregarded the constitutional significance of the 
case. The Court’s approach forecloses any possibility for constitutional review of acts ultra vires by 
the EU that may alter the constitutional identity of a Member State. As Chapter 4 indicated, the bail-
in resolution was decided by the Eurogroup and transposed into law through national means that 
concealed via formalism a constitutional mutation for both the EU, as it extends its competences, 
and for Cyprus as it forms a direct challenge to the House of Representatives decision-making 
powers and sovereignty. Christodoulou could have been a significant opportunity to initiate a series 
of discussions concerning the constitutional relationship between the European Union and Cyprus, 
but it served the exact opposite purpose. In a remarkable act of self-negation, the Supreme Court 
limited its own jurisdiction to hear public law cases by finding that under Article 146 the applications 
could not be reviewed. It is noteworthy that the Court did not make use of public law concepts such 
as acts of government to strike down the application as inadmissible – an argument put forward by 
the Advocate General of the Republic. Had it done this, it would have accepted the applicability of 
public law and used legal concepts within that sphere that might have applied. Instead, the Court 
completely foreclosed the public law avenue. While this move may leave the applicants with a 
possible claim in civil courts, it is a severe blow on the exercise of constitutional review at times of 
crisis and it further reinforces the scrutiny lacuna.  
Just as the CJEU’s light touch of review constitutionalised the scrutiny lacuna initiated by 
institutional development; the Supreme Court of Cyprus’ approach provided legal validation to the 
same space for economic decision-making. What we observe in the scrutiny lacuna is not the 
absence of law – quite the contrary. It is through the operation of judicial review that the scrutiny 
lacuna, as an insulated space for informal economic decision-making, obtains legal validation. In 
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other words, by reviewing these processes and opting not to intervene, constitutional courts accept 
the existence of a scrutiny lacuna and constitutionalise it.  
3. Dissenting Judgments: A futile attempt to salvage constitutional review 
Contrary to the majority judgment, two minority opinions recognised the constitutional 
parameters of the case and attempt to retain a space for public law arguments. Judges 
Papadopoulou and Erotocritou issued dissenting opinions explaining the reasons they believe any 
preliminary objections should be rejected. Doctrinally, the point of distinction between the majority 
judgment and dissenting opinions lies in the categorisation of the contested Decrees as Individual 
Administrative Acts as opposed to Regulatory Administrative Acts. This leads to a different 
conclusion as the dissenting opinions recognise an alteration in the legal rights of applicants due to 
the operation of the contested Decrees and, thereby recognise their locus standi and jurisdiction of 
the Court to hear the application under Article 146. Conceptually, the minority opinion attempts to 
initiate those constitutional discussions foreclosed by the majority opinion. In this section, I draw 
upon the minority opinion to consider how this case could have been dealt with within the ambit of 
public law, initiating in this way vital conversations about any reservation formula concerning the 
supremacy of EU law and, by extension, the exercise of judicial review in instances where acts of the 
EU can be considered ultra vires. 
3.1. Doctrinal distinctions: Positioning the contested decrees within public law  
The first point of distinction between majority judgment and minority opinions, is on locus 
standi. In considering this issue, the first question the minority opinion addresses, is whether the 
Decrees serve a public purpose and are therefore within the scope of public law. A public purpose is 
considered to be that which the public has an interest in. In contrast, an act of private importance 
regulates the private rights of citizens. Since the collapse of two major financial institutions would 
have major knock-on effects on the economy of Cyprus, the Decrees issued by the CBC aimed not 
only to regulate the terms of liquidation for BoC and Laiki, but also to avoid a major economic 
breakdown. As Judge Erotocritou points out, while the Decrees regulate the conditions under which 
Laiki is lead into liquidation and the BoC is recapitalized, their broader and primary goal was to avoid 
the uncontrolled collapse of the financial sector. According to this assessment, the act is clearly one 
of public importance since the public is concerned with the outcome of the contested Decrees, 
leading the two judges to the conclusion that both Decree 103 and 104 fall within the ambit of 
public law.  
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The second point of distinction concerns the nature of contested Decrees and whether they 
should be considered as regulatory or individual administrative acts. As Judge Papadopoulou 
indicates, the fact that the Decrees have been issued as Regulatory Administrative Acts is of no 
importance. Their character is determined by their nature and not by how they are termed. 
Papadopoulou reaffirms the established position that an act is determined through an empirical 
inquiry, as outlined in Section 2.1 above, echoing the words of Bingham LJ who, in a different 
context, claimed that “a cat does not become a dog because the parties have agreed to call it a 
dog”.69 Judge Erotocriou follows a similar rationale. He argues that that the Decrees cannot be 
understood as Regulatory Administrative Acts due to the absence of generality in their nature and 
content. Instead of general (objective) provisions, the Decrees establish specific (subjective) rules 
applicable to an identifiable group of people who have in common their contractual relationship 
(debtor and creditor) with a particular financial institution. Similarly, the Decrees regulating the sale 
of Laiki’s operations can be treated as Individual Administrative Acts due to their specificity and lack 
of general application. As a result, the two judges conclude that the contested Decrees should be 
understood as Individual Administrative Acts, not Regulatory Administrative Acts. The nature and 
character of the Decrees means that they alter the rights of the depositors and therefore fall within 
the ambit of public law as well as within the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 146. 
Consequently, the minority opinions recognise the applicants’ legal standing to challenge the 
content of the Decrees.  
Since the minority opinion found legal standing, the two judges were forced to consider an issue 
not addressed by the majority decision. The Advocate General in his submission accepted the 
applicant’s legal standing but continued to argue that the Decrees should be understood as acts of 
government as they form part of a wider political agreement between the Eurogroup and the 
Government of Cyprus. Therefore, the next issue addressed by the dissenting opinions, was whether 
these Decrees can be termed as acts of government.  
As a special category of governmental action recognised by a number of other jurisdictions, 
including France, Greece, Germany and the U.S,70 the nature or purpose of acts of government is 
usually considered of such great importance for the State such that they cannot be reviewed by a 
Court. Examples include the declaration of war or a state of emergency, army conscription, matters 
 
69 AG Securities v Vaughan; Antoniades v Villiers [1988] UKHL 8, [1990] 1 AC 417, [1988] 3 All ER 1058. 
70 Different terminology may be employed depending on the jurisdiction where these acts are found. For example, in the 
French tradition, acts of government are translated directly to “actes du government”, while in Greek we find a number of 
different formulations such as governmental action, acts of government or political decision. In Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions 
terms such as act of state, state immunity or act of government are found. 
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of defence or wider international relations of a State.71 It is within the power of a Court to decide 
whether an act can be included within this category, however, as Judge Papadopoulou points out, 
the Courts are reluctant to expand the ambit of acts falling outside their reach. In their examination 
of whether Decrees 103 and 104 are acts of government, the two judges followed a similar approach 
and rejected the claims of the Advocate General. The judges justified their conclusion by highlighting 
the need for judicial review of all measures that can either limit the rights of individuals or alter the 
constitutional division of power. Judge Erotocritou argued that if administrative acts of this kind 
could escape judicial review on the grounds of exceptional circumstances that would allow them to 
be termed acts of government, “executives will be able to decide on those measures they believe to 
be suitable, irrespective of the fact that overnight their decisions will influence the economic 
organization of Member States”.72 The rule of law, division of powers, limited government and 
effective judicial review would be under threat should executive acts go unreviewed.  
3.2. Conceptual distinctions: Recognising the constitutional significance of Christodoulou  
The Court’s approach to the issue of acts of government reflects a broader, more conceptual, 
point of distinction between majority judgment and minority opinions. The constitutional 
significance of Christodoulou, like Mallis, lies in the challenge to the expansion of competences by 
EU institutions and the consequent disruption to the constitutional relationship between EU and its 
Member States – a fact that the minority opinions recognise. Judge Erotokritou highlighted what 
Chapters 3 and 4 argued in some detail: “recent events in Europe due to the financial crisis and the 
measures taken, give the impression that not only international law, but also the European and 
national law seems to be rewritten.”73 Given these changes, the judge argued, Christodoulou should 
be “approached as an issue exceeding the consensus that pre-existed” between the EU and Member 
States concerning the division of competences and resulting democratic settlement.74 Commenting 
on Judge Erotocritou’s opinion, Kombos and Laulhé-Shaelou rightly indicate that crisis response 
measures signify a “unilateral alteration of the equilibrium that relates to the transfer of sovereignty 
 
71 While the list of acts considered in the category of an ‘act of government’ is not exhaustive, it is generally accepted that 
they are limited. Cyprus case law recognizes acts of government are found in the Greek and French traditions. As the Court 
notes, this tendency is linked with the idea of the rule of law. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court, drawing upon the 
French doctrine of actes détachables, recognizes two aspects of an act of government. The first is that which is considered 
to be political in nature and cannot be reviewed. However, the doctrine of a ‘detachable act’ allows the Court to 
differentiate between the political character of an act and its effect or result. For example, while the act of declaring war 
cannot be reviewed, the Court can examine the result of war and consider, for instance, acts that may breach fundamental 
human rights. 
72 Myrto Christodoulou v. Central Bank of Cyprus (and other consolidated cases), Case No. 551/2013, Supreme Court 
Judgment of 07/06/2013. 
73 Myrto Christodoulou v. Central Bank of Cyprus (and other consolidated cases), Case No. 551/2013, Supreme Court 
Judgment of 07/06/2013. 
74 Kombos and Shaelou, The Cypriot Constitution Under the Impact of EU Law: An Asymmetrical Formation, 1373-1432, 
1420. 
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to the EU and to the corresponding application of the principle of primacy of EU law. This becomes 
especially relevant if the impact of the alteration is directed towards the protection of fundamental 
rights and has as a result a unilateral and substantial shift in competences”.75 When approached as 
an issue of transgressing existing constitutional barriers, Christodoulou gives rise to a series of 
constitutional issues, two of which Judge Erotocritou pointed out. First, that  
“in order to safeguard the rights of the parties arising from the TEU, to give the chance to 
national administrative courts to control not only the legality of the contested acts, but also the 
compatibility of the various national laws which led to the contested measures with EU law.”76  
Secondly, the need to scrutinise a further erosion of national sovereignty: 
“It seems that the further erosion of that national sovereignty and the parallel erosion of 
fundamental rights, often through informal procedures should at some stage be scrutinised. [If 
this does not happen] executives will be able to decide on those measures they believe to be 
suitable, irrespective of the fact that overnight their decisions will influence the economic 
organization of Member States”.77  
In the above passages, Judge Erotocritou stresses the need for effective constitutional review to 
preserve both the rights of parties but, also, the constitutional settlement and identity of the EU and 
its Member States. He elaborates on this point by arguing that  
“In the European legal system the primacy of the Rule of Law and legal protection, both of which 
are fundamental principles of the European Union and are inherently interwoven with 
democracy, cannot be eradicated with the creation of exemptions from judicial review every time 
a national government, for whatever reason, is found in distress and is forced to take decisions 
which breach basic human rights arising from the European legal order and the acquis 
communautaire.”78 
At this point we can also observe how the constitutional tradition of the Supreme Court, as outlined 
above, is repeated. Judge Erotocritou follows a simple yet forceful argument, that legal restrictions 
on the exercise of powers need to be respected and protected even in times of distress. As Kombos 
and Laulhé-Shaelou rightly indicate, Christodoulou is an “opportunity for starting to express the 
 
75 Ibid, 1421. 
76 Judge Erotocritou as translated in Ibid, 1420. 
77 Myrto Christodoulou v. Central Bank of Cyprus (and other consolidated cases), Case No. 551/2013, Supreme Court 
Judgment of 07/06/2013. 
78 Myrto Christodoulou v. Central Bank of Cyprus (and other consolidated cases), Case No. 551/2013, Supreme Court 
Judgment of 07/06/2013. 
 191 
inherent reservations as regards the principle of primacy of EU law and for starting to set the limits 
to the acceptance of the principle”.79  
Apart from the doctrinal differences, minority opinions bring into focus the case’s broader 
significance, not just for the constitutional implications the crisis may have on the constitution of 
Cyprus, but for European constitutionalism as well. By refusing to recognise the Court’s jurisdiction 
under Article 146 – a conclusion that, as the minority opinion indicates, could have been avoided – 
and equating the result of a public law action with the results of a civil law action, the decision 
significantly undermined scope and reach of public law. Unfortunately, the points that Judges 
Erotocritou and Papadopoulou used to justify allowing the application to proceed – protection of the 
rule of law, division of powers, limited government and effective judicial review – have been 
severely undermined by the majority judgment.  
Conclusion 
This chapter approached Christodoulou through the following question: could the Eurogroup’s 
development and consequent expansion of EU competences effectively alters the constitutional 
identity of Cyprus and therefore be reviewed by the Supreme Court? In response, the chapter 
indicated that when constitutional review was germane, the Supreme Court of Cyprus exercised a 
surprisingly light touch of review. By foreclosing the public law avenue, the Supreme Court failed to 
initiate conversations about the limits of EU law and delivered a significant blow to Cyprus’ tradition 
of constitutional review and scope of public law. From the perspective of EU public law and effective 
judicial review concerning cases of ultra vires acts, a broader problematic arises. While the ongoing 
claim of the ECJ to exercise constitutional review, outlined in the previous chapter, is indirectly 
accepted by Judge Erotocritou,80 the role of national courts should not be undermined. Not only do 
national courts present an alternative course of action for litigants, they continue to play an 
important role in constitutional adjudication by actively participating in a judicial dialogue with the 
ECJ. One can only speculate what the German Federal Constitutional Court’s position would be had 
Germany experienced a similar situation especially after its PSPP judgment, but surely the Court’s 
approach would not have been as light as the Cypriot Supreme Court. For as long as the EU is based 
on the principle of conferral, national courts continue to hold some degree of power in terms of 
constitutional guardianship.  
 
79 Ibid, 1421. 
80 Judge Erotocritou in Christodoulou stated that: “the further erosion of that national sovereignty and the parallel erosion 
of fundamental rights, often through informal procedures should at some stage be scrutinised by the CJEU, albeit indirectly 
through Article 267, as to whether it is compatible with the primary law of the European Union.”  
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As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, in countries such as Greece and Portugal 
constitutional review was light initially but gradually offered some constitutional protection to their 
nationals and challenged to a degree the withering of national sovereignty. In the case of Cyprus, 
however, constitutional review never recovered.81 As the public law avenue remains unavailable for 
Cypriot applicants, constitutional review in the EU is missing one of its two major components – for 
one of its Member States, at least. Drawing on this observation, the chapter indicated how a light 
touch of review further insulates the scrutiny lacuna. I did not present the detailed consideration of 
minority opinions to simply present a completed commentary on the case. On the contrary, 
considering the minority opinions lets us see how constitutional review could have been exercised in 
a way that addressed the core constitutional significance of this case. The existence of a legally 
feasible alternative approach is crucial for the claim put forward by this chapter: that constitutional 
review at the national level provides a further layer of insulation to the scrutiny lacuna 
constitutionalised by the CJEU. Once again, it is the exercise of constitutional review that gives legal 
validation to the scrutiny lacuna. By reviewing the actions of executive bodies and the constellation 
of crisis response practices but not interfering, constitutional courts legally validate the scrutiny 
lacuna and constitutionalise a space for informal decision-making that neither democratic bodies nor 
constitutional courts can interfere with.
 
81 In a series of subsequent cases, the precedence set in Christodoulou was affirmed as the Court re-stated its position that 
claims against Decrees issued during the crisis are beyond the scope of public law. See: Cyta Pension Fund and others V. 
Central Bank of Cyprus, Case no. 5728/13, Judgment of the Court of 3/11/2017; Eirini Karamanou V. Central Bank of Cyprus 
and others, Case no. 3393/2013, Judgment of the Court of 20/4/2018; Vias Demetriou and others V. Central Bank of Cyprus 
and others, Case no. 2014/2013, Judgment of the Court of 9/10/2014; FBME Bank Ltd V. the Republic of Cyprus, Case 
no.1658/201, Judgment of the Administrative Court of 25/02/2016. 
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Conclusion 
Constitutional moments often arise during crises. The Eurozone crisis is no exception. As I 
indicated throughout this thesis, in an effort to push through with those measures framed as 
necessary – such as austerity measures, increased budget supervision, financial assistance to 
Eurozone members, or in the case of Cyprus a bail-in resolution – European institutions and 
Eurozone members resorted to novel channels of economic coordination and decision-making that 
effectively overcame constitutional restrictions on possible courses of action. By focusing on how 
crisis response measures were decided and implemented, the thesis considered shifts in decision-
making, such as increased informality or the increasing exercise of economic governance by 
European institutions, and the constitutional implications thereof. Therefore, the main question 
addressed by the thesis was how the Eurozone crisis impacted European constitutional law and, 
more specifically, how has institutional development altered Europe’s constitutional settlement. In 
order to address these questions, the insulation of economic decision-making from political 
interference observed during the crisis was positioned and analysed within the political economy of 
European constitutionalism. For this reason, the thesis firstly considered the relationship between 
neoliberal political economic thought and European constitutionalism and continued to examine the 
Eurogroup’s development as well as judicial responses to institutional development through the 
case of Cyprus. By engaging with constitutional debates on the constitutional implications of the 
Eurozone crisis, the thesis contributes to discussions on institutional development more broadly and 
the Eurogroup more specifically; to discussions concerning the wider constitutional significance of 
the crisis; and to critical understandings of both the crisis and European constitutionalism. 
Contributions to the above discussions can be broken down to four main arguments.  
First, the thesis contributes to the study of institutional development during the crisis. By tracing 
the intensification of coordination between European institutions and Eurozone members, I showed 
how institutional development leads to intensified insulation of economic decision-making and the 
creation of a scrutiny lacuna. Through an in-depth study of the Eurogroup’s role in the Cypriot crisis, 
a more detailed examination in the operation of a scrutiny lacuna was achieved while also 
addressing two existing blind spots in the study of institutional development – the Eurogroup’s 
development and the case of Cyprus. By positioning institutional development within the ongoing 
relationship between neoliberalism and European constitutionalism, the thesis offers a critical take 
on existing constitutional debates and develops our understanding of the political economy of 
European constitutional law in the aftermath of the crisis.  
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Second, a further contribution to the study of institutional development was made by indicating 
how judicial responses to institutional development operate to provide legal validation to 
institutional practices adopted during the crisis, constitutionalising in this way a scrutiny lacuna. The 
case of Cyprus offered a first-class opportunity to study the institutional development of the 
Eurogroup, not only in terms of the forum’s involvement in devising a bail-in resolution but also in 
the ways through which the CJEU and Supreme Court of Cyprus dealt with claims brought before 
them by affected depositors. Through an in-depth study of the Eurogroup’s role in the Cypriot crisis 
and court responses to the forum’s involvement in devising a bail-in resolution, the thesis 
considered the exercise of ultra vires review by the CJEU and Supreme Court of Cyprus and identified 
how judicial review complements the relationship between neoliberalism and European 
constitutionalism.  
Third, the thesis develops theoretical considerations concerning the relationship between 
neoliberalism and constitutional law. By identifying the intersection between neoliberal political 
economic thought and constitutionalism beyond the state, I continued to consider in more detail the 
ways through which a scrutiny lacuna is constitutionalised during the crisis. Drawing on the 
contributions outlined above, I was able to identify how judicial review can complement institutional 
practices enhancing the insulation of economic decision-making from political interference, thus 
contribute towards expanding our understanding of the intersection between neoliberalism and 
constitutional law. 
Fourth, the thesis contributes to broader discussions on the constitutional implications of the 
Eurozone crisis by arguing that European constitutionalism is no longer a space for constitutional 
conflict. Although European constitutionalism reflected and consolidated neoliberal processes aimed 
at insulating economic decision-making from political interference, competing constitutional 
objectives also operated prior to the Eurozone crisis. However, the thesis identifies a clear neoliberal 
moment where the insulation of economic decision-making from political interference became a 
central constitutional objective and neutralised, in this way, constitutional conflict.  
1. Institutional development and the creation of a scrutiny lacuna 
One of the central aspects of crisis response measures examined by this thesis is institutional 
development. By examining the intensification of coordination between European institutions and 
Eurozone members during the crisis, the thesis argued that institutional development lead to the 
creation of a scrutiny lacuna whereby economic decision-making was insulated from political 
interference, mainly by the national level where most of the contestation to suggested measures 
was expressed. The thesis continued to examine a blind spot in the study of institutional 
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development, that of the Eurogroup, through the case of Cyprus. It was argued that the Eurogroup’s 
involvement in reaching a bail-in resolution was such that the decision could be attributed to the 
forum. Therefore, the Eurogroup is understood as a body that exceeded its informal status and 
developed into a body of economic decision-making. By retaining its informal working methods and 
the informal relationship between each actor within the Eurogroup, the thesis indicated how the 
forum could exercise economic policy while operating within a scrutiny lacuna. Therefore, by 
positioning the development of institutions within the broader relationship between neoliberalism 
and constitutional law, the thesis contributes to the study of institutional development in two ways. 
First, by highlighting how institutional development leads to the intensification of insulation of 
economic decision-making and the consequent creation of a scrutiny lacuna within European 
constitutionalism. Second, by considering the role of the Eurogroup in deciding crisis response 
measures and indicating the scrutiny lacuna within which economic decision-making occurred during 
the crisis.  
The scrutiny lacuna identified during the Eurozone crisis is the continuation, evolution one could 
say, of a long-standing relationship between constitutional law and neoliberalism in the European 
Union. In Chapter 1, I indicated that one of the central aspects of neoliberal political economic 
thought is to separate and insulate economic decision-making from political interference – what I 
identified as a scrutiny lacuna. The relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law, as 
identified in that chapter, is to create and sustain the insulation of economic decision-making from 
political interference; in other words, to create and sustain a scrutiny lacuna. Drawing on the 
relationship between neoliberalism and constitutionalism beyond the state as developed in Chapter 
1, the thesis proceeded to examine the relationship between neoliberalism and European 
constitutionalism prior to the Eurozone crisis. By studying theories of European constitutionalism, 
the EU’s institutional structure and ECJ decisions, Chapter 2 indicated how the separation and 
insulation of economic decision-making from political interference was achieved through 
constitutional law. However, constitutional law does not necessarily contribute to the practical 
realisation of neoliberalism; constitutional law has the capacity to act as a vehicle for articulating 
other, often conflicting, constitutional objectives. In each of the above examples, a further 
dimension to constitutional law was identified – that of articulating constitutional objectives that are 
often in competition to the objective of insulation. Drawing on this conflict, Chapter 2 argued that 
the neoliberal objective of creating and sustaining a scrutiny lacuna within which economic decision-
making can operate without any political interference did not materialise fully in the context of the 
European Union as competing objectives can be found in European constitutional law. Therefore, 
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the chapter suggests that European constitutionalism prior to the crisis was a space for 
constitutional conflict.  
However, during the Eurozone crisis the thesis observes a clear neoliberal political economic 
moment where economic decision-making is conducted within a scrutiny lacuna. Understood as an 
insulated space for economic deliberation and decision-making between executives, the scrutiny 
lacuna provides protection for European institutions and Eurozone members to devise and advance 
crisis response measures without abiding to any requirements for accountability, transparency or 
legitimacy and, more importantly, without any interference by democratic bodies or judicial review. 
The scrutiny lacuna was carved out to circumvent those constitutional limitations – whether the 
division of competences, the need for transparency and accountability, or restrictions in the nature 
of financial instruments – that precluded or slowed down the imposition of those measures framed 
as necessary by European institutions and Eurozone members. The creation and operation of this 
insulated space was traced in Chapters 3 and 4.  
Chapter 3 indicated that dominant framings of the economic conditions pertaining at the time, 
determined the position of European institutions and Eurozone members as to what policies were 
best suited in order to face the economic downturn created by the financial crisis. The dominant 
policy approach, as indicated in that chapter, was to implement a range of austerity measures in 
those countries in receipt of financial assistance. In order to achieve this policy approach, the thesis 
observed an intensification in coordination between European institutions and Eurozone members. 
The intensification of coordination between Eurozone members, European institutions and 
international creditors lead to an analogous intensification of insulation. Three examples of 
intensified coordination were studied in that chapter. Firstly, the creation of a permanent financial 
facility, the ESM, by Eurozone members increased the degree of coordination between those 
countries whose currency is the Euro and European institutions. Moreover, coordination was also 
intensified through debt conditionality as all members in receipt of financial assistance were 
pressured into abiding by very similar conditions. The redemptive formula of austerity was applied 
indiscriminately while a series of structural changes were also pushed through in an attempt to 
effect long-lasting changes in the economies of those countries. Hence, by shifting economic 
deliberation and decision-making to an international instrument, such as the ESM, and employing 
debt conditionality as a way to lock-in a specific policy approach, Eurozone members and European 
institutions were able to enhance coordination between them and, more importantly, insulate 
themselves from interference by majoritarian bodies in those members where policy or structural 
changes were pursued. Secondly, Chapter 3 also indicated how the new fiscal framework intensified 
existing processes of coordination by giving the Commission greater powers of review. The European 
 197 
Semester ensures that national budgets meet the targets set by the Commission and are firstly 
approved by European institutions before national bodies. In essence, no budget in economically 
distressed countries can be approved without the Commission firstly reviewing it. In this way 
coordination between European institutions, is enhanced in order to push through their own policy 
approach. Insulation is achieved through the legal framework put in place as majoritarian bodies are 
afforded far less flexibility than before. Lastly, the example of institutional development indicated 
how novel institutional practices, such as breakfast meetings, and configurations, such as the Troika, 
created new informal spaces for economic deliberation. Once again, coordination and insulation 
were intensified as various institutions and Eurozone members met in these informal formations. All 
three examples, therefore, indicate different ways through which a scrutiny lacuna is created during 
the crisis.  
Although the importance of the Cypriot crisis and its close link to institutional development have 
been recognised, a study into the constitutional implications of this example has not yet been 
conducted. For this reason, Chapter 4 continued to examine the development of the Eurogroup into 
a decision-making body of the Union and its operation within a scrutiny lacuna. Due to its informal 
nature, the Eurogroup had always acted as an insulated space without requirements for 
transparency or accountability. However, what was already an insulated space for economic 
coordination was transformed into a body of economic decision-making during the crisis. What 
changed during this period is the intensity of activity within the forum. Instead of cooperation in 
fiscal policy, we observe the coordination of fiscal policy measures. Instead of consensus, we see the 
employment of political pressure to inflict a crisis response approach or measure on Eurozone 
members in need. Moreover, the Eurogroup acted as a space where numerous EU institutions met 
and shaped and expressed a unified European position. During this process of intensification of 
coordination, the Eurogroup underwent an institutional development. No longer an informal forum 
for discussion, it is now an institution capable of reaching binding economic decisions at a Union 
level that Member States are obliged to follow. For this reason, Chapter 4 argues that the Eurogroup 
acted as a body of deliberation and decision-making, effectively deciding on how Cypriot banks 
would be recapitalised.  
This conclusion was further supported by closely reading parliamentary debates of two plenary 
sessions in the Cypriot House of Representatives. The chapter indicated that the Cypriot House of 
Representatives, was faced with the stark alternative of, on the one hand, facing state bankruptcy 
or, on the other hand, accepting the terms of an EU-financed loan. In the case of Cyprus, the bail-in 
resolution was a prerequisite to receiving financial assistance by the EU. Therefore, citizens affected 
by crisis response measures could not contest the measures implemented as the government was 
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politically and economically coerced into accepting the prescribed crisis response measures while 
the House of Representatives, also acting under economic duress, gave legal form to these 
measures. As the House had no influence on the content of crisis response measures, including the 
bail-in, the thesis concludes that national parliaments engage in a rubber-stamping process that 
simply gives legal form and formal legitimacy to Eurogroup Statements.  
Institutional development, as observed through intensified coordination and the case of Cyprus, 
indicates how European institutions and Eurozone members operated in a scrutiny lacuna. This has 
important consequences for the relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law in the 
European Union. As economic deliberation and decision-making continues to migrate from national 
institutions to supranational institutions, or in this case institutional configurations, indicates the 
continuing reconfiguration of legal authority on a sectoral and functional basis. Consequently, the 
insulation of economic decision-making is intensified due to the ongoing separation of economic 
decision-making from the national sphere where political contestation is most likely to occur. In 
addition, institutional development reveals a shift from legally recognisable routes such as the 
Community method toward legally ambiguous and informal formations such as the Eurogroup. 
Procedural rules established to ensure some form of democratic participation or at least 
transparency, are circumvented, allowing economic decision-making to be conducted in a highly 
insulated environment. As a result, we observe the strengthening of neoliberal political economic 
objectives, such as the creation of a scrutiny lacuna, within Europe’s institutional structure.  
2. Ultra vires review and the constitutionalisation of a scrutiny lacuna  
In addition to the creation of a scrutiny lacuna caused by intensified of coordination, the thesis 
provides a further contribution to constitutional discussions concerned with institutional 
development. By examining judicial responses to the Eurogroup’s development, I argued that judicial 
review operates to constitutionalise a scrutiny lacuna. As indicated in the section above, the 
proliferation of informal coordination between European institutions and Eurozone members 
insulates economic decision-making from political interference. The results of intensified 
coordination are not formally adopted as legally binding measures. Instead, policy decisions such as 
the bail-in are transposed into law by national authorities, disassociating in this way decision from 
implementation. While this process does create a ring-fence around supranational bodies engaged 
with economic decision-making and effectively insulates them from political interference at the 
national level, it does not necessarily protect bodies such as the Eurogroup from judicial review. 
Therefore, the thesis highlights how the exercise of judicial review legally affirms the creation of a 
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scrutiny lacuna, providing in this way a further contribution to the study of institutional 
development.  
As I argued in Chapters 5 and 6, both the CJEU and the Supreme Court of Cyprus could have 
exercised ultra vires review that would lift the veil of informality covering economic decision-making 
in the Eurogroup and recognise the binding legal effects of Eurogroup Statements. What the thesis 
identifies as a scrutiny lacuna translates into very specific constitutional implications for Europe’s 
constitutional arrangement; implications that form the basis for claims challenging institutional 
development more broadly, and Eurogroup Statements more specifically. By showcasing the 
decision-making capacities of the Eurogroup (Chapter 4) and the legal relations established between 
Eurogroup Statements and Member States towards which it is addressed (Chapter 5), I argued that 
the Eurogroup engaged actively in the process of decision-making. The results of intensified 
coordination, as outlined by Eurogroup statements, do not allow any discretion to national 
authorities; the final say does not remain with national parliaments or governments. Instead, the 
result of intensified coordination, such as the bail-in, is implemented by national authorities who act 
as a mechanism for legitimation and implementation of supranational decisions. Therefore, the most 
important implication of the Eurogroup’s development on Europe’s constitutional arrangement is 
the development or change in the competences of the EU and, inevitably, that of Member States as 
the increasing ability of EU institutions to influence fiscal policy constitutes an equal diminution of 
national sovereignty in these areas.1  
Another important parameter to constitutional change consequence of the scrutiny lacuna is the 
disturbance of Europe’s democratic settlement. As Chapter 2 of the thesis indicated, the democratic 
settlement upon which the Union is based depends on a very strict division of competences 
between the Member States and the Union. According to the theoretical premise behind this 
division, matters of technical importance not in need of democratic legitimacy could be transferred 
to the technocratic body of the European Communities and, later, the European Union. However, 
matters of social or fiscal policy, that are sensitive for each Member State and in need of democratic 
legitimation, were left in the sphere of competences of Member States. The Treaty of Maastricht 
may have distorted this balance, but fiscal policy remained a core competence of Member States 
due the democratic legitimacy needed for such decisions. As the core values upon which the EU is 
constructed are not justiciable but could, at best, inform and guide judicial interpretation,2 
 
1 Similar arguments can be made about the development of Union competences in the area of social policy; however, the 
thesis only examined the decision for a bail-in and did not extent to cover the decision and implementation of austerity 
measures.  
2 Laurent Pech, "‘A Union Founded on the Rule of Law’: Meaning and Reality of the Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle 
of EU Law”, European Constitutional Law Review 6, no. 03 (2010), 359-396. 
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commentators indicate that institutional development, and consequent change in competences, is 
the “obvious anchor in the court’s case law”3 for considering broader issues of constitutional 
identity.  
The constitutional implications of intensified coordination and consequent institutional 
development did not go unchallenged. In Chapter 3, I considered how the Court of Justice of the 
European Union responded to two sets of cases; those challenging conditionality measures under 
adjustment programs on the basis of their compatibility with fundamental or social rights, and those 
cases challenging the legality of crisis response measures against existing constitutional provisions 
and principles, including the division of competences and democratic settlement achieved between 
the EU and its Member States. Drawing on the Court’s approach to both sets of cases, the chapter 
identified an unwillingness to interfere with matters that are considered to be either political or 
technocratic – or simply too sensitive to the survival of the Eurozone. 4Despite the significant 
constitutional challenges raised by litigants, especially with regards to ultra vires claims, the Court 
appeared unwilling to distort the application of emergency measures or mechanisms. By engaging in 
what some commentators termed as “complex judicial acrobatics”,5 the CJEU overcame any 
constitutional objections raised by applicants and effectively foreclosed avenues for substantive 
judicial review of crisis response measure. For these reasons, I argued that the CJEU restricted its 
own jurisdiction to exercise constitutional review and sent constitutional questions back to national 
courts. I then continued to argue that by affirming the operation of decision-making outside its own 
jurisdiction, the CJEU constitutionalised the scrutiny lacuna established by institutional practices and 
developments.  
In Chapter 5, I continued to examine how the CJEU responded to the Eurogroup’s development. 
In the case of Mallis, the Court of Justice was asked to consider whether the Eurogroup’s 
development to a decision-making body amounted to the expansion of competences and whether 
Eurogroup statements outlining the bail-in resolution amounted to an act ultra vires. By interpreting 
the contested Eurogroup statement as a unilateral declaration of intent by national governments in 
order to obtain financial assistance, the Court neither recognised the Eurogroup as the author of 
crisis response measures or as a decision-making body with the capacity to issue binding measures. 
 
3 Mark Dawson and Floris Witte, "Constitutional Balance in the EU After the Euro-Crisis”, The Modern Law Review 76, no. 5 
(2013), 817-844., 828. 
4 Michelle Everson, "An Exercise in Legal Honesty: Rewriting the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht”, 
European Law Journal 21, no. 4 (2015), 474-499; Alicia Hinarejos, "The Role of Courts in the Wake of the Eurozone Crisis”, 
in Beyond the Crisis: The Governance of Europe's Economic, Political, and Legal Transformation, eds. Mark Dawson, Henrik 
Enderlein and Christian Joerges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 112-136. 
5 Takis Tridimas, "The ECJ and the National Courts: Dialogue, Cooperation and Instability”, in The Oxford Handbook of 
European Union Law, eds. Anthony Arnull and Damian Chalmers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 403-430., 424. 
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As a result, the Court of Justice of the European Union found no formal link between Eurogroup 
statements and the adoption of a bail-in resolution by the government of Cyprus, ruling Mallis as 
inadmissible on the basis of the mistaken designation of a defendant. What Chapter 5 shows is how 
informal institutional practices allow the CJEU to retain the operation of the Eurogroup behind the 
cloak of informality. By retaining the informal character of Eurogroup proceedings, European 
institutions and Eurozone members were able to reach formally non-binding decisions that were 
then adopted by national authorities. This disassociation of decisions from their implementation is 
what creates the scrutiny lacuna and by ruling the cases as inadmissible, the CJEU provided legal 
validation to this practice. As a result, the thesis identified how institutional development during the 
Eurozone crisis remains hidden behind the formal description of Union institutions and how the 
active involvement of the Eurogroup in deciding crisis-response measure remains legally 
unaccounted for.  
A parallel process is observed at the national level. Chapter 6 studied closely the Supreme Court 
of Cyprus decision in the case of Christodoulou. Similar to the CJEU, the Supreme Court of Cyprus 
ruled Christodoulou inadmissible, failing to engage with the substance of the case. Christodoulou 
could have been a significant opportunity to initiate a series of discussions concerning the 
constitutional relationship between the European Union and Cyprus, but it served the exact 
opposite purpose. In a remarkable act of self-negation, the Supreme Court limited its own 
jurisdiction to hear public law cases by finding that under Article 146 the applications could not be 
reviewed. As a result, the Supreme Court of Cyprus did not proceed to examine the possible 
withering of national sovereignty consequent from the Eurogroup’s development. Through the light 
touch of constitutional review, the scrutiny lacuna was given legal validation at the national level as 
well, reinforcing in this way the degree of insulation afforded to economic decision-making at the 
supranational level.  
In Chapters 5 and 6, I showed that both the CJEU and Supreme Court of Cyprus could have 
approached the matter through a different scope and bring the actions of the Eurogroup within their 
scope of review. By considering what Mallis and Christodoulou could have been, I stressed the fact 
that that the scrutiny lacuna may be created by informal decision-making but is validated through 
the exercise of light constitutional review. In other words, the judgments studied by the thesis 
indicate how constitutional review, as a legal instrument, operates to constitutionalise informal 
methods of economic coordination and decision-making at the supranational level. It may be that 
Europe’s constitution is guarded by both national and supranational courts, often creating tension 
between the two, but in the case of the Eurozone crisis, judicial review did not challenge any 
institutional developments. As ultra vires review remains effectively inert during a time that it is 
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most relevant, constitutional law ceases to perform its very core function: to contain the exercise of 
power within the boundaries and strictures of a defined constitutional agreement. Any definitive or 
absolute conclusions as to the effect of this observation would, perhaps, be premature. It is, 
however, difficult to not accept the absence of a judicial challenge to institutional development and 
the shifting competences observed during the crisis; and this contributes to a continuing withering 
of public law instruments, such as ultra vires review, in European constitutionalism. By restricting 
their own capacity to review the actions of institutions, both Courts delivered a blow to the reach, 
effectiveness and contemporary application of ultra vires review in the European Union with the 
effect of constitutionalising an insulated space for informal decision-making whereby European 
institutions can coordinate with Eurozone members without political or judicial interference. 
3. Judicial review and the relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law 
The political economy of constitutionalism provided a theoretical lens through which to examine 
the constitutional implications of institutional development during the crisis as well as the broader 
constitutional significance of this moment for European constitutionalism. Chapter 1 considered the 
relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law in the broader context of 
constitutionalism beyond the state. Drawing on existing accounts on the intellectual history of 
neoliberalism, I identified the separation and insulation of economic decision-making from political 
interference as central elements to neoliberal political economic thought. The commitment of 
neoliberal political economy to create and sustain a scrutiny lacuna within which economic decision-
making can unfold without irrational political interference was then traced in the development of 
economic globalisation and the parallel development of constitutionalism beyond the state. The 
intersection between neoliberalism and constitutional law was observed along four points of 
contact: the separation and insulation of economic decision-making by transferring economic 
deliberation beyond the state; the locking in of neoliberalism through constitutional provisions; and 
the insulation of economic decision-making through institutional structures; and the complementary 
role of judicial review in neoliberal processes establishing and sustaining a scrutiny lacuna. By 
observing how neoliberalism and constitutional law intersect during the crisis, the thesis contributes 
to theoretical discussions about this relationship. 
At the end of Chapter 1, I argued that Wendy Brown’s work is a call to extend the scope of 
critical inquiries on the intersection between neoliberalism and law beyond the structuring of 
markets and institutions, to consider how legal reason complements the practical realisation of 
neoliberal political economic thought through constitutional law. If we look at the first three aspects 
in the relationship between neoliberalism and constitutional law, it becomes clear that existing 
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discussions are mostly concerned with how constitutional law can create those institutional 
structures or legal frameworks to restructure the sate along the lines of neoliberal political economic 
thought. What the thesis observes during the Eurozone crisis is a different trend. Instead of 
establishing and maintaining a scrutiny lacuna through constitutional law, a shift to informal means 
of coordination allowed institutions to develop their means of coordination and operate in an 
insulated environment. However, this development should not be viewed as the absence of 
constitutional law; on the contrary, the scrutiny lacuna is constitutionalised through the operation of 
constitutional review, leading to the rather paradoxical position whereby constitutional courts 
accept the creation of a space for economic decision-making which the law cannot access in order to 
review its operation.  
What the thesis observes, therefore, is how judicial review can operate to complement 
neoliberal processes achieving the insulation of economic decision-making from political 
interference. It must be clarified that the operation of judicial review, as identified by the thesis, 
does not implement or interpret existing constitutional provisions. In other words, it is not 
complementary in the sense that courts sustain the constitutional framework established through 
legal provisions. Instead, the exercise of judicial review operates as a constitutional instrument in its 
own right and in a way that provides legal validation to institutional practices that insulate economic 
decision-making. By observing how judicial review constitutionalises a scrutiny lacuna, the thesis 
contributes towards expanding the scope of critical inquiry to beyond the structuring of markets or 
institutions.  
4. Is European constitutionalism still a space for conflict and contestation?  
The fourth, and final, argument put forward by the thesis contributes to broader discussions on 
the constitutional implications of the Eurozone crisis by arguing that European constitutionalism is 
no longer a space for constitutional conflict. Chapter 2 of the thesis presented European 
constitutionalism as a space for constitutional conflict. In each of the three sites of analysis 
considered (European constitutional theory; the institutional framework of the EU; and ECJ 
jurisprudence), the chapter identified how constitutional law reflected and consolidated neoliberal 
political economic thought. At the same time, a further dimension to constitutional law was 
identified – that of articulating constitutional objectives that are often in competition to the 
objective of insulation. Examples discussed include the development of social and political notions in 
the many constitutions of Europe (Section 1), the development of democratic processes of decision-
making (Section 2) and the development of social and fundamental rights by the ECJ (Section 3). 
These constitutional objectives operate parallel to the aim of separating politics from the economy 
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in a way that creates cracks in the insulation provided to economic decision-making. As conflict 
persisted throughout Europe’s constitution, the neoliberal political economic project was 
continuously challenged, whether through the operation of social objectives, the incorporation of 
political principles, such as accountability and transparency in the operation of Union institutions, or 
the empowerment of citizen participation. What Chapter 2 observes, is on one hand a political 
economy of constitutionalism that achieved the neoliberal objective of separating the economy 
from politics and insulating the market, and on the other hand, constitutional provisions that 
created cracks in the wall of insulation. By accepting that constitutional law does contribute to the 
realisation of neoliberal political economic thought but does not “necessarily do so”,6 the chapter 
recognises constitutional law as a vehicle for neoliberalisation but also as a vehicle for countering 
neoliberalism. Not falling back on a deterministic and instrumental understanding of constitutional 
law is what allows us to recognise the existence of contestation and insists on retaining the 
constitutional question open, at least for the period prior to the Eurozone crisis.  
However, the Eurozone crisis presents us with a clear neoliberal moment where institutions 
engaged with economic decision-making are afforded a significant degree of insulation to the extent 
that they operate within a scrutiny lacuna. As institutional development intensifies the degree of 
insulation afforded to economic decision-making and further separates politics from the economy, 
the possibility for competing constitutional objectives to take effect is minimised. The creation of a 
scrutiny lacuna allows European institutions and Eurozone members to push through only with 
those measures framed as necessary, silencing in this way all other considerations, whether social 
considerations, the articulation of alternative policy approaches or political considerations like 
greater democratic participation. It must be stressed that institutional development resulting in a 
scrutiny lacuna is not a ‘momentary lapse of reason’ on the part of EU institutions; it is not an 
exceptional circumstance where normality has been suspended in order to reinstate constitutional 
order. Instead, it is a moment where the already existing relationship between neoliberalism and 
European constitutional law is intensified. This transformed European constitutionalism from a 
space for constitutional conflict to an insulated space for economic decision-making. For Europe’s 
constitution, the significance of this moment is found in the disturbance of the constitutional 
settlement, including the democratic balance, division of competences and continuing significance 
of ultra vires review. For the political economy of European constitutionalism, the significance of this 
moment is located in the constitutionalisation of a scrutiny lacuna and the primacy of neoliberal 
 
6 Owen Parker, "Challenging ‘New Constitutionalism’ in the EU: French Resistance, ‘social Europe’ and ‘soft’ Governance”, 
New Political Economy 13, no. 4 (2008), 397-417, 399. 
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political economic objectives over other constitutional objectives operating within Europe’s 
constitution.  
I would like to end this thesis with a note on the direction of European critical legal scholarship. 
In the aftermath of events such as the Eurozone crisis, critical scholarship should call institutional 
and social power into question; uncover relations of power and domination; and explore the 
complex intersection of law with social, political or economic conditions. I locate my current work 
within these endeavours, as I attempted to highlight the complex interaction between neoliberalism 
and European constitutional law and decipher the role of judicial review in the validation of 
informal, insulated spaces for economic decision-making. Through this project, I contributed 
towards understanding the complementary role of judicial review to neoliberal processes creating 
scrutiny lacunas. Nonetheless, there is still much work to be done in order to understand the 
interplay between neoliberal rationality and constitutional discourse. Critical scholars have made 
steps to this direction,7 and it is off outmost importance to continue along this path in order to 
understand how neoliberalism affects the way we think, speak and practice constitutional law. 
However, it is not enough to uncover the complex interaction between constitutional law and social, 
political or economic conditions. Critical thought must also take steps to radically rethink and recast 
the direction of law and social relations. Even though I identified a clear neoliberal moment and 
primacy of neoliberal political economic thought over other objectives, constitutional law may still 
be thought of as a mechanism through which to contest and push back neoliberalism. The capacity 
of law, including constitutional law, to express and even consolidate objectives that contest the 
marketisation of social relations has not altered.8 It is for this reason that in the aftermath of the 
crisis, critical constitutional scholarship set out to rethink the project of integration and form a new 
basis for European constitutionalism.9 By thinking what the cases brought forward by Cypriot 
depositors could have been, I showed that constitutional law can be otherwise, taking another small 
step towards reinstating legal honesty.
 
7 Michelle Everson and Julia Eisner, The Making of a European Constitution: Judges and Lawyers Beyond Constitutive Power 
(Abingdon and New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007); Michelle Everson, "The Fault of (European) Law in (Political and 
Social) Economic Crisis”, Law and Critique 24, no. 2 (2013), 107-129. 
8 Ben Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick’s work is particularly helpful for thinking of law in this way. See: Ben Golder and Peter 
Fitzpatrick, Foucault's Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). 
9 Indicatively, see: Everson, An Exercise in Legal Honesty: Rewriting the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
474-499; Michelle Everson, "Finding our Way Back to Europe?" in Polity and Crisis: Reflections on the European Odyssey, 
eds. Massimo Fichera, Sakari Hänninen and Kaarlo Tuori (Ashgate, 2014), 91-108; Michelle Everson and Christian Joerges, 
"Reconfiguring the Politics–Law Relationship in the Integration Project through Conflicts–Law Constitutionalism”, European 
Law Journal 18, no. 5 (2012), 644-666; Mark Dawson, Henrik Enderlein and Christian Joerges, eds., Beyond the Crisis: The 
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